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ABSTRACT
Enlightened Defense: The National Security Policy of Thomas Jefferson
LTC(R) Robert R. Leonhard

The triumph of Thomas Jefferson and the Democratic Republicans in
1800 left the deposed Federalists aghast at what this Francophile, antinationalist,
reputedly atheistic president might do to the country. Despite Jefferson’s
impulses toward pacifism, national isolation, the diffusion of political power, and
healing faction, the eight years of his two administrations were destined to be as
calm as a hurricane. The turbulent situation in Europe had already made a
mockery of Washington’s advice to avoid entanglement, and during Jefferson’s
presidency, the dangers only increased.
Jefferson’s ideas on national security were diametrically opposed to those
of Alexander Hamilton and the Federalists. Jefferson was an advocate of states’
rights, but Hamilton of centralized power. Jefferson wanted to avoid debt, while
Hamilton thought debt was a positive and unifying factor. Jefferson believed in
maintaining a minuscule standing military in favor of state militias, whereas
Hamilton called for a huge, regular army and a sea-going navy. The debate was
not an academic one: the young nation was literally surrounded by enemies and
potential enemies. Spain had a stranglehold on New Orleans, and the slightest
pressure there could (and sometimes did) throttle the entire economy of the
American west. Britain, with a firm hold on Canada and total domination of the
high seas, bullied the Americans with seemingly unfair commercial practices.
When Napoleon began to restrict trade as well, Jefferson and his countrymen
faced economic calamity and the threat of wars they would not likely win.
Jefferson introduced legislation that altered the structure of both the army
and navy, established the military academy at West Point, and changed the
political constitution of the defense establishment. He fought a long, frustrating
war with Tripoli, fended off insults from Europe, and struggled to formulate an
Indian policy that would protect native Americans while dealing with the reality
and inevitability of white domination of the continent. Jefferson also pulled off the
most spectacular land deal in history: the Louisiana Purchase—an accretion that
doubled the size of the young republic and sowed the seeds for the eventual
triumph of Jefferson’s strategic calculations.
By the end of his second term, however, Jefferson’s initial successes had
been eclipsed by the disappointing results of his embargo against Great Britain.
Historians roundly condemn the embargo as both ineffective and a direct
violation of Jefferson’s own ideas on governance. His handling of the military
has also been criticized, particularly in the light of America’s martial mediocrity in
the War of 1812—shortfalls that can be partially attributed to Jefferson’s underfunding of the army and navy.
This essay looks critically at the military and national security policies of
Thomas Jefferson with a view to penetrating beyond traditional interpretations.
By examining closely the political, economic, social, and military context of the
times—especially the delicate domestic situation—it is possible to see
Jefferson’s policies with a new appreciation of how enlightened and ultimately
effective they really were.
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INTRODUCTION
That 'Whimsical Phylosophic President'

On 4 March, 1801 Chief Justice John Marshall administered the oath of
office to newly elected President Thomas Jefferson, inaugurating not only a new
administration, but a new era for the young republic. Jefferson rose to the
presidency during a time when the United States was arguably at its most
vulnerable, from both foreign and domestic threats. The election of 1800 left a
wake of bitterness, hatred, and even fear of a bloody purge.1 Out-going
President John Adams had ungraciously fled the city at 4:00 AM that morning.
Across the Atlantic Ocean, the French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon
threatened to spill violence onto American shores and the possibility of war
between Britain and France posed a constant threat to American commerce.
In this context, Thomas Jefferson took the reins of government. There
was justification for the skepticism with which many viewed his rise to power. He
was not an experienced military man. His affection for France was suspicious.
His Republican views on governing were diametrically opposed to the party that
alone had governed the republic since 1789. Could Thomas Jefferson function
effectively as both President and Commander-in-Chief? The answer to that
question was a matter of vital importance to the new nation.

1

David McCullough, John Adams (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 564.
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The administration of Thomas Jefferson was uniquely situated to attract
criticism. Following the “Revolution of 1800”, Jefferson’s presidency represented
the first transition of power between rival political parties in American history.
The two previous administrations had certainly had their detractors, but
Washington himself remained, with some exceptions, above the vituperative
criticism that others could attract. John Adams had to deal with his critics also,
but by the end of his term of office, he had erected legal barriers to restrain his
political enemies in the form of the Sedition Act. When Jefferson took office, he
and the Congress allowed the hateful legislation to expire, and, in accordance
with his political beliefs, he invited criticism and open debate.2 During the years
of his presidency and the centuries following, he got his full measure.
The reputation of the Jefferson administration still suffers from its alleged
culpability concerning the marginal performance of the American military during
the War of 1812. Disasters on land and near impotence on the sea demanded
someone be blamed. The buck stopped first at the desk of President James
Madison, but critics and historians have likewise pointed to Thomas Jefferson as
the man who deliberately emasculated the army and moth-balled the navy in
favor of his experimental and utterly ineffective gunboats.3 Jefferson, too, had
appointed an ineffective party hack, Dr. William Eustis, as secretary of war in
1809, and Madison had kept him on.4

2

Joyce Appleby, Thomas Jefferson (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2003), 58.
See for example, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sea Power and its Relations to the War of 1812 (New
York: Reprint Services Corp, 1905) 1: 296; and Forrest McDonald, The Presidency of Thomas
Jefferson (Kansas City: University of Kansas Press, 1976), 44.
3

2

Like his near contemporary, Frederick the Great, Jefferson had to wed
concepts of Enlightenment and humanism with military necessity—both in his
mind and in practice. Unlike Frederick, Jefferson had no prior military training.
His legacy as a military commander and a strategist was therefore unique in the
republic’s brief history. There were difficult strategic problems for the new
president to solve. Among these were homeland defense against Indians and
foreign powers, the protection of American shipping, and—related to the first
two—the organization of the armed forces.5
The last of these problems had political as well as military dimensions.
Jefferson’s basic conception of strategy for the land component was simple and
relatively unchanged during his administration: he would rely on the “body of
neighboring citizens as formed into a militia”. Jefferson believed that a European
invader could launch an attack at any of hundreds of different points along the
extensive American seacoast, and that it was therefore unfeasible for a standing
army to be the primary defense. Rather, as an invasion unfolded, the local militia
would destroy the threat or contain it long enough for the regular army to arrive
and finish off the enemy.6 But in order for this system to work, the national
government would have to be on good political terms with state governors, and
the states, in turn, would have to organize their militias according to a national
standard.

4

John K. Mahon, The War of 1812. New York: De Capo Press, 1972; 5.
Allan R. Millet and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: a Military History of the United
States of America. New York: The Free Press, 1984, 87-102
6
First Inaugural Address, 4 March 1801, Washington ed., viii, 1-6.
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The formula for homeland defense was thus set for Jefferson’s
administration: initial defensive operations by militiamen, to be followed if
necessary by regular troops mustered for the purpose and dispatched to the
trouble spots. The underlying assumptions, of course, were that (1) the militia
would be responsive and effective; and that (2) any crisis could be either
defeated or contained long enough to allow regulars to arrive. Above all,
Jefferson wanted to prevent the buildup of a large, regular army, because
(among other reasons) he saw it as a possible threat to democracy. Jefferson’s
political opponents, chiefly Alexander Hamilton, disputed both of these
assumptions, and Jefferson, in turn, mistrusted the opposition’s motives. In the
words of Henry Adams, “To crush democracy by force was the ultimate resource
of Hamilton. To crush that force was the determined intention of Jefferson.”7
The political turmoil of the late 18th century in America came about
because of the existence and development of two rival political parties in a time
when such parties were considered detrimental to good governance. The initial
bifurcation between Federalist and anti-Federalists over the ratification of the
Constitution of 1787 had quieted somewhat under George Washington’s steady
hand. But despite Washington’s pleas to Hamilton and Jefferson, his two chief
ministers supervised a bitter newspaper war, each employing editors to denigrate
the other. The emerging political parties that arose over policy disputes became
known as the Federalists and Democratic Republicans. Hamilton and Jefferson
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Henry Adams, Albert Gallatin (New York: Chelsea House, 1983), 170.
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were the respective de facto heads, but the American political culture would not
recognize the legitimacy of parties until much later.8
During the Washington and Adams administrations several proposals
came forward for a strong national, regular army. But there were powerful
obstacles to such schemes—chiefly lack of resources and a pervasive belief that
a standing army was a threat to freedom, especially among Democratic
Republicans. After the ratification of the new constitution and the election of
George Washington in 1788, the Federalists attempted—mostly without
success—to boost the strength of the army and build a sea-going navy. But it
wasn’t until the crises of John Adams’ administration (1797-1801) that Hamilton’s
military ideas gained ascendancy. The perceived threat from France and
“Jacobins” within the United States gave rise to a panicked accretion in army
authorizations and appropriations for the navy.
In the years leading up to the dramatic election of 1800, Democratic
Republicans railed against the enlargement of the military and its use against
domestic insurrections (chiefly Fries’ Rebellion of 1799). The passage of the
Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798 gave rise to a sustained reaction against
Hamiltonian Federalism and contributed to the vigorous political organization that
underlay the Republican victory of 1800. By the time of Jefferson’s election,
peace with France had spurred Congress to disestablish much of Hamilton’s
military initiatives, but suspicion about a large military and what unscrupulous
men might do with it remained.9

8
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Joyce Appleby, Thomas Jefferson (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2003), 134.
Joseph J. Ellis, Founding Brothers (New York: Vintage Books, 2002), 194.
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Jefferson’s first term saw the passage of the Military Peace Establishment
Act, which purged 88 officer positions held by Federalists and added 20 ensigns,
all of whom would be Republicans. This move among others has led to a school
of thought among some historians that Jefferson was determined to
“Republicanize” the armed forces with a determination equal to Hamilton’s.10
Reducing the army from four infantry regiments to two, the Republican legislation
also brought the army’s end strength down to sixty percent of its original strength.
The traditional criticism of Jefferson has it that his unrealistic reliance on state
militias, his naive insistence on economy, and his vengeful desire to purge the
ranks of Federalist officers led him to pare the army down to a level that was
destined to fail in any serious military undertaking.11 Indeed, it was Jefferson
who once opposed a standing army on the grounds that “we have no paupers to
man it.”12 Some historians have accused Jefferson of under-funding the military
to the point that it was ineffective both to awe the Indians and to deter invasion.13
Thus the disasters in 1812 along the Canadian border had at their root Thomas
Jefferson’s antipathy toward the military.
Even the ostensibly pro-military act of establishing the United States
Military Academy had suspicious roots. Why would Jefferson, who opposed the
academy idea when it was sponsored by Washington and Hamilton, suddenly
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Millet and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 99.
See for example, Forrest McDonald, The Presidency of Thomas Jefferson (Lawrence, KS: The
University Press of Kansas, 1976), 43; Anthony Wallace, Jefferson and the Indians: the tragic
fate of the first Americans (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1999), 13-20.
12
James R. Jacobs, The Beginning of the US Army, 1783-1812. (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1947), 12.
13
Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: evolution of a party ideology (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1978), 289-90.
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exert himself in favor of the idea upon the success of the Republicans in 1801?
Historians Stephen Ambrose and Dumas Malone assert that Jefferson was trying
to cultivate engineering and science by founding West Point, but others
disagree.14 Theodore Crackel instead asserts that the United States Military
Academy at West Point was part of Jefferson’s plan to purge Federalists from the
military.15
Likewise the navy suffered at the hands of the new president. Upon
taking office Jefferson laid up the six frigates still operating, cancelled future
construction, and cut appropriations to a mere one million dollars, down from
$3.5 million in 1800.16 Instead of relying on the traditional sea-going navy for
defense, Jefferson, as his critics charged, lit upon a hare-brained scheme to
employ hundreds of tiny gunboats. These small craft were inexpensive, easy to
handle (thus removing the requirement for an aristocratic, adventurous, and
largely Federalist officer corps), and would not be regarded as a provocation by
other powers. New Hampshire Federalist William Plumer despised the gunboat
plan and ridiculed Jefferson as “this whimsical, philosophic president”.17 During
the War of 1812, the ramshackle gunboat fleet was singularly ineffective. As
famed naval proponent and historian, Alfred Thayer Mahan, saw it: “Jefferson
with his gunboat policy…proclaimed by act as by voice his adherence to a bare
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See for example, Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Times: the Sage of Monticello (Boston:
Little, Brown & Co., 1981), 235.
15
Theodore J. Crackel, Mr. Jefferson’s Army: political and social reform of the military
establishment, 1801-1804 (New York: New York University, 1987), 59-62.
16
Gene A. Smith, For Purposes of Defense: the politics of the Jeffersonian Gunboat Program.
Newark, NJ: University of Delaware Press, 1995; 11.
17
Ibid, 33-34.
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defensive.”18 His criticism of Jefferson informed generations of American
historians, who likewise pointed to the president’s military incapacity.19
The combined effects of these attacks on the American military were to
weaken the country—or more specifically the national government—for years to
come. Forrest McDonald argues that—
“The long-range implications of these false economies were to
reduce the military capacities of the United States to virtually
nothing, and thus to tie the nation’s hands in its foreign relations far
more than Hamiltonian policy ever had.”20
McDonald delivers a yet more stinging rebuke in discussing Jefferson’s demands
upon Great Britain following the infamous Chesapeake incident:

“But one does not bind one’s self hand and foot and then issue
ultimatums… the achievements of Hamiltonian Federalism had all
been undone; after six and a half years of Jeffersonian
Republicanism, the Americans were more dependent upon the
whim of George III and the will of his ministers in 1807 than they
had been in 1775.”21
The most obvious and tragic result of this emasculation was the ill-fated
Embargo Act of 1807. The “half-way pacifist” president, faced with clear and
provocative acts of war by England, chose to employ an economic weapon rather
than have recourse to military action. Waves of protest, defiance, and
disobedience followed as Federalist merchants in the northeast faced loss of
their livelihoods. Jefferson himself concluded that the embargo was a singular

18

Alfred Thayer Mahan, War of 1812, (New York: Reprint Services Corp., 1905), 1:296.
See for example, Russell F. Weigley, The American War of War: a History of United States
Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 46-47.
20
McDonald, The Presidency of Thomas Jefferson, 44.
21
Ibid, 136-37.
19
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failure, and the great irony was that in enforcing it he became every bit the tyrant
he so feared in others. A more obvious strategic failure would be hard to find.
Historians Henry Adams, Paul Leicester Ford, Forrest McDonald, Joyce
Appleby and others have likewise pointed to the hypocrisy of Jefferson, who by
1808 employed federal troops to replace New England militias in the
enforcement of the embargo.22 Late in 1808, the president, who had once
opposed a call for a 12,000 man force, requested an army of 50,000!23 Since
Jefferson had a long, public record of tying standing armies in times of peace to
tyranny, one could interpret his call for a larger military as his intention to pursue
a Republican form of tyranny. This at least was the fear of his Federalist foes.
Likewise in his handling of Indian affairs, Jefferson comes under the
criticism of Anthony Wallace, who views Jefferson as an ethically flawed,
hypocritical, and incompetent dilettante. Ostensibly sympathizing with the noble
savages in his Notes on Virginia, Jefferson nevertheless pursued policies inimical
to their survival in order to further his own interests in land speculation as well as
those of his political cronies.24 According to Wallace, Jefferson intended, as
explained in his first inaugural address, to eradicate the Indians’ way of life and
convert them to agriculture, while snatching up their lands for white settlers. At
the same time he cut the size of the army to a mere 3, 289 officers and men in

22

See for example Paul L. Ford, ed., The Autobiography of Thomas Jefferson, 1743-1790
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), i-ix; Joyce Appleby, Thomas Jefferson (New York:
Henry Holt & Co., 2003), 128-130; Forrest McDonald, The Presidency of Thomas Jefferson
(Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 1976),137.
23
Jefferson, The Anas, July, 1807, Ford ed., i, 329.; see also Theodore J. Crackel, Mr.
Jefferson’s Army: political and social reform of the military establishment, 1801-1804. New York:
New York University, 1987; 181.
24
Anthony Wallace, Jefferson and the Indians: the tragic fate of the First Americans. Cambridge:
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999, 1-12.
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the Military Peace Establishment Act of 1802—a force entirely too small to
restrain white settlers from encroaching on Indian lands.25
Jefferson’s handling of the Tripolitan War, 1801-05, likewise attracts
criticism. Having virtually disestablished the navy prior to the war, Jefferson was
forced to employ the Federalist frigates, sloops, and schooners that he had
previously under-funded. Punctuated by episodes of heroism and small
successes, the war dragged on for four and a half years. Its end came about
through the adventuring of William Eaton, the very ‘man who would be king’ that
Jefferson most feared. Hence the war with Tripoli has every appearance of
being fought with no one at the helm.26

It seems obvious at a glance, then, that Jefferson was ineffective in his
roles as commander-in-chief and the nation’s chief administrator. But the
obvious is difficult to prove and sometimes wrong. In order to judge accurately
the course of Jefferson’s administration in strategic and military matters, it is
necessary to view the problem in the context of early 19th century America, rather
than from the viewpoint of citizens of a superpower two centuries later. Context
is everything when evaluating an enigmatic person such as Jefferson.
From my research I have developed views about Thomas Jefferson’s
national security policies that differ from most published works. Historians can
find it difficult to filter out subtle prejudices and can sometimes attempt to retrofit

25
26

Ibid, 216.
Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 12.
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modern ideas onto the past. Such is the case with current views on Jefferson’s
military policies.
Modern evaluation of Thomas Jefferson’s military policy suffers from
viewing the problem in retrospect through the wrong lenses. The first lens is that
of a world superpower. Since the late 19th century, the United States of America
has become the most prominent player within the community of nations. Our
culture of success and strength blinds us to the realities of Jefferson’s country in
1800. When evaluating Republican domestic and foreign policy from 1801
through 1809, critics often fail to consider the fundamental weakness of the
United States in terms of military manpower and the arms industry. As a result,
commentators view unfavorable episodes like our disappointing performance
against the Barbary pirates, the ill-fated Embargo Act of 1807, and later,
America’s marginal military performance in the War of 1812 as the result of
Republican policy-making, when in fact they are more attributable to the young
nation’s inherent strategic limitations. The United States had a small population,
primitive infrastructure, a vulnerable coastline, and almost no arms industry.
Hence, regardless of the administration’s policies, America was bound to fall
short in its foreign policy ambitions until the Industrial Revolution could take hold
and impel it to prosperity and strength.
A fair evaluation of Jefferson must therefore take into account other
potential policy options and their likely outcomes. In this light, for example, one
can condemn the Embargo of 1807 yet still perceive correctly that other
options—most notably war with Britain—would likely have fared even worse.

11

The War of 1812, just five years later, demonstrated America’s military
incapacity. To explore possible permutations of the nation’s history it is
necessary to examine the historical context and then critically analyze the major
policy options by which Jefferson and the Republican Congress shaped the
military establishment and the nation’s foreign policy. By thus comparing what
they did with possible alternatives, we can better evaluate Jefferson as
commander-in-chief. We may discover that the critics were right in some
instances, but that in others, this “whimsical, philosophic president” had greater
insights than his detractors.
The second lens through which we tend to view Jefferson’s administration
is that of a modern, stable, functioning democracy. We have over two centuries
of history behind us during which the Constitution was tried, modified, and
proven. Each age of our nation has produced its own set of calamities and
political dramas, including a bloody civil war, but the system of checks and
balances has since then proven resilient enough to provide for stable governance
of the nation. The notion of a coup, secession, or a series of bloody purges
among our politicians is the stuff of good fiction, but in 1800, such things were
distinctly possible. The Constitution was a mere eleven years old, and there had
been only one party in control since the beginning. (Indeed, the Federalists
scarcely recognized themselves as a ‘party’, but rather as the only legitimate
government.) The concept of a unified polity—one that could withstand the
passions of democracy and party conflict—was very much in question, and the
idea of a legitimate “loyal opposition” was nonexistent.

12

Much of Jefferson’s policy formulation aimed at forestalling a falling back
to rule by the privileged few on the one hand, and the violence and upheaval of
the French Revolution on the other. Thus his military policy had to balance both
the demands of the turbulent European situation and the internal threat of a
political or military coup. Threat of secession by one or more states was a
regular feature of those years, culminating, of course, in the crisis of 1861. With
the shared depredations at the hands of Great Britain fading away as a unifying
force, early 19th century America was a crucible of divisive issues, restive political
factions, and competing visions of what America should be. It is only against this
backdrop that Jefferson’s policies can be fairly judged.
What follows, then, is a critical examination of Thomas Jefferson’s military
policies with a view to the context of his time. Evaluating the outcomes of
Jefferson’s decision making must include comparing them to likely alternative
outcomes—war with Britain or France, a military coup, a secession crisis, or fullscale civil war. Against this backdrop and the consequences that might have
followed for the young republic, the disappointing results of Jefferson’s embargo,
and the stagnation of the War of 1812 may suddenly appear as startling
successes.

13
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Thomas Jefferson’s background, education, and pre-war experiences
shaped his thoughts on military policy well in advance of his taking the reins of
government in 1801. From these factors emerged Jefferson’s earliest thinking on
the military. During the years leading up to the achievement of American
independence, Jefferson’s ideas about military policy were conditioned by two
sources: his reading and the colonial experience with the British army. Only
later, when Jefferson participated in the administrations of Washington and
Adams, was his thinking influenced by experience in governing.
In his book, The Jeffersonian Persuasion, Lance Banning takes on the
task of defining Republican “ideology”, which he defines as “the more or less
coherent body of assumptions, values, and ideas that bound Republicans
together as it shaped their common understanding of society and politics…”27 He
examines the political struggles during the English Civil War (1642-51), the
Restoration (1660-61), and the Glorious Revolution (1688-89), a period rich with

14

political commentary. Jefferson and his allies assimilated and often exaggerated
the principles of opposition that grew out of that dramatic period of British history,
and the management of the military figured prominently in the ongoing debate. A
voracious and critical reader, Jefferson learned to view the military establishment
not only from the standpoint of patriotism, nationalism, and security from
invasion, but also as an instrument of political corruption, repression of liberty,
and potentially, tyranny.
But Thomas Jefferson was not the product of just book learning. As a
young man he was ensconced in the practical struggle against Great Britain, and
the young aristocrat was to observe firsthand the use of redcoats to suppress
civil rights. British grenadiers were often the most conspicuous and offensive
face of London’s American policy. In the years leading up to the Revolution, the
army upheld the authority of royal governors and supervised the sometimes
repressive commercial and political measures passed by the ministry in London.
In the course of leading his native state of Virginia as a wartime governor,
Jefferson had to escape on horseback when British soldiers sought to arrest him
during an invasion.
In this chapter, I will demonstrate that long before he came to office as a
minister to France and later Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson’s thoughts on
military policy matured from his reading and personal experience.

27

Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: evolution of a party ideology (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1978), 15.
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The Education of a Revolutionary
Thomas Jefferson was born April 13, 1743, the third child and first son of
Peter and Jane Jefferson. His birth into the community of the Virginia gentry set
the conditions for a life of social and economic success, but it could not account
for his singular rise to the height of American politics, nor for the profound
influence Jefferson would have on the course of American history. His unique
intellectual talents and quiet determination, his spirit of unlimited inquiry, and his
remarkable self-restraint marked him as a man destined for greatness. But once
he chose the path he thought most moral and ethical his inner strength led him to
defy first his mother country, and second, the men he had thrown in with during
the Revolution. By 1800, he had in fact created what he called a second
revolution in which Jefferson would steer the country’s policies in the direction he
saw fit—a vector radically different from that of George Washington or John
Adams. It is in his education and early experiences in politics that one can find
the origins of Jefferson’s thinking about politics in general, and military policy in
particular.
Jefferson had a classical education in Albemarle County, where he
learned Greek and Latin, and where he began a lifelong love affair with books.
At age 17 he moved to Williamsburg and entered the College of William and
Mary. There he came under the tutelage of Dr. William Small, a layman who
instructed Jefferson in science and mathematics. This experience fanned the
flame of inquiry within young Thomas, and thereafter he preferred what he

16

considered “useful” education to the classics. Eventually, he would connect
classical education to the perpetuation of privilege and the stagnation of
American society. At a young age, Jefferson became a son of the Age of
Reason.28
After two years at college, Jefferson began to study law under George
Wythe, an undertaking that would last five years and provide a firm foundation for
his later sponsorship of the rights of man. His initiation into the works of
seventeenth century legal scholar Sir Edward Coke acquainted the aspiring
lawyer with the thinking of the Puritan opposition to James I (b. 1566; reigned
1603-1625) and Charles I (b. 1600; reigned 1625-1649). Since Coke and his
colleagues framed their conflict with the crown in terms of the rights and liberties
of man, Jefferson became well grounded in the developing ideology of the
Enlightenment.29 Puritan thought included a rejection of the divine right of kings,
the advocacy of popular sovereignty, and a reaffirmation of the conviction that no
one was above the law—this last point deeply rooted in English tradition, dating
back at least as far as the Magna Carta (1215).
Whig ideology blossomed in the late 1670s and early 80s during the
opposition to James, duke of York (b. 1633; reigned 1685-1701), who succeeded
Charles II (b. 1630; reigned 1660-1685). Since James was openly Catholic, he
attracted the ire and dogged disapproval of the Whigs, led by the Earl of
Shaftesbury (1621-1683). Fearful of corruption, tyranny, and religious
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repression, the Whigs struggled to formulate and define a proper government—
one immune to the encroachments of man’s base nature. James Harrington’s
work, The Commonwealth of Oceana, published in 1656, described the ideal of a
“mixed government”—i.e., rule by a combination of monarchy, aristocracy, and
democracy—described by King Charles I in 1642 as “the one, the few, and the
many”.30 Whigs believed that the separate elements of mixed government would
serve as a check on tyranny.31
Harrington, Algernon Sidney, and others also saw the dangers of
corruption, which sprung ultimately from one’s economic dependence upon
another. Since only an independent man was free from the danger of corruption,
it followed that land ownership should be the basis for the franchise. Reason
must prevail over self-interest, and Harrington railed against the evil of hereditary
offices and standing armies as constant threats to liberty. Thomas Jefferson’s
world view grew from these doctrinal roots.32
Restoration England was governed by the “king-in-parliament”, who had
the right to dismiss ministers at will. Ministers, in turn, used patronage and
bribery to interfere with elections and voting. John Locke (1632-1704) and others
railed against this practice, because it put too much influence in the hands of the
executive. In A Letter from a Person of Quality to His Friend in the Country
(1675), thought to have been written by Shaftesbury, the author argues against a
professional army (seen as both an expense and a direct threat to liberty), and in
30
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favor of an hereditary nobility as the people’s champions to balance the power of
the crown.33
Commenting in the mid-eighteenth century on how the English constitution
evolved, Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755) continued the
conceptual development of mixed and balanced government by emphasizing the
value of virtue. He defined virtue as the seeking of public good over personal
gain and its theoretical converse, corruption, as the spreading rot of
embezzlement, bribery, and drive for personal gain. Because virtue was always
at risk of being overcome by man’s baser nature, a mixed and balanced
government was the best protection against what would otherwise be unchecked
corruption. Again, it was the independent land owner who could best stand firm
against evil and fight for public good, while anyone dependent on another—a
stock holder, a pensioner, or a wage earner—would ultimately succumb to the
influence of his patron.34
Whig ideology also held that no matter how vigilant the opposition or
virtuous the ministry, government would inevitably slip into evil and corruption,
and that only a dramatic, decisive return to first principles would restore virtue.
Whigs viewed this cycle as both inevitable and beneficial, and Jefferson’s later
characterization of his own election in 1800 reflected this belief as well. By the
latter years of John Adams’ administration, Jefferson viewed the Federalists’
policies and Hamilton’s plans as thoroughly corrupt—a rejection and repudiation
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of the principles of 1776. Jefferson, as the ultimate champion of the
Enlightenment, would restore virtue to government. This ideology in no small
way framed his perspectives on the military.35
Cato’s Letters, written by John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon and
published from 1720-23, praised English liberty and compared it favorably to the
popery and tyranny found elsewhere in the world. But the authors of this
influential work also warned that the court, in its never-ending attempts to subvert
liberty, would consistently seek to raise taxes, form armies, and fight foreign wars
to distract the country from encroaching corruption and tyranny. Hence, Whigs
were predisposed to be alarmed at any schemes of government that called for
taxes or an accretion in the strength of the military.36
In 1701, Charles Davenant published The True Picture of a Modern Whig,
which detailed the financial activities of the Whig government. The author played
upon the suspicions and paranoia of the opposition to cause alarm, both in
England and in America, whenever the government attempted to regulate
domestic trade. Jefferson’s reactions to Hamiltonian financial policy proposals
followed this line, and the vastly divergent ideological convictions of both men
foreordained conflict over the proper course for the republic.37
Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke’s (1678-1751) Tory opposition to Sir
Robert Walpole’s Whig ministry (1721-1742) also contributed to the development
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of Jefferson’s political thought. In two works, Remarks on the History of England
(1730-31) and A Dissertation on Parties (1733-34), Bolingbroke condemned
court influence on the Commons, high taxes, and standing armies. He noted that
Henry VII’s attempts to subvert liberty by destroying the nobility failed, largely
because the Commons gained control of the land lost by the nobles, and thus
transferred real power there. The court then began to systematically influence
the Commons through patronage, bribery, and by infiltrating army officers and
pensioners into the Parliament. Since these latter two classes were dependent
upon the crown, they could not vote independently; they were the very definition
of corruption. 38
As historian Bernard Bailyn observed: “The transmission from England to
America of the literature of political opposition that furnished the substance of the
ideology of the Revolution had been so swift in the early years of the eighteenth
century as to seem almost instantaneous; and…these ideas acquired in the
colonies an importance, a relevance in politics, they did not then have—and
never would have—in England itself.”39 For the men who led the American
Revolution, the turbulence of England’s experience yielded a shared vocabulary
of opposition to established authority.

Documenting Tyranny
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Thus, well before Jefferson officially entered the world of politics with his
election to the Virginia House of Burgesses in 1768, he had assimilated the
English classics on political theory and was intellectually disposed to engage the
crises that would soon descend on America. As he assumed his seat, the
Virginia Burgesses were expressing their vehement opposition to the Townshend
Acts—a perspective that impelled the governor, Norborne Berkeley, baron de
Botetourt (1768-1770), to dismiss the body. When the popular William Pitt, earl
of Chatham (1757-61; 1766-68)—a champion of the rights of the colonies—
became ill, Charles Townshend, Chancellor of the Exchequer, convinced
Parliament to pass new taxes on the Americans’ importation of lead, paint, paper,
glass, and tea. The legislation also suspended New York’s legislature until they
agreed to collect taxes to support British troops in accordance with the
Quartering Act (1765). Surrounded by like-minded Virginia gentry and grounded
in opposition ideology, Jefferson saw these acts as encroachments on English
liberties. His signature was soon affixed to a declaration of non-importation in
defiance of both the governor and Parliament.40
In March, 1773, Jefferson returned to the House of Burgesses, by this
time an accomplished legislator and a newly married husband and father. He
was drawn into a circle of young firebrands intent on opposing the tyranny they
saw inflicted on the colonies. Together they began the system known as
“committees of correspondence”, through which they could coordinate the
growing revolutionary impulses throughout America. In the aftermath of the
Boston Tea Party (1773) and Parliament’s subsequent imposition of the Coercive
40
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Acts (June, 1774), which included the closing of Boston port, Jefferson prepared
A Summary View of the Rights of British America—a document proclaiming the
British colonies’ exclusive right to legislate for themselves. Although premature
in its radical ideas, the document made Jefferson famous as a patriot and
champion of American rights.41
Jefferson boldly asserted that the British citizens who emigrated to
America were legally of the same status as the Saxons who emigrated to
England and took possession of the island. Once there, the Saxons made their
own laws without interference from their former mother-country. In a similar way,
Jefferson argued, British colonists in America had the sole right to govern
themselves. He went on to assert that British Americans had carved out and
secured their country with no help from England, except in the latest conflict, the
French and Indian War. Jefferson mirrored the attitude of many American
colonists when he explained that although England helped defeat the French, it
was for the mother country’s own benefit as well. (The English position was that
the colonists’ contributions to the war effort were minimal.) The dispute over this
point remained a major cause of the crises leading to the American Revolution.42
The British government maintained that the colonies had to help pay for the
protection that regular soldiers provided, while the Americans persisted in their
belief that England should be grateful for the help the colonial militias gave to the
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mother country’s war against France. The failure to come to agreement on this
issue was a significant factor leading to the break in 1776.43
A Summary View reads like a preliminary draft for the Declaration of
Independence that Jefferson penned two years later. Both documents detail
colonial grievances against the Crown and Parliament, and among the points of
contention is the quartering of soldiers in British America. The Boston Massacre
(1770) and the use of British regulars against tenant farmers in New York had
outraged Americans. Jefferson insisted that any troops sent must be subject to
the local laws of the lands they visit and not be instruments of arbitrary rule from
afar. Clearly, the young Virginian aristocrat equated military force with the
suppression of liberty—a view that, years later, shaped the policies of his own
administration.44
The spring and early summer of 1775 found Jefferson again at work,
drafting a response to the proposed legislation of Lord North’s government, in
which the British offered to forego any extra taxation of any colony that itself
levied taxes for defense and in support of the government. Although drafted to
demonstrate a spirit of compromise, the proposal was still coercive and still
insisted on taxation in support of the crown. Jefferson’s response was less
dramatic than A Summary View, but he rejected North’s proposal and reiterated
that Parliament had no authority over the colonies. He also stated Virginia’s
strong opposition to the maintenance of a standing army in America—an army
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whose nominal purpose was to protect the colonies, but which could also be a
handy instrument with which to suppress liberty and coerce free citizens.45
In June, 1775, Jefferson arrived at Philadelphia to attend the Continental
Congress. His reputation as a gifted writer landed him on the committee whose
task was to draw up a declaration that would be published as George
Washington assumed command of the Continental Army. The “Declaration of
the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms” was a hybrid of several authors,
but Jefferson and John Dickinson were the primary writers. The document
began by decrying Parliament’s unbounded lust for power and reiterates that
attempts to extend its authority over the colonies were completely unjustifiable. It
praised the policies and attitude of William Pitt (though not naming him directly)
“…the minister, who so wisely and successfully directed the measures of Great
Britain in the late war…”, and it quoted Pitt’s belief that the colonies had shown
themselves indispensable to the decisive victory over France. The authors then
deprecated the post-war decisions of the King and Parliament in trying to recover
their depleted finances at the expense of the colonies. As in A Summary View,
Jefferson and his colleagues point to Britain’s use of military coercion.
“Administration sensible that we should regard these oppressive
measures as freemen ought to do, sent over fleets and armies to
enforce them.”
“Soon after, the commercial intercourse of whole colonies…was cut
off by an act of parliament…and large reinforcements of ships and
troops were immediately sent over to general Gage.”46
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The Declaration then gave the American perspective on the military
confrontation at Lexington and Concord (April, 1775), charging the British
soldiers with “murdering” and “butchering” colonial citizens (and conveniently
ignoring the violence perpetrated by the colonists themselves). It further charged
that General Gage, the ranking British commander in America at the time, with
instigating Indian attacks against colonists. Unlike the more famous declaration
of the following year, the document offered assurances that separation from the
mother country was not yet in view, but rather called for a restoration of relations
with due respect for American interests.

Within a year Jefferson’s name would forever be associated with another
document that came to an altogether different conclusion. In June, 1776,
Jefferson, working alone, drafted what would become the Declaration of
Independence. It remains a remarkable work of political thought and a cherished
expression of American ideology, and it reiterated Jefferson’s loathing of the
standing army and the evil uses to which it was put.

“He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without
the consent of our legislatures.
“He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior
to the Civil power.
“For Quartering large bodies of armed troops among us;
“For protecting them [crown officials], by a mock Trial, from
punishment from any murders which they should commit on the
inhabitants of these States;
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“He has plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our towns,
and destroyed the lives of our people.
“He is at this time transporting large Armies of foreign Mercenaries
to compleat the works of death, desolation and tyranny, already
begun…”47

Shortly after finishing his work with the Continental Congress, Jefferson
returned to his beloved Virginia, intent on assisting his countrymen in the
business of planning and creating a state government. From 1776 through 1779,
Jefferson worked as a legislator and headed up the effort to reform Virginia’s
laws. Though not all of his recommendations gained acceptance, Jefferson
successfully led the way in reforming the criminal code, modernizing property
laws, and, in the 1780s, achieving religious freedom.48
His years of legislative work in the Virginia Assembly may seem at a
glance to have little to do with his later military policy, but this period was in fact
formative. While Washington and his army endured the British, the elements,
and the ineffectual workings of the Continental Congress, Jefferson was busy
exploring the social dimensions of the Revolution. He earnestly desired the
eradication of privileged aristocracy and its replacement by an “aristocracy of
virtue and talents.” In a letter to his friend John Adams, Jefferson observed:
“There is a natural aristocracy among men. The grounds of this are
virtue and talents… There is, also, an artificial aristocracy, founded
on wealth and birth, without either virtue or talents…a mischievous
ingredient in government, and provision should be made to prevent
its ascendency.”49
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In Virginia, Jefferson intended to do just that. He led the charge against
out-dated laws of entail and primogeniture—customs that perpetuated family
wealth and land ownership. He also formulated a comprehensive plan for public
education, a system specifically designed to produce well educated, well
prepared public servants—men of virtue sifted “from the rubbish” as Jefferson put
it.50 In these and his many other legislative initiatives, Jefferson sought to bring
meaning to the Revolution, achieving not merely a political separation from
England, but the inauguration of a whole new enlightened society. His social
agenda ran completely counter to the spirit of brotherhood developing among
Washington’s wartime officers. One of the reason Jefferson would later object to
the formation of the Society of the Cincinnati was that it smacked of artificial
aristocracy.

Condolences
In June, 1779, Thomas Jefferson was elected governor of Virginia.
Foreseeing the challenges that lay ahead, Jefferson suggested to a friend that in
place of congratulations, the governor-elect should be offered condolences. The
essential problem for Jefferson’s two year administration was a consistent lack of
resources equal to the demands of war. The governor’s powers were limited and
dependent upon a cooperative legislature. Although Virginia’s potential
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resources were considerable, it was a huge state with little infrastructure and a
small tax base.51
Jefferson’s unhappy duty was to administer a crucial state during the nadir
of the American Revolution. Six months after his election, the British shifted their
strategy in the Americas and began to focus on the south. Jefferson knew that
this would mean invading armies sooner or later would arrive in Virginia. Until
that happened, he busied himself in the administrative duties that the war
required. He supervised recruitment, provisioning, and the development of
magazines. During his sojourn as governor, no one was happy with his state’s
performance. Washington and the other generals, the Continental Congress,
and the citizens of the state remained dissatisfied and increasingly frustrated at
the lack of progress.52
In the winter of 1780-81 the British began a series of forays into Virginia,
and Governor Jefferson had to scramble to try to put together a defense built
around local militias. His efforts were wholly ineffective, and the traitorous
Benedict Arnold, commanding a British army, marched into Richmond and
destroyed a foundry there before departing. Only the arrival of regular troops
could give the British invaders pause, but by spring of 1781, General Charles
Cornwallis (1738-1805), now in command, was ready to make a major effort at
knocking Virginia out of the war. On 31 May he sent Lieutenant Colonel
Banastre Tarleton (1754-1833) on a long-range raid to Charlottesville in an
attempt to capture the Virginia legislature and Governor Jefferson. Forced into a

51
52

Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time, Vol 1 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1948), 301-313.
Ibid, 314-329.

29

flight that would sully his reputation thereafter, Jefferson barely escaped capture.
Since his term as governor was technically over, he decided not to attempt to
return to the legislature and instead sought refuge at a family property in Bedford
County. For the rest of his life he would have to defend his actions, but there
was really very little anyone could have done in his place. (William Livingston,
governor of New Jersey, also fled in 1776 when the British invaded.) Jefferson
was eventually exonerated of all charges against him and thanked for his faithful
service.53
The following year found Jefferson out of public life and in retirement at
Monticello, there to attend to his wife’s failing health. When his beloved Martha
finally succumbed in September, 1782, Jefferson fell into deep depression and
only recovered when at last he was appointed as a minister plenipotentiary to
negotiate peace in France. Instead of departing immediately for Europe, he
spent time in Philadelphia and Annapolis, serving as a legislator with the
Congress of Confederation. He witnessed George Washington’s farewell as
Commander of the Continental Army, and he remained deeply appreciative of
Washington’s demonstrated virtue in surrendering so much power voluntarily.
But in 1783, an event occurred that nearly trumped Washington’s self-restraint
and threatened a military coup.54
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Making a Wise Man Mad: The Newburgh Conspiracy of 1783
Of the various threats to liberty that Thomas Jefferson feared, military
repression was the chief. Throughout his political career he warned that a large
military establishment was expensive, provocative, and a constant danger to
freedom. He and his fellow revolutionaries knew well the chronology of English
history that led to the dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell, and they feared a replay of
it in America. As the Revolutionary War was drawing to a close, that fear was
one step away from becoming reality.
In early 1783, the Continental Army was encamped at Newburgh, New
York, with the mission of keeping an eye on British troops who remained in New
York City. Peace negotiations were ongoing in Paris, and there had been no
serious fighting since the British capitulation at Yorktown in 1781. With little to
do, soldiers and officers grew increasingly restive at Congress’ failure to provide
pay and allowances. Most of the men had not been paid in months, and some
were due up to six years’ back pay. But that was not the Army’s only concern. In
an effort to curb mass desertions in 1780, Congress had offered a lifetime
pension of one-half pay for the officers and a bounty of eighty dollars to the
enlisted men who remained with the Army. Those promises seemed at risk, now
that the Articles of Confederation had gone into effect and the British threat
removed. Under the new Articles, nine states would have to give assent to any
such measure, and it was certain that nothing close to such a majority could be
found by 1783.55
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Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress had no more than the right
to ask for revenue from the states. The states had the option to refuse
payment—an option more frequently used than not. Unable to pay even the war
debts incurred by their own state budgets (including in some cases, foreign
loans), the state legislatures for the most part turned a deaf ear to the needs of
the Congress. Many lawmakers were openly hostile to the notion of granting
pensions to officers, both for the political implications and for fear of the drain on
revenues. By the summer of 1782, Congress had appropriated a mere $125,000
to cover a $6 million requirement, and they could not come close to meeting the
military payroll.56
In the face of this seemingly irresolvable crisis, an aged and respected
colonel of the Pennsylvania line, Lewis Nicola, wrote to George Washington with
a singular request: to accept the crown and take over the United States as
monarch. Washington’s reply was a categorical refusal, couched in a
reprimanding tone. In this letter back to Colonel Nicola, Washington’s character
and sentiments toward the republic are clear. He expressed “astonishment” and
“abhorrence” at the proposal. While promising to keep the suggested coup
secret for the time being, he urged his officers to “banish these thoughts from
your Mind…” He was discouraged at the thought that some word or action on his
part had led the officers to think he would accede to the request.57
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In place of this monarchical scheme, Washington encouraged General
Henry Knox to head up a committee that would communicate the situation to
Congress and seek resolution of the crisis. In November, 1782, the committee of
officers drafted a proposal to Congress in which the pension plan might be
replaced with a lump sum payoff for the officers, while the enlisted men would
still receive the promised eighty dollars. Although most congressmen eventually
agreed that something would have to be done for the Army, the intransigence of
the state legislatures prevented decisive action, and no taxation was authorized.
There was more talk of disbanding the Army to prevent them from marching on
the capital.58
A conspiracy of officers at Newburgh decided to take action. With
Washington’s feelings well known, the discontented officers looked elsewhere for
leadership. Both officers and men, feeling they were justified in their contempt
for Congress, could not be put off by vague sentiments of republicanism. As
General Alexander Macdougall noted, “The army is verging to that state which,
we are told, will make a wise man mad.” Knox and Alexander Hamilton were
sympathetic but too close to Washington to be involved. General Horatio Gates,
on the other hand, was only too anxious to accept the remonstrations of the men,
especially if there were an opportunity to discredit Washington himself. Second
in command at Newburgh, he was ready and willing to sponsor a radical move to
correct the situation.59
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The conspirators decided to have a meeting among the malcontents at
Newburgh. To that end Gates’ officers circulated several letters, urging the
Army’s officers to be prepared to act to obtain justice and oppose the tyranny of
an ineffective and ungrateful Congress. They also invited them to assemble on
March 10th in the Public Building at Newburgh. When Washington received
news about the proposed meeting, he acted decisively. He sent orders canceling
the planned meeting and scheduled a new meeting for the 15th. At the same
time he notified Congress what was in the offing and worked through Henry Knox
to gain the support of key senior officers. He also duped the conspirators into
believing that he himself would not attend. Thus when Gates prepared to chair
the meeting on March 15, he was shocked when George Washington suddenly
entered the room.60
The men quieted as Washington asked for and received permission to
address the officers. He made it clear that he had copies of the subversive
letters that had been circulated. According to the letters, the Army was to either
quit the country and head west if war continued, or refuse to disband and use
their arms to coerce Congress once peace was attained. Washington continued
by denigrating the anonymous author of the plot and appealed to the audience
that not only were the planned actions dishonorable, they were also unfeasible.
They would, in the end, make a just remuneration even more difficult to obtain
from Congress. He went on praising the Army’s record of honorable service and
assuring them that he would continue to seek justice on their behalf. He insisted
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that Congress was fully resolved to pay them their just compensation, but that
such deliberations took time.61
Whether the assembled officers were impressed by the speech is
unknown. Had Washington simply departed at that point, things may have gone
against him. But after his formal remarks, he reached into his cloak and removed
a letter. The letter was from Congress, and as he prepared to read it, he begged
forgiveness for having to don his spectacles: “Gentlemen, you will permit me to
put on my spectacles, for I have not only grown gray but almost blind in the
service of my country.”
Here was the decisive moment. The humble remark reminded his officers
of their shared past. As he read the letter to them, many in the room began to
weep. Washington had won them over. He folded the letter, removed his
spectacles, and departed. As soon as he was out of the room, Henry Knox and
others loyal to Washington introduced resolutions praising the commander-inchief, pledging loyalty to the Congress, and deprecating the proposed plot. The
assembled officers assented almost to a man. The Newburgh plot was
defeated.62
While Gates and his co-conspirators were the losers in this affair, their
erstwhile allies in the government were the winners. The Army’s reputation had
been saved and the proposed coup aborted, but Congress had been sufficiently
frightened by the affair so as to goad the lawmakers into action. They approved
measures to pay off the officers and men, although payment was delayed. The
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Army was largely disbanded through the vehicle of furloughs while the revenues
were collected and gradually dispersed.63
On April 11, 1783, however, Congress announced an end to hostilities,
despite the lack of a peace treaty. Soldiers demanded immediate release and
payment, but Congress did not want to let them go before they achieved a final
peace, not to mention they did not have the funds to pay the soldiers off. The
reaction in the ranks was explosive, and in mid-June soldiers of the Pennsylvania
regiments in the Continental Army marched on the Pennsylvania State House,
where Congress was in session. The soldiers explicitly threatened the
Congressmen with violence if their demands were not met, but the legislators left
the building while the mob railed at them. Jefferson, who was working with
Congress in Annapolis at the time, learned of the affair from his close friend and
colleague, James Madison.64 The lesson was clear: a standing army and an
ineffectual Congress together would produce violence against the government
sooner or later.65
Thomas Jefferson was not directly involved in the events of the Newburgh
Conspiracy; it occurred at a time when Jefferson was much distracted and
depressed by other happenings. He was rebounding emotionally from his
disappointing sojourn as Governor of Virginia and still resentful of the attempt to
censure him for his conduct during Tarleton’s invasion of the state.66 Then, in
62

Flexner, George Washington in the American Revolution, 507.
Edmund C. Burnett, The Continental Congress (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1941), 551-74.
64
Madison to Jefferson, Philadelphia, 17 July, 1783, Julian Boyd, ed., The Papers of Thomas
Jefferson, vol. 6 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), 318-19.
65
Allan R. Millet and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: a military history of the United
States of America. New York: The Free Press, 1984, 85.
66
Cunningham, 74-75.
63

36

fall, 1782, his wife Martha passed away, and a grief-stricken Jefferson withdrew
into solitude and sorrowful reflection. In November he rallied at the news that he
had been chosen to serve as a minister plenipotentiary to France, but before he
could travel there, the war with Britain had ended, and Jefferson was ensconced
with Congress through the following two years. It was a time in Jefferson’s life
when his flagging reputation and influence disallowed any strong protest at the
attempted coup.
But there is perhaps another reason why Jefferson refrained from any
direct comments about the crisis. Such behavior by a standing army was at the
very heart of Jefferson’s fears about the military. But until the Newburgh
Conspiracy, those concerns had remained merely theoretical. Now he had
witnessed his own country on the brink of a military coup, and the subject was
one of great sensitivity. Gates or some other officer might well have stepped into
the shoes of Oliver Cromwell, had it not been for the actions of Washington.
Jefferson understood well the critical role that Washington had played in the
affair, and he deeply appreciated the general’s restraint and virtue: “…that the
moderation & virtue of a single character has probably prevented this revolution
from being closed as most others have been, by a subversion of that liberty it
was intended to establish…”67 But he was also concerned that the nation could
not depend on individual virtue alone to protect it from the threat of a military
takeover. He anticipated a day when another man might choose the path of
Caesar rather than Cato. Jefferson’s appreciation of this very close call may
have contributed to his general silence on the subject. The other pragmatic
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reason not to make too much of the affair was the role of Horatio Gates, who
would later become an ally to Jefferson before the former’s death in 1806.68
The abortive coup by the army at Newburgh reiterated one of the main
concerns Jefferson had about the military. In 1775, he had written that “armies
are inconsistent with the freedom [of the colonies] and subversive of their
quiet.”69 Chafing that he had been left out of the writing of the Constitution of
1787 (he was in Paris during the Constitutional Convention), Jefferson told
Madison that he would have added more safeguards concerning civilian control
of the army.70 Later he was thankful that the Federalist army had been
disbanded prior to the election crisis of 1801, because he feared the military
might have intervened.71 During his own presidency he concluded that “The
spirit of this country is totally adverse to a large military force.”72 Throughout his
life, Jefferson feared what a discontented military establishment might do to
threaten liberty.
The Newburgh Conspiracy was an important event, and one of many that
guided the hands of the men who in 1787 would draft a new constitution. But it
also served to illustrate the desperately thin line between a successful republican
experiment and the chaos of a military coup. It was the fear of such incidents
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that motivated President Thomas Jefferson to avoid creating a sizable military
establishment.

The Society of the Cincinnati
Two months after the abortive Newburgh plot, nearby at the headquarters
of General Friedrich von Steuben at Mount Gulian, officers of the Continental
Army founded an organization called The Society of the Cincinnati, named after
the Roman patriot and hero, Cincinnatus, who led 5th century Rome to victory,
only to humbly return to his farm at the conclusion of his service. The purpose of
the organization was "to perpetuate the remembrance of the achievement of
national independence, as well as the mutual friendships which had been formed
under the pressure of common danger." The Society was to accept members
throughout the officer corps of the Continental Army, including those foreign
allies who fought during the Revolution. It would seek, among other things, to
provide benevolence and aid to war-weary veterans returning home to an
uncertain future. There would be a branch of the organization in each state to
facilitate ongoing communication among the veteran officers. Henry Knox was
the Secretary General of the organization as well as the primary force in its
establishment, but he and the other prominent members appealed to George
Washington to serve as President of the Society. The first national assembly of
the Society of the Cincinnati was to meet in May, 1784.73
Such a movement among veterans would seem innocent enough in our
day, but some people had grave concerns about the Society of the Cincinnati in

39

1783. The three major points of contention were the Society members’ intention
to wear a commemorative ribbon, hereditary membership only for those whose
ancestors fought in the Continental Army, and the establishment of Society
chapters abroad (i.e., in France). Thomas Jefferson offered his frank opinion
about the organization when George Washington solicited his advice as to
whether he should agree to a connection with the Society. The organization was
unlikely to accomplish its goals but instead would become a divisive debating
society. Moreover, Jefferson explained, it would cultivate an hereditary
aristocracy that might insinuate itself into governance. The connection to France
suggested the danger of foreign influence in the new republic. Finally, the
Society seemed to threaten “…a distinction…between the civil and military…”74
Taking these words to heart, Washington purposed to use his influence
with the officers to disestablish the more controversial aspects of the Society. He
decided to insist upon the removal of hereditary membership and the frequent
meetings called for by the Society’s constitution. His “Observations on the
Institution of the Society of the Cincinnati” sought to significantly restructure the
organization in order to make it more palatable and less potentially dangerous to
a free society. He directed the members to remove any hint of politics in the
charter, and to discontinue the idea of hereditary membership. He further
ordered that there be no influence from abroad in the form of subscriptions or
gifts. Finally, he pushed for a strict limitation to the number of meetings.75
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Washington threatened to withdraw from the Society if the delegates did
not accept his proposals. They did so, but the issue continued to fester, because
each state chapter had to ratify the revisions, and some disagreed with the
President. When matters came to a head, Washington tried to convince the
officers to disband the Society. But as the debate continued, a delegation arrived
from France, including Pierre Charles L’Enfant, a French volunteer who had
attained the rank of major under Washington, and who had brought Society
badges and a gift for Washington—an exquisite golden eagle studded with
diamonds, presented on behalf of the French navy. L’Enfant reported that such
French notables as Admiral Jean Baptiste D’Estaing and Marshal Jean Baptiste
Vimeur, Count de Rochambeau enthusiastically established a French chapter of
the Society with the approval of the king himself. Further, the French promised
to provide generous donations to the Society in America. Washington’s hand
was thus forced: he could not disband the Society without insulting a key ally.
Some of his revisions were adopted, and others were not. The Society survived
and continues to this day.76
Jefferson’s misgivings about the Society and the dangers it represented
were no more apparent than in his warning to Washington: "the moderation &
virtue of a single character [i.e., Washington] has probably prevented this
revolution from being closed as most others have been by a subversion of that
liberty it was intended to establish…”77 It is clear that Jefferson remained
concerned that if men of moderation—himself and Washington—were removed
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from the scene, that others of less restraint, banded together in a Society that
provided ideological validation for their ambitions, could replace democracy with
tyranny. This threat represented the most serious challenge to national security.

Thus by the time Jefferson departed for France in the summer of 1784 he
had watched the disturbing development of an American military philosophy—
one that resembled sentiments commonly found in the tyrannical regimes of
Europe. In both instances—the Newburgh Conspiracy and the matter of the
Society of the Cincinnati, Jefferson saw only the character of one man—
Washington—stand in the breach between military coercion and civil liberties.
For a man of Jefferson’s ideals, a republic could not depend on the continuing
good character of a handful of virtuous public servants. Instead, they would have
to rely on strict constitutional limits on the military establishment.
Jefferson’s role in France was to help negotiate treaties of commerce and
to generally represent American interests in Europe. At this time he shared the
sentiments of some of his later enemies (e.g., Hamilton) that the Articles of
Confederation left the national government too weak, and he viewed the
conclusion of commercial treaties as helping to strengthen the hand of Congress
vis a vis the states.78 It would only be later, when he saw Hamilton’s financial
schemes as leading to corruption that he began to oppose movements toward
the consolidation of the central government.
While in France, Jefferson supervised the publication in book form of his
Notes on the State of Virginia. The book was popular in Europe as a source on
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American geography and culture, and Jefferson’s reputation as a scholar,
scientist, and writer was well established. In 1785, upon the retirement of
Benjamin Franklin, Jefferson was appointed minister to France. Thus he would
be absent for four crucial years as American leaders replaced the Articles of
Confederation with a more effective form of government.79
One of the catalysts for change was a popular uprising known as Shays’
Rebellion, and as Jefferson viewed the incident from afar, his sentiments
concerning the evolution of American government began to visibly shift away
from those of his fellow revolutionaries. While his break with what became
known as Federalism was not yet apparent, as a result of Shay’s Rebellion,
Jefferson’s views on the proper uses of the military became crystal clear.

An Honorable Rebellion
In 1786 a group of farmers in western Massachusetts rebelled against
taxes levied on them by the state government. Massachusetts had previously
witnessed uprisings within the cities on the eastern seaboard (principally Boston)
when they increased taxes on the urban population. Afraid of repeating those
unhappy events, the legislature decided to shift the burden onto farmers in the
west, who were less numerous and more dispersed. Many farmers faced
imprisonment for debts they could not pay, or the loss of their farms.
Daniel Shays rose to lead the revolt, which was thereafter called by his
name, Shays’ Rebellion. Shays had served in the Continental Army and had
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held office after the war in Pelham, Massachusetts. As the rebellion grew,
Shays’ small army marched on courthouses in Great Barrington, Springfield,
Concord, Worcestor, and other towns. The resulting rebellion produced a crisis,
because the Confederation Congress proved unable to raise enough troops to
confront the rebels. Eventually, Massachusetts volunteers, led by General
Benjamin Lincoln, quelled the uprising with minimal bloodshed in 1787. That
spring, John Hancock became governor of Massachusetts and worked with the
state legislature to pardon most of the rebels, reduce court fees, and provide
debt relief. But Shays’ Rebellion pointed clearly to the weakness of the national
government.
The effects of the uprising (and similar events in other states) on the
national government far exceeded the local significance. General Henry Knox,
the superintendent for war, deliberately misrepresented the size and purpose of
the rebel force to Congress. He claimed that 12,000 to 15,000 well-armed men
were trying to seize Massachusetts and force a redistribution of property, and
that if they were not stopped, others from adjoining states would soon join them.
As this distorted news reached other states, it served to spur their willingness to
send delegates to the proposed constitutional convention in Philadelphia
designed to fix the flaws of the Confederation.80
Alexander Hamilton’s reaction to Shays’ Rebellion was in line with his
ideological predisposition for strengthening the national government above all
other considerations. A student of David Hume and Emmerich de Vattel, he
rejected the contractual theory of John Locke and instead viewed government as
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necessary to secure commerce and agriculture. People obeyed the government
not from some vague respect for a social contract, but rather because of the
need for order and the fear of coercion. Further, Hamilton saw the protection of
liberty not as the main goal of government, but rather as a means toward
promoting national economic and political success.81
Jefferson sympathized with the rebels.
Can history produce an instance of rebellion so honorably
conducted? …God forbid we should ever be twenty years without
such a rebellion.82
I am not discouraged by this; for thus I calculate: An insurrection in
one of thirteen States in the course of eleven years that they have
subsisted, amounts to one in any particular State, in one hundred
and forty-three years, say a century and a half. This would not be
near as many as have happened in every other government that
has ever existed.83

Jefferson did not especially fear uprisings—especially ones outside his
own state of Virginia. He calculated that an occasional rebellion would be a
healthy indicator of freedom. He pointed out that the people of Massachusetts
had lost markets for their goods as a result of the Revolution and the war with
Algiers (which began in 1786), so that money was scarce. He believed that state
legislature was wrong to lay so heavy a burden on the farmers, and, while
deprecating their violent acts, he understood the rebels’ concerns. He viewed
the disgruntled farmers’ actions as a needed check on arbitrary government.
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Hamilton, on the other hand, saw no virtue in rebellion. Following the
writings of Sir James Steuart84, he believed that the best guarantor against
tyranny was wide-scale commercial development, not the violent impulses of the
lower classes. The economic success of the republic depended above all on law
and order. Rebels were to be suppressed, not praised for their republican
virtue.85
Jefferson was concerned by the readiness of the Massachusetts state
militia to point their muskets at their fellow citizens, and he feared any form of
government that over-relied on coercion rather than on political communication.86
Moreover, he was aware that champions of the national government were using
the affair to push for a stronger coercive instrument to be used against
recurrences of societal violence. He was balanced in his understanding of the
need for law and order, and he even noted to a friend that Europe viewed the
eventual suppression of the rebellion as a fair indicator of the strength of the
American system. But he trusted the local militia more than a standing military
commanded by a national government. “I am persuaded myself that the good
sense of the people will always be found to be the best army.” 87

It would seem from his reaction to developments leading up to the drafting
and ratification of the new constitution that Jefferson was invariably opposed to
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the military establishment, but such was not the case. As he toiled to improve
America’s economic and political standing in Europe, Jefferson weighed in on the
growing problem of piracy from the Barbary States, and he found himself arguing
for military intervention.

The Chief of a Gang of Robbers
In June, 1786, Jefferson received a letter from Richard O’Brien, captain of
the Dauphin, which had been captured and whose crew was held captive by the
Dey of Algiers. In the letter, O’Brien explained the two approaches that the
United States might take toward the Barbary States and their interdiction of trade.
First, the Americans could pay tribute, as most European powers were doing at
the time. Secondly, they could fight and try to intimidate the piratical
governments into leaving American ships alone. The choice between these two
strategic options came down to two issues: cost efficiency and national honor.
Captain O’Brien suggested to Jefferson that the British minister to the Dey was in
fact advising the potentate on how to extort the maximum amount from the
Americans. This allegation resonated with the Anglophobic Virginian, and in
Jefferson’s mind, the solution was clear: war.88
The Barbary powers—Morocco, Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis—were
nominally loyal to the Ottoman Empire, but in reality they were independent
potentates. The ruling powers in Algeria at the time of the crisis were Turks—
mostly military adventurers—who had migrated to Algeria, about 12,000 in
number. They were forbidden to marry Moors and most often stayed single, and
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their singular focus was on ruling over the natives for profit.89 The Dey of
Algiers—who ruled until his death in 1791—was an impulsive, unpredictable ruler
who proceeded to alienate most of his Turkish colleagues, with the result that he
had to spend enormous sums to keep from being assassinated. He and his
successor specialized in extorting money from foreign powers through demands
for tribute and ransoming captured crews. It may seem curious that the great
European powers did not combine their efforts to suppress this state-sponsored
piracy (as Jefferson urged), but most nations accepted the demand for tribute as
a more cost-effective way of securing the sea-lanes. Further, since European
powers were often at war with each other, they saw the Barbary pirates as a sort
of auxiliary force that could prey upon their enemies.
Some Americans, like John Adams, were like-minded. But for the most
part, the citizens of the fledgling American republic rankled under the humiliating
practice and desired to be free of paying tribute to any power. American ideals,
freshly washed in the blood of patriots who fought against unfair British taxation,
would in any case be inimical to such blackmail. As Americans generally wanted
to avoid the complications of European wars, they had no interest in the
pragmatic arguments and martial calculations that explained away Barbary
depredations in Europe. In short, the American political outlook ultimately would
choose war rather than tribute. 90
In the late 1780s, approximately 17% of American wheat exports and
about 25% of salted fish exports were finding the best markets in Mediterranean
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ports. Thus about 100 American merchant ships per year were traversing the
waters in vicinity of the Barbary powers.91 American ships were especially
vulnerable to interception, because, unlike the ships of France, Naples, Spain,
Italy, and others who sailed from ports throughout the Mediterranean, the
American ships had to enter through the Straits of Gibraltar. Captured crews
were most often transported directly to Algiers, whereupon they were stripped,
put into chains, and forced into hard labor as slaves. The common seamen were
exposed to the harshest conditions, often sleeping on stone floors without clothes
or blankets. The officers and wealthier passengers would normally find housing
with sympathetic European notables in Algiers, although they were still
considered slaves and forced to work. While many of the enslaved would survive
for up to ten years before being liberated, a number of them died from the
recurring plague or simply from the rigors of slavery.
In a letter to John Adams in July, 1786, Jefferson proposed that war with
Algeria was preferable to peace, and that in the long run, it would be cheaper
than paying endless tribute and more in accord with national honor. He
estimated that a “fleet of one hundred and fifty guns” would do the job at a cost of
four hundred and fifty thousand pounds to construct the ships, plus forty-five
thousand pounds per year operating cost. This amount, he claimed, was less
than what they would have to pay in tribute.92 Adams responded that Jefferson’s
estimates were decidedly low, and that the Algerines had a formidable navy and
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an invulnerable port in which to hide. Although he agreed that the cause was
just, Adams believed (correctly) that their new nation would not tolerate the
enormous cost of war. He further pointed out that if the United States were to
provoke the Dey through limited and ineffectual attacks, it would only make the
matter worse. “We ought not to fight them at all, unless we determine to fight
them forever.”93 For the time being, the United States would not fight at all. But
the problem would continue into the Washington administration.
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Conclusion
Jefferson departed Le Havre for England and eventually for Norfolk on 7
October, 1789. Arriving in Virginia in late November, he learned that Washington
had appointed him secretary of state and that the Senate had already confirmed
him. It took him until February, 1790 to finally assent to the post, and he reached
the temporary capital, New York City, on March 21st to take up his new duties.
By the time Jefferson became part of Washington’s first administration, his
views on the proper role of the military were firmly established. The coming
conflict with secretary of the treasury Alexander Hamilton had not yet
materialized, and Jefferson was still acting in concert (for the most part) with the
generation of revolutionaries with whom he had led the nation. The threats of
violence that accompanied the Confederation Congress’ ineffectual handling of
soldiers’ pay and release from service concerned Jefferson and his allies. But
over the next few years, these concerns became fears and took on flesh in the
persons of Hamilton and his cronies.
Jefferson’s early perspectives on the military establishment emanated
more from political theory and his experiences of British depredations than from
actual experience at governance. He was opposed to a standing military
establishment on three grounds: the threat to liberty, the expense, and the social
implications of a military aristocracy. These three ideas were wedded through a
rich tradition of British political writing that informed the Democratic Republicans
and populated their vocabulary with dark terms: “corruption”, “interest”,
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“coercion”, and “tyranny”. Jefferson led a faction (not yet a party) within the
Revolutionary society that was conditioned by education to perceive any
aberrations in the nation’s political development as deliberate evil, and their
Devil’s primary tool was the military. Once involved in the national government,
Jefferson would experience firsthand the threat of an American military
establishment and its implications for the future of the republic.
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When George Washington became the nation’s first president in 1789, he
chose Thomas Jefferson to be his secretary of state. Jefferson joined a cabinet
of fellow Revolution-era luminaries: John Adams, vice president, Alexander
Hamilton, secretary of the treasury; Edmund Randolph, attorney general; and
Henry Knox, secretary of war. During his sojourn as the administration’s chief
diplomat and later as John Adams’ vice president, Jefferson found himself
increasingly at odds with Federalist policies in general and with the political,
economic, and military schemes of Hamilton in particular. In defiance of
Washington’s repeated pleas to avoid factionalism within the administration,
Jefferson became the de facto head of what became the Democractic
Republican party—a party defined by its opposition to Washington’s and Adams’
administrations. This period saw the continued development of Jefferson’s
thinking about military policy, and by the time of his election to the nation’s
highest office in 1801, the army and navy were at the center of his
disagreements with Hamiltonian Federalism.
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Jefferson reached the nation’s capital, New York, in late March 1790 to
take up his duties as secretary of state. In his role as a member of Washington’s
cabinet, Jefferson developed conflicting feelings about his chief. He deeply
respected Washington and appreciated the centrality of his fellow Virginian to the
success of the republic. But he became uncomfortable with Washington’s style
as president. The nation’s first chief administrator was trying to find the balance
between avoiding any pretension of monarchical ambition on the one hand, and
avoiding the government’s slide into democratic chaos on the other. As a result
Washington assumed a dignified, aristocratic demeanor and labored to reinforce
the authority and power of the executive. Jefferson and other anti-Federalists
grew concerned that despite the virtue of Washington, the office of president
might become a seat of tyranny.94
Jefferson’s first significant accomplishment as secretary of state had little
to do with foreign policy. When Congress deadlocked over Hamilton’s plans to
fund the national debt and have the federal government assume the states’
debts, Jefferson brokered a deal with Madison that resulted in the passage of the
assumption bill in July 1790 along with provisions to move the capital temporarily
to Philadelphia and ultimately to the Potomac. Although he grew more and more
suspicious of Hamilton’s motives, Jefferson was instrumental in convincing his
anti-Federalist allies to assist in the first steps toward Hamiltonian Federalism. 95
More conflict ensued with Hamilton over his unauthorized meddling in
foreign affairs. According to long British tradition, the first lord of the treasury
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was the prime minister, and Hamilton saw his role in this light. The secretary of
the treasury favored an alliance with Great Britain, because he saw such a
friendship as important to the nation’s security and prosperity. Jefferson,
however, loathed England and foresaw any such alliance as a precursor to the
very subjection the United States had fought a war to escape. The battle lines
were forming: Hamiltonian Federalists with an affinity for better relations with
England; Jeffersonian anti-Federalists (later, Republicans) more admiring of
revolutionary France.96
In the developing debate over how to deal with England, Jefferson
outlined his strategic assessment to President Washington. Louisiana had been
a Spanish colony since 1762, and according to the Treaty of Paris (1783) and
Britain’s corresponding agreements with Spain, France, and the Netherlands,
known as the Treaties of Versailles, Spain also received the ill-defined East and
West Florida. Since Spain was a weak power, vis a vis France and England,
Jefferson was concerned about the future of the American West and South. He
pointed out that the greatest danger from abroad would be realized if the British
were able to wrest control of the Mississippi River and Louisiana Territory from
Spain, because they would then have the United States completely surrounded.
A British presence west of the Mississippi would mean incessant English
meddling aimed at the destruction of the American republic. Hence, Jefferson
concluded, American strategy—both diplomatic and military—must aim at
deterring or delaying any British moves toward acquiring Louisiana. A war
95
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between European powers should see the United States as strictly neutral,
Jefferson counseled, unless those powers attempted to seize the other’s
American holdings, thus disrupting the balance along the frontiers. If London
could agree to equitable treaty arrangements that left the status quo alone in
America and treated the United States as a diplomatic equal, then the secretary
of state would acquiesce in such a treaty. The vast disparity in strength
(economic and military) between the two nations, along with England’s need to
control shipping to and from the European continent, precluded such an ideal
outcome. As a result, the controversy between the two embryonic American
political parties came to a head over the English connection. The Federalists’
(and especially Hamilton’s) coziness with the English worried the Virginian
Francophile.97
The Algerine War
The ongoing conflict with the Dey of Algiers was still festering when
Jefferson became secretary of state. His impulses to fight rather than pay tribute
were still strong, but the reality of America’s naval weakness tempered his policy
recommendations.
When three ships—the Betsey, Dauphin and Maria—were captured along
with their crews, the Washington administration, through secretary of state
Jefferson, sought the release of the captives. Jefferson sent an envoy, Mr. John
Lamb, but the mission was hopeless before it got started, because the
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Americans had determined to offer the Dey less than $300 per man—a pittance
compared to the going rate for redeeming Christian slaves. Most nations were
redeeming their citizens at a rate of $1200 to $4000 per man. The American
envoy was snubbed and returned home.98 Later remonstrations from Captain
Richard O’Brien and others claimed that the ill-advised and arrogant Mr. Lamb
had done irreparable damage to the American reputation and chances for peace
both in Algeria and Morocco.99 Jefferson’s responsibility—indeed, culpability—in
this affair is inescapable, but it derived from a profound American ignorance
concerning the norms and standards of Barbary diplomacy. As the years went
by, Jefferson and his colleagues would become more attuned to the issues and
more willing to compromise…to a limit.
While some in Congress and in the administration agreed in principle with
Jefferson’s martial sentiments, several years went by without resolute action. In
February, 1792, Congress authorized a sum of $100,000 to bribe the Barbary
powers into peace, and another $40,000 for the president to redeem the
prisoners in Algiers.100 Unfortunately for the Americans, prices had gone up,
both for peace and redemption of slaves. The regency of Algeria was not
amenable to cutting a special deal with the Americans, for fear that European
powers might get wind of it and vie for reduction of their tribute as well.
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In spring, 1792, Washington tried another approach. As Captain O’Brien
had suggested that paying an annual tribute was historically more effective than
paying a large lump sum for a treaty of peace, the president commissioned John
Paul Jones to make his way to Algiers as the American Consul there and offer up
to $25,000 annually plus another $27,000 for the immediate release of the
thirteen remaining American captives (one of whom was actually a Frenchman
who had been a passenger on one of the captured ships).101 Admiral Jones died
in Paris before receiving his commission, so Jefferson directed Thomas Barclay,
US Consul in Morocco, to take over the mission, but he also died before he could
negotiate the deal. As the Americans scrambled to secure a deal, the Algerines
captured another prize—an American schooner, the Lark. Fortunately, her crew
escaped capture, for which the diplomats were profoundly grateful. If they had
been captured, the special envoy sent to secure peace and release of all
hostages would have had insufficient funds to obtain their freedom.102
Another blow to the American desire for peace came in October, 1793
when Algeria and Portugal concluded a twelve-month truce. With free access to
the Straits of Gibraltar, the Algerine ships would go after American shipping with
a vengeance.103 Edward Church, US Consul in Lisbon, reported to Jefferson that
the truce was a British concoction—negotiated by them on behalf of the
Portuguese—for the nefarious purpose of turning the Algerines loose on the
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Americans.104 To add to this injury, the British were impressing American sailors
from ships that put into Cadiz or Lisbon.
Throughout the conflict with the Barbary powers, Jefferson was also
convinced that the European nations, acting in concert with America, could easily
suppress the piracy to the mutual benefit of all. He was relentless in pursuing
and recommending such a course of action but without much success. While no
formal confederation was achieved, the United States’ shipping did benefit from
the actions of the Portuguese navy until it was temporarily withdrawn pursuant to
the truce in 1793. But in general the Europeans were unwilling to take on the
expense of such operations, and they viewed Barbary depredations upon others
with apathy or even delight. And as Nathaniel Cutting observed from Lisbon, the
various Christian powers were unwilling to take action that might benefit other
powers.105
By the end of October 1793, the Algerines had captured eleven more
American merchantmen along with their crews, bringing the number of American
slaves in Algiers to something more than 110.106 The Dey of Algiers was
reportedly demanding a ransom of $3,000,000 to settle the matter.107 This and
the regent’s refusal to negotiate with Colonel David Humphreys—the latest
choice for special envoy to Algiers—convinced George Washington, his cabinet,
and Congress that their only recourse was to build a navy and fight. Even the
captive Captain O’Brien advised against bribery and tribute, because he
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conjectured that any negotiated peace was almost certainly to be repudiated
upon the death of each Barbary ruler. As soon as a new ruler arose, O’Brien
stated, both his own avarice and the prompting of European powers (i.e., Britain)
hostile to the United States would convince the new dey to demand more tribute.
Nathaniel Cutting, an American official in Lisbon, wrote a lengthy letter to
Jefferson decrying the hopelessness of obtaining peace with Algiers—
In my opinion it would be more to the honor and advantage
of any nation which is determined to keep up a naval
establishment, to expend ten times the sum in supporting a
Squadron of Ships of War in the Mediterranean sufficient to protect
its Commerce, than tamely to comply with the insolent demands
with the chief of a gang of Robbers is pleased to make…
How small a proportion of the immense amount that has
been received by the States of Barbary as the price of peace with
this last half Century, would support a naval armament sufficient to
annihilate their Marine! This, I am aware, would not be so easy an
achievement as many imagine; --but still I think it within the line of
possibility if proper methods are pursued. It is not great force that
is so necessary to effect this desireable purpose, as great vigilance,
activity, patience & persevereance. [sic]108

The Americans also tried secretly to work through the French religious
order, the Mathurins, which had been founded in 1198 for the purpose of
redeeming Christian slaves taken by the Barbary powers. Although the French
were willing and able to assist, the price of redemption was climbing dramatically,
and the Mathurins were reluctant to act until the requisite monies were deposited
in Paris. As the French Revolution unfolded, the assets of the Mathurins, like
those of other religious orders, were seized and made public—a severe blow to
the ability of the order to negotiate redemptions. By the time the penurious
108
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American Congress appropriated the money, the price for redemption was well
beyond the available money, and negotiations through the Mathurins ceased.109
Thus Jefferson was again convinced that military means were the best
hope for procuring the release of the American captives. He proposed that the
United States send a force to patrol the endangered area from April through
November each year, when the Barbary pirates were active. He even suggested
to Congress that if American naval forces could prey upon Algerine or Turkish
ships and capture their crews, that the Dey might be amenable to a prisoner
exchange, although Jefferson admitted that such an arrangement would be
extraordinary, based upon past experiences. In any case the Algerine navy was
not that strong, and their ships never acted in concert, but rather preyed upon
other vessels in single-ship actions. Their gunnery was mediocre at best, and
they relied upon boarding to make their captures. Finally, Jefferson reported,
their ships are not well constructed and unable to withstand a broadside from an
American frigate.110
Still, it takes a navy to fight a naval war, and the United States had none
since the last ship of the Revolutionary War was sold in 1785—coincidentally the
same year that Algiers began preying on American merchantmen.111 With
virtually no one still clinging to the hope that peace could be bought from the Dey
of Algiers, Washington prevailed upon Congress to build a navy, and in March,
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1794, Congress authorized four 44-gun and two 36-gun vessels.112 The act
allowed the president to either construct or purchase the vessels, and it also
specified the size, pay, and rations of the crews—including a detailed daily menu
for each day of the week. Washington’s administration opted to construct the
vessels, one each in Boston (Constitution, 44 guns), New York (President, 44
guns), Philadelphia (United States, 44 guns), Baltimore (Constellation, 36 guns),
Portsmouth, New Hampshire (Congress, 36 guns), and Norfolk (Chesapeake, 44
guns).113 The ships were to be completed and afloat in 1795.114
The political wrangling over the bill was intense, as many felt that any
military establishment was expensive, provocative to foreign powers, and a threat
to liberty. In the end, the bill was passed with a proviso that the construction
would be cancelled in the event a negotiated peace occurred. Although
construction began the ships were not completed before peace between the two
powers was concluded in March, 1796. Only three of the ships were authorized
for completion—the United States, Constitution, and Constellation.115
Meanwhile, Jefferson and his successors at the State Department,
Edmund Randolph (2 Jan 1794 through 20 Aug 1795) and Timothy Pickering (10
Dec 1795 through 12 May 1800) continued to work through David Humphreys to
effect peace and redemption of prisoners with Algiers. The liberal sum of
$800,000 was to be Humphreys’ upward limit in his efforts with the Dey. Actual
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ransom was to be obtained at the lowest possible price, not exceeding $3000 per
man. In the eight years since the Dauphin and Maria were captured, Jefferson
and the rest of the administration had come to realize that dealing with the
Barbary states was not cheap.116 Still, this sum was far short of the millions
demanded by the Dey. But throughout 1795 American officials instructed
Humphreys and the other agents to the Barbary powers to try to effect peace
and, where necessary, release of American slaves. In August, James Simpson
reported to Secretary Randolph that he had achieved a peace treaty with “his
Imperial Majesty Muley Soliman”, the regent of Morocco, on similar terms as
those agreed with the ruler’s late father.117
In September, 1795, the US envoy to Algiers, Joseph Donaldson,
concluded a treaty of peace with the government of the Dey. Some of the
American captives were freed (the rest to be arranged later), and the American
Senate ratified the treaty on 7 March, 1796.118 Official documents listed a paltry
$38,188.40 as the price for this treaty, but letters from David Humphreys state
that the deciding factor in winning peace from the Dey was French influence.119
In addition the Turkish version of the treaty states that an annual tribute of 12,000
Algerian gold pieces (or the equivalent value in naval stores) would be paid to
Algeria. A letter from Captain O’Brien in 1796 refers to $60,000 in presents to
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the Dey.120 In a secret letter from David Humphreys to the US Charge d’Affaires
in Madrid, the amount of $400,000 in Spanish silver or hard dollars is requested
for export to Algiers for the redemption of Americans there, and other
correspondence confirms that the United States gave the Dey an armed frigate
as well.121 In any case the treaty did not represent a complete resolution of the
Barbary problem, because the Dey constantly threatened to renew assaults if his
demands were not met, and both Tripoli and Tunis remained in some state of
hostility with the United States.122 Further, when civil war broke out in Morocco,
the pretender to the throne began to prey upon any shipping he suspected of
transporting goods that would aid his enemy.123
In April, 1796, Joel Barlow wrote extensively to Secretary of State Timothy
Pickering explaining why concluding peace with Algiers, even at the expense of
over a million dollars, was well worth the cost. He showed that the cost of losing
ships, redeeming crews, and rising insurance rates would soon make the
Mediterranean trade next to impossible. Peace, on the other hand, would
facilitate a most lucrative trade, which would stimulate American economy and
more than compensate the public monies through taxes and duties.124 It was this
line of reasoning, along with an innate fear of a standing military establishment,
that convinced the administration and the Congress to conclude peace with the
Dey. In vindication of Barlow’s advice, the Dey of Algiers fought a war against
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Tunis when the ruler there refused to deal peaceably with the Americans.125
Jefferson, who officially resigned as secretary of state on 31 December
1794 soon to re-entered politics as vice president to John Adams in 1796 and,
even more importantly, as the de facto head of the emerging Republican Party.
The Barbary States continued to be a thorn to the Americans throughout the
period, and matters would come to a head during Jefferson’s presidency.
Through the conflict with the Dey of Algiers, Jefferson had learned that the tribute
system was well established and, from a dispassionate, economic standpoint,
well-reasoned. Ultimately, however, his own feelings of justice and nationalism,
and the advice he received from realists like Nathaniel Cutting, caused Jefferson
to view the tribute system as an offending anachronism of the Old World
monarchical system. When faced with depredations at the hands of the Pasha of
Tripoli, President Jefferson would opt for war.

Alexander Hamilton and the Development of Federalist Military Policy
Much of what constitutes the political legacy of Thomas Jefferson must be
attributed to his sustained reaction to Hamiltonian Federalism. According to
Edward Mead Earle (and many other historians), during the years 1789-1797,
Alexander Hamilton did more than any other individual to establish the early
national policies of the United States.126 He sought to strengthen the national
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government at the expense of states, and he believed that in order to develop a
strong nation, he must revive public credit. To achieve this latter goal, he had to
have both the financial and political backing of speculators, and this in turn
argued for a Congress comprised of men with interests in the public debt. From
Thomas Jefferson’s viewpoint, this arrangement was the very definition of
corruption and had to be opposed.127 Since a primary source of public expense
was the military establishment, it was inevitable that Jefferson would oppose any
accretions to army or navy strength, and his opposition in fact came to
characterize Democratic Republicanism. Jefferson’s perceived opposition to a
large standing military thus emanated from an optimistic pacifism, from a desire
to restrict debt and the political corruption that would attend that debt, from an
aversion to the establishment of a military aristocracy that would threaten
Jefferson’s egalitarian social goals, and from fear that the military establishment
would be a threat to liberty. Because President Jefferson’s military policies were
in large measure a reaction to Hamilton’s policies during the administrations of
Washington and Adams, he had much to undo before he could formulate a
rational military policy.
The disaffection that existed between Jefferson and Hamilton began with
their service together in Washington’s administration. As secretary of state
Jefferson served alongside Hamilton, the secretary of the treasury. They began
as friends, but the relationship deteriorated over ever-widening political views. At
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a dinner at Jefferson’s house in April, 1791—John Adams and Alexander
Hamilton attending—the conversation drifted to the British constitution.
Adams: “Purge that constitution of its corruption, and give to its
popular branch equality of representation, and it would be the most
perfect constitution ever devised by the wit of man.”
Hamilton: “Purge it of its corruption, and give to its popular branch
equality of representation, and it would become an impracticable
government: as it stands at present, with all its supposed defects, it
is the most perfect government which ever existed.”128
Hamilton, despite his vigorous arguments in favor of the new American
Constitution, had originally called for a government in which the president and
senators were elected for life. He wanted the president to be empowered to
appoint state governors, and to be invested with the right to veto state
legislation—even if passed unanimously. With the expression of such
sentiments, Jefferson could not but interpret Hamilton as the enemy of liberty.
Jefferson also had grave concerns over Hamilton’s financial schemes, because
he viewed public debt, pensioners, and stockjobbers through the lens of James
Harrington and Algernon Sidney, who believed that only an independent man
(e.g., a landowner) could be free of corruption. By populating Congress with men
who had an interest in the public debt—either as pensioners or creditors—
Hamilton (and, by extension, Federalists) were gaining undue influence over the
political system. Thus were planted the seeds of the nation’s two-party system.
The resulting vicious newspaper war that ran its course in the early 1790s
dismayed Washington but became a necessary dialogue between two diverging
views on the proper course for the republic.
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The question of whether the nation required a standing army led to a
fundamental disagreement between the Federalists and the Republicans. Taking
his cue from Whig philosophy, Jefferson claimed that standing armies were an
unnecessary expense and “dangerous to the rights of the nation”.129 He even
dipped into ancient history, despite his later deprecation of classical (as opposed
to scientific) education:

"The Greeks and Romans had no standing armies, yet they
defended themselves. The Greeks by their laws, and the Romans
by the spirit of their people, took care to put into the hands of their
rulers no such engine of oppression as a standing army. Their
system was to make every man a soldier and oblige him to repair to
the standard of his country whenever that was reared. This made
them invincible; and the same remedy will make us so." 130

It is easy to over-emphasize this difference in opinion. As was often the
case in the political conflicts of the early republic, both parties wanted a viable
national security establishment, and both understood the need for some sort of
standing army. The difference between Hamiltonian Federalists and Jeffersonian
Republicans was a matter of nuance and degree. Despite his oft-repeated
rhetoric and his ideological background, Jefferson came to recognize that no
modern nation could depend solely on the militia.131 But it was Alexander
Hamilton’s deliberate politicization of the regular army (by reserving commissions
for loyal Federalists and restricting the opportunities of Republicans) that, in
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Jefferson’s mind, endangered the nation and in turn shaped Jefferson’s handling
of military affairs.132

Hamilton had been born on the West Indian island of Nevis and was
orphaned by the time he was eleven. He made his way to New York and entered
King’s College in 1773. He shortly thereafter became a writer of much
prominence in the pamphlet wars that preceded the Revolution. In 1776, he
entered the Continental Army and fought with Washington at Long Island, White
Plains, Trenton, and Princeton. He became Washington’s secretary and later
commanded a regiment under Lafayette with distinction. At Yorktown, he
commanded a column in the final assault on the British fortifications. After the
war, he worked with Washington to bring about a strong military establishment
for the new Confederation. Hamilton married well by winning the hand of
Elizabeth Schuyler, the daughter of General Philip Schuyler, and thus allied
himself with one of the most prominent families in New York. In April, 1783,
Hamilton chaired a Congressional committee whose task was to formulate a
post-war military policy. He solicited advice from Washington, and Washington
responded with his “Sentiments on a Peace Establishment.”
Washington believed that the country required a regular army to garrison
West Point as well as critical points in the north, west, and south to “awe the
Indians” and protect against any attacks from Canada or Florida. He wrote that
an army of 2,631 officers and men would suffice. Washington anticipated
reaction to what was considered a high number, but he noted that it would be
132
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better to start with a large army that would impress the Indians and then
decrease slowly, than to suffer an embarrassment and later be required to build
up. (His unintentional prophecy came true seven years later with Josiah
Harmar’s defeat at the hands of Little Turtle in 1790, and a year after that with
the Miami Indians’ decisive defeat of General Arthur St. Clair’s army.) He also
believed in the development and organization of a militia that would be
nationalized when required, as well as supervised by an Inspector General. He
called for the establishment of arsenals and manufactories to store and build
arms and munitions. Finally, he believed that one or more military academies
should be established to educate young officer cadets in military science—
especially engineering and artillery. In passing, Washington endorsed the need
for a sea-going navy to protect American commerce and coastlines.133
Hamilton’s subsequent report to Congress followed Washington’s
recommendations generally, but he emphasized the role of regulars and less that
of militia. He began his report by urging the Congress to clarify their powers to
organize the military, since the Articles of Confederation were vague on the
subject. He then argued the case for a nationally organized military
establishment, rather than trying to depend upon the several states, each
developing its own militia. He concluded his report by recommending a standing
army of four regiments of infantry and one of artillery, along with a corps of
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engineers.134
Hamilton, however, was arguing in favor of a national military
establishment at a time when the Congress was ardently anti-nationalist and antimilitary. His report and recommendations were rejected, and on June 2, 1784,
the Congress disbanded most of the army, leaving only 80 men and a few
officers.135 But with military threats growing in the West, the Congress realized
that this tiny force could do nothing to defend against the Indians or the British,
and could not even restrict white squatters settling illegally in Indian lands. The
day after disbanding the Continental Army, they therefore authorized the
organization of the 1st American Regiment—a 700 man outfit to be provided by
four states and organized as a compromise between militia and regulars. In
1785, they authorized the regiment to be filled with soldiers enlisting for three
years. Under the command of Josiah Harmar, this single regiment had little
chance to “awe the Indians” or command respect from the British. It remained a
woefully inadequate force.136
The experience of Daniel Shays’ Rebellion in 1786 made it clear both that
the single regiment army was insufficient for the nation’s security needs and that
the Confederation Congress was dysfunctional, as indeed were the Articles of
Confederation themselves. The result was the Constitutional Convention of
1787, which produced a mixed and balanced form of government. The
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Constitution split control of the military between the Executive, who would
command the military, and the Congress, who would authorize, organize, and
equip the military. The new Constitution also established the dual tradition of a
regular army and state militias.
Hamilton, of course, was instrumental in achieving the ratification of the
Constitution, arguing strongly in favor of the nationalist idea in the Federalist. In
Number 24, he addressed the military question directly and noted that those who
opposed the new Constitution because of fears of a standing army were
misinformed. First, neither the Articles of Confederation nor most of the state
constitutions prevented the establishment of standing armies. Second, and more
to the point, Hamilton argued that the new republic required a standing army, due
to the threats to the north, south, and west. Militias, he claimed, would not be
capable of sustained frontier duty.137
In Number 25, Hamilton went on to argue that the states were not
competent to handle military exigencies, because the threats to security span
“from Maine to Georgia”. He pointed to the prohibition in the Articles of
Confederation against states maintaining non-militia armies of their own and
endorsed the sentiment that a military run by the several states would be
uneconomical, disorganized, and ineffective. Instead, a national force,
consisting of regulars, not militia, must be the bedrock of American security.
Here I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country is its
natural bulwark, and would be at all times equal to the national
defense. This doctrine, in substance, had like to have lost us our
independence. It cost millions to the United States that might have
137
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been saved. The facts which, from our own experience, forbid a
reliance of this kind, are too recent to permit us to be the dupes of
such a suggestion. The steady operations of war against a regular
and disciplined army can only be successfully conducted by a force
of the same kind. Considerations of economy, not less than of
stability and vigor, confirm this position. The American militia, in the
course of the late war, have, by their valor on numerous occasions,
erected eternal monuments to their fame; but the bravest of them
feel and know that the liberty of their country could not have been
established by their efforts alone, however great and valuable they
were. War, like most other things, is a science to be acquired and
perfected by diligence, by perseverance, by time, and by
practice.138
Hamilton believed that recent history had shown that even in peace, the
states had on occasion kept standing armies as a deterrent to insurrection. The
logical conclusion, then, would be that the Constitution should allow the
Congress discretion in whether to keep an army, rather than proscribing one
altogether. By leaving the power to raise armies in the hands of the legislature,
there would be no need to fear executive excess.139
Jefferson, to the contrary, feared giving the national government the
power to maintain a standing army, especially in times of peace. Indeed, he
wrote to Madison concerning the Bill of Rights that he would have preferred the
inclusion of another provision: “All troops of the United States shall stand ipso
facto disbanded, at the expiration of the term for which their pay and subsistence
shall have been last voted by Congress, and all officers and soldiers, not natives
of the United States, shall be incapable of serving in their armies by land except
during a foreign war.”140
On June 21, 1788, the ninth state ratified the Constitution, and a new form
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of government was in place. The stage was set for the creation of a military
policy that could transcend the weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation. Just
as he had incalculable influence in obtaining ratification of the Constitution, so
also Hamilton would be a key figure in developing the military policies of the
Washington and Adams administrations.
With Henry Knox as the Secretary of War, Washington’s administration
urged Congress to nationalize the state militias, giving the central government
the power to train, equip, and organize them in a coherent way. Instead, in 1792,
Congress responded with two pieces of legislation that fell far short of creating
effective militias: the Calling Forth Act, and the Uniform Militia Act. By the
former, the president could, in time of war, nationalize the state militias—but not
to suppress an insurrection or for any other purpose. The latter act theoretically
provided for uniform militia regulations that would have produced the “sameness”
and interchangeability that Washington called for, but since the legislation had no
coercive power, the states largely ignored it. The main impact of this bad
legislation was that it proved the nation would have to rely primarily upon a
regular army for security.141
Hamilton believed that the nation’s economy was fundamental to its
power, and that the economy must be nurtured and controlled to a degree by the
state. An economic nationalist, Hamilton wanted to “render the United States
independent of foreign nations for military and other essential supplies.”142
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Hamilton argued in 1791 that economic independence through diversity of
manufactures, selected protection of industries, and some government subsidies,
along with agriculture, would lessen the possibility of foreign intrigue and render
the nation less likely to be embroiled in foreign wars. This happy state, in turn,
would lessen the need for a large military establishment.143 Such sentiments
against a large military establishment would certainly have resonated with
Jefferson. But there is no evidence that Hamilton actually believed his own
words. The disagreements between the two men were destined to come to a
head during the administration of John Adams.

The Wild, Wild West
A critical analysis of Thomas Jefferson’s military policies will necessarily
include a discussion of his dealings with the American Indians. Anthony Wallace,
in Jefferson and the Indians: the tragic fate of the first Americans, represents the
most common school of thought on the subject, and he criticizes Jefferson and
others for their hypocrisy, cruelty, and culpability in the eventual destruction of
Indian society.144 The salient problem with this analysis is that it is based more
on morality and ethics than on historical context. Although aware of the ethical
implications of their various policies toward the Indians, policymakers of the early
republic thought of the matter more in terms of national security. The reason was
simple: the Indians represented a grave threat to the viability, even the survival
of the United States. While moral analysis of Jefferson’s policies remains
143

See Washington’s Farewell Address, 1796, drafted by Alexander Hamilton.

75

attractive for 21st century critics, the morality question is quite beside the point of
this study; the Indians were a serious threat.145 To understand Thomas
Jefferson’s Indian policy, it is necessary to review how the two previous
presidents dealt with the problem.
Washington’s administration had achieved a peace treaty with the Indians
south of the Ohio River, the Treaty of New York. Due to the diligence of
Secretary of War Henry Knox, the American frontiersmen in Tennessee, although
guilty of occasional transgressions, remained restrained enough to avoid fullscale war with the Indians there. In the Old Northwest, however, a confederation
of tribes backed by British support emerged as a serious threat to the fledgling
republic. The Ohio River was crucial to the economic well-being of the nation,
and clashes throughout the valley were common. By June 1790 the violence
there was serious enough for the Americans along that frontier to request federal
assistance in quelling the Indians’ attacks.146
To that end Knox ordered an expedition under General Harmar and the
governor of the Northwest Territory, Arthur St. Clair. The objective of the
expedition was to destroy the Indian war parties that emanated from the area
between the Wabash and Maumee Rivers. In a display of utter incompetence, a
two-pronged assault into the area led to disaster. One wing of the attack turned
back after making only half-hearted progress up the Wabash. The other wing
suffered two ambushes by the Indians and fell back in disorder. Overall the
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performance of the militia was abysmal, while the regulars—small in number—
proved generally reliable.147
The following year, Washington, armed with a new act of Congress that
allowed him to call up both militia and short-term volunteer levies to supplement
the regular army, ordered St. Clair to conduct a swift campaign to retrieve the
defeat of the previous year. The largely ill-trained, undisciplined rabble marched
to the vicinity of present-day Fort Wayne, Indiana and camped along the Wabash
River. The war chief of the Miami Indians, Little Turtle, organized a massive
assault against the American force on the morning of November 4. St. Clair’s
militia fled almost immediately, while the governor led a bayonet charge by the
regulars. Despite his individual heroism, the battle was decidedly against the
small remaining forces, and St. Clair had to lead the survivors in a hasty retreat.
The Indians had inflicted over 900 casualties on the Americans—the US Army’s
single worst defeat in history.148
Washington was outraged and demanded that St. Clair resign from the
army, which he did, while remaining governor. Washington then commissioned
Anthony Wayne to settle the matter with the Indians in 1794. In the intervening
two years, Congress authorized three new regiments, and Knox organized the
Army into what became known as the Legion of the United States, with the men
further organized into four sublegions. Wayne ruthlessly drilled the Legion, and
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in late 1793, Knox ordered him to move against the Indians.149
As Wayne advanced and built forts along his route, the British responded
by building Fort Miami along the Maumee, where two thousand Indians then
gathered to receive British aid. Confident in their numbers, the Indians attacked
Fort Recovery, which Wayne had built on the site of St. Clair’s defeat. Although
outnumbered 10-to-1, the American defenders held the Indians at bay. Later
reinforced with 1500 Kentucky mounted rifles, Wayne moved out in late July to
engage the combined force of Indians and the British. To his surprise and the
Indians’ consternation, however, the British had a change of heart and refused to
support their former allies. At the Battle of Fallen Timbers, Wayne’s Legion and
volunteer auxiliaries routed the 500 Indians who had gathered for battle. With no
further confidence in the British, and fearful of the reinvigorated US Army, the
Indians signed the Treaty of Greenville, ceding most of Ohio and part of
Indiana.150
Although Thomas Jefferson was not directly involved in these operations
or the decisions that led to them, he was intensely interested in America’s Indian
policy. Jefferson’s attitude toward the American Indians was a mixture of
admiration, contempt, sympathy, and fear. Discussing the value of an alliance
with them against the British in 1776, Jefferson wrote to John Page “They are a
useless, expensive, ungovernable ally.”151 While he maintained an academic
interest in their cultures, he nevertheless foresaw the destruction of their way of
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life and professed a goal of amalgamating them into American agricultural
society. “The ultimate happiness for them is…to intermix, and become one
people.”152
His sincere respect for Indian culture combined with his nationalistic fear
of the danger Indians represented, and long before he took office, Jefferson’s
views on Native Americans had coalesced with those of Washington and
Hamilton. The Indians were a national security problem.153 But they were only a
part of the challenge of how to handle the fast-growing American west.

The American west of the early 19th century was a curious combination of
burgeoning democracy, corrupt regional politics, and exciting opportunity.
Although it was unclear whether the west would be incorporated as states into
the Union, the region was nevertheless vital to the security and economic
success of the nation. The Mississippi River, along with the Ohio River,
constituted a major line of communication between the economies of the west
and the vital port of New Orleans.
The politics of the east were deeply intertwined with the development of
the western territories, not only because many politicians dabbled in land
speculation, but also because those on either side of the slavery issue foresaw
(incorrectly) its successful resolution in the west. Jefferson had called for the
banning of slavery in the western territories, but the proposed ordinance of 1784
was narrowly defeated. The ban did go into effect in the Northwest Territory,
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established by the Ordinance of 1787, but slavery was to remain a hot issue in
the southern regions of the west. For the first half of the 19th century the west
was to play the dual roles of ameliorating and furthering the political conflict
between north and south.154
With Spain in possession of Florida and the trans-Mississippi, the western
territories were constantly threatened with war. Outright invasion along the
American seacoast was a remote possibility, but conflict along the western
borders was virtually inevitable. Further, Spain and England were more than
willing to involve themselves in American politics, and throughout the west
unscrupulous men were involved with Spanish and British intrigues.
In 1788, for example, Colonel Josiah Harmar arrested a dissident leader
and warned the secretary of war that westerners had a plan to force the opening
of the Mississippi by attacking the Spanish in Natchez or New Orleans. Harmar
sent Ensign John Armstrong on a secret fact-finding trip through Franklin,
Tennessee, where he reported on separatist plots and foreign influence.155
William Blount, Federalist senator from Tennessee, concocted a plot with Robert
Liston, British minister to the United States, in which British troops would march
south from Canada, join with American frontiersmen, and march on Spanish
Florida and Louisiana. The conspiracy was foiled when one of Blount’s letters
was leaked to the press. Blount was expelled from the Senate, but he returned
to Tennessee and took over as president of the state senate there.156 Benjamin
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Sebastian, Associate Justice of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, was also in
Spanish pay, receiving a pension of $2000 per year.157 He was eventually
exposed and had to resign, and in the wake of the scandal, several duels were
fought between Republicans and Federalists in Kentucky.
Regular army officers were involved in numerous plots aimed at annexing
Spanish Florida, and many wished for a war of conquest.158 Jefferson, while not
averse to a war with Spain (which he thought the most winnable of conflict
scenarios), did not want to occasion the chaos and political crisis that would
result from an independent movement by westerners.159
The legislature of Georgia added to the confusion of the American west
through the botched handling of the Yazoo land grants. In the wake of a
campaign of corruption and bribery, they sold millions of acres of western land to
speculators, including influential politicians from the northeast. When the
corruption was exposed, the legislature nullified the transactions. Unfortunately,
some of the land sold had already been resold to others. This resulted in longterm confusion over who had legitimate title to the lands in question.
The condition of the American West during Thomas Jefferson’s
presidency bore directly on his perspective of national security. Both George
Washington and Thomas Jefferson contemplated the possibility that the western
territories would at some point coalesce into a separate confederacy, hopefully
friendly to but not part of the United States. Of paramount importance was that
the west not be permitted to become a hostile neighbor, because such a power
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would interdict the Mississippi. Regarding the various plans of governance being
considered for the west, Jefferson wrote in 1786 of the need to allow the western
territories to evolve into fully equal states enjoying self-government.160
Thus part of Jefferson’s western policy would be to forestall a split that
might endanger the nation. Still, Jefferson looked to the west as the best hope
for continued development of agriculture and democracy:
“It seems to me that in proportion as commercial avarice and
corruption advance on us from the north and east, the principles of
free government are to retire to the agricultural States of the south
and west, as their last asylum and bulwark. With honesty and selfgovernment for her portion, agriculture may abandon contentedly to
others the fruits of commerce and corruption.161
Unfortunately, to realize his policy goals, he would have to rely upon men,
some of whom were dubious and ill-motivated characters. To fully appreciate
Jefferson’s national security policy, it is necessary to see how vulnerable the
republic was to foreign influence by examining the career of a prominent military
leader at the time.
The Number 13
James Wilkinson, ranking general in the Army of the United States during
the Jefferson administration, was in the pay of the Spanish.162 Wilkinson joined
the Continental Army during the Revolutionary War and served honorably with a
somewhat mixed record. He was part of Benedict Arnold’s Quebec expedition
(along with Aaron Burr) and later served as secretary of the Board of War.
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In 1777, following Horatio Gates’ decisive success at Saratoga while
Washington had been defeated at both Brandywine and Germantown, General
Thomas Conway, angry with Washington, wrote a disparaging letter about the
commanding general to Gates. Wilkinson, then serving on Gates’ staff,
misquoted a portion of the letter to General William Alexander, who in turn
communicated Wilkinson’s version to Washington. When Washington sent the
letter to Gates, the latter defended himself and the matter became known to the
Congress. The so-called “Conway Cabal” amounted to nothing, due mostly to
Washington’s reputation within Congress and in the public’s eye, but it was the
first of many dubious incidents in the life of James Wilkinson.163 Toward the end
of the war, Wilkinson became embroiled in a conflict with General Gates, who
purportedly challenged his former staff officer to a duel. Although energetic,
ambitious, and normally well thought of by his superiors, Wilkinson developed a
reputation for shady dealings and for being overly outspoken concerning his
opinion of superiors.164
As Clothier-General of the Army, Wilkinson was accused of corruption and
roundly criticized by Washington and others. As a result Wilkinson resigned his
post and moved to Kentucky, where he pretended to represent a large mercantile
association from Philadelphia.165 Throughout the late 1780s, Wilkinson became
a prominent figure in supporting Kentucky’s efforts to separate from Virginia and
become a state. Benefiting from his senior military rank, he used his personal
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charisma to charm his fellow frontiersmen and became the center of the district’s
sectional politics. In 1786-87 the Virginia Assembly agreed in principle to the
eventual separation of Kentucky, but it also imposed delays until Kentuckians
could secure a guarantee that the United States would accept the district as a
state, and until Kentucky derived a state constitution. The Northwest Ordinance
of 1787 had provided a template for achieving statehood that would frame
Kentucky’s efforts, even though as a district of Virginia the new law did not apply
directly to Kentucky. According to the law, a newly surveyed territory would be
administered initially by a governor and judges appointed by the Congress of the
United States. Upon achieving a population of 5,000 free males of voting age,
the inhabitants would elect a territorial legislature, which would in turn send a
non-voting delegate to Congress. When the territory’s population reached
60,000 the legislature would submit a state constitution to Congress, who, if it
approved of the constitution, would then accept the territory as a state. The
delays implied by this system angered most of Kentucky’s citizens, and Wilkinson
set out to capitalize on their discontent.166
In August, 1785 Wilkinson became a member of the Kentucky delegation
to the third convention dealing with the district’s separation from Virginia.
Although the Virginia Assembly was favorable to the district’s petition for
separation, it also imposed a lengthy procedure that included a fourth convention
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to confirm the people’s desire to separate under the terms granted, and yet
another convention to determine the degree to which Virginia laws would pertain
during the course of separation. Wilkinson and his allies complained about the
delays and pushed for unilateral separation. His position a popular one, the
general was elected to represent the district again at the fourth convention.
When this meeting was delayed and then undermined by further legislation by
the Virginia Assembly, the political outrage in the Kentucky district accrued to
Wilkinson’s advantage. 167
The situation was exacerbated because the Spanish government in New
Orleans refused to guarantee Americans the right to ship goods out of the port.
For those farmers in the West who were at this time beginning to produce
bumper crops, the Mississippi River was the only viable outlet for their goods.
Shipping upstream along the Ohio River was too expensive, so New Orleans was
vital to the economy of the west. The apathy of the Federalist Northeast angered
citizens in the West and contributed to the general lack of loyalty to the United
States found west of the Appalachians at this time. Wilkinson was perfectly
positioned to turn this discontent into profit.168
The general decided to take the matter in hand and negotiate a separate
deal with the Spanish that would put control of Kentucky’s trade in his hands. He
bribed and talked his way down the Mississippi River in the spring of 1787,
arriving in New Orleans in the summer of 1787 and proceeded to negotiate a
deal with the Spanish governor there, Esteban Rodriguez Miro. Wilkinson
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argued that if the Spanish would grant him a monopoly on the river trade, he in
turn could use his considerable influence to further Spanish goals in western
North America. In August, Wilkinson swore allegiance to Spain. His plan was to
encourage the disaffection of Kentucky from the United States with a view to
establishing at some point a western confederacy friendly to (or perhaps joined
with) the Spanish Empire. 169 He instructed his Spanish contacts not to refer to
him by name, but rather by his coded designation, the Number (or Agent) 13.
Wilkinson’s introspection and comment on his own behavior is instructive
regarding the ease with which loyalty to the national government was exchanged
for personal gain.
Interest regulates the passions of Nations, as also those of
individuals, and he who attributes a different motive to human
affairs deceives himself or seeks to deceive others: although I
sustain this great truth, I will not, however, deny that every man
owes something to the land of his birth and in which he was
educated.170
Born and educated in America, I embraced its cause in the
last revolution, and remained throughout faithful to its interest, until
its triumph over its enemies: This occurrence has now rendered
my services useless, discharged me of my pledge, dissolved my
obligations, even those of nature, and left me at liberty, after having
fought for her happiness, to seek my own; circumstances and the
policies of the United States having made it impossible for me to
obtain this desired end under its Government, I am resolved to
seek it in Spain.171

Meanwhile, in Kentucky, the landless poor and small estate owners
effected an alliance of sorts. The goal of the landless poor was a radical
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redistribution of the land, which had been parceled out into large estates by
Virginia. The lawyers, judges, and small estate owners, known as the court
party, worked with them toward the goal of statehood. While the poor wanted
access to cheap land, the court party wanted free navigation of the Mississippi.
The district’s wealthy landowners, known as the country party, opposed any
move that would threaten their property and status, but they were ultimately
persuaded that statehood would serve their interests as well.172 Wilkinson
garnered political power by capitalizing on the fact that the eastern portion of the
country considered freedom of navigation on the Mississippi a lesser priority than
their Atlantic concerns. If their sentiments continued to dominate Congress, then
Kentucky would have to act on its own to protect the people’s interest there. He
viewed a separation of the west as inevitable and warned his Spanish patrons
that once separate, the west would have to ally either with Spain or with England.
He assured them that he was their only hope to sway Kentucky over to their side,
and he urged the Spanish to continue the blockage of trade, while simultaneously
allowing private deals that would encourage the west to leave the United
States.173
From 1787 through 1789 the citizens of Kentucky—both court and country
parties—pushed for statehood. While they had the support of both Virginia and
the national Congress, the Constitutional Convention derailed the process. The
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Congress meeting in New York eventually denied Kentucky statehood in
anticipation of a new constitution, which was then being ratified. Wilkinson saw
this impasse as a golden opportunity to encourage his countrymen in Kentucky to
declare independence from the United States and to ally themselves with Spain.
In the end, most of the citizens, although angry and frustrated at the Congress,
elected to remain with the United States, and Wilkinson’s plot fell apart.174
His failure led Wilkinson to strengthen his ties to the Spanish in New
Orleans, and he pressed his case hard there, insisting that he alone could further
Spanish interests in Kentucky. He continually sought money and land from
Governor Miro, but the Spanish began to lose interest in Wilkinson and his
designs. The “Spanish Conspiracy” was over. By 1791, Wilkinson despaired of
his Kentucky plan, and he left the state, accepting a commission in the United
States Army again. Kentucky became a state the following year.175
After his promotion to brigadier general in 1792, Wilkinson attempted to
purge the army of the officers who were still serving who came from the old First
Regiment. He represented this effort as an attempt to rid the army of
incompetent and unethical men, but the evidence points more to personal dislike
of officers who would not accept the patronage of the ambitious general. When
Major General Anthony Wayne took command following the disastrous Indian
campaigns of 1790-91, Wilkinson embarked on a deliberate campaign of
agitation against his senior. Even after Wayne’s splendid victory at Fallen
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Timbers, Wilkinson continued to criticize him until Wayne’s death in 1796.176

The character of James Wilkinson was a testimony to the dangers that
threatened the infant United States from within. With no compunction toward
serving foreign interests and selling his services to Spanish agents, the general
was a caricature of the nefarious adventurer from whom men of virtue had to
protect the public interest. Yet due to the party factionalism within the army,
Wilkinson remained a political ally of Jefferson’s, and the Republican leader
needed the support of the general. In later years, President Jefferson would
make use of Wilkinson and rely upon him to help thwart the Burr conspiracy.
Jefferson was aware of the general’s suspicious behavior and dubious loyalties,
but Wilkinson was a useful man in promoting Jefferson’s agendas with the army,
the navy, and against Aaron Burr.177 Although he ultimately allied with Wilkinson
against Burr, Jefferson’s deepest fears about corruption and abuse of power
were personified in men like the Number 13.

Growing Concerns: The Whiskey Rebellion and the Jay Treaty
By 1794 citizens of western Pennsylvania were ready for a fight. The
defects of early American governance were coalescing to produce an
increasingly intolerable situation for farmers there, and discontent arose from
many causes. Large numbers of absentee landlords created a socio-economic
cauldron of angry disputes. Judicial resolution of conflicts on the western frontier
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required arduous journeys to Philadelphia. To the west, farmers found their
access to the Mississippi restricted, and the federal government was continually
lax in providing protection from Indians. The final straw was Alexander
Hamilton’s excise tax (1791), which was perceived as targeting poor farmers in
favor of the urban elite.
The tax on whiskey was set at seven cents per gallon, with some
exceptions. But since the tax was collected when the product was distilled
(rather than when it was sold), it fell even on whiskey intended for the farmers’
own consumption. Further, since whiskey sold for about twenty-five cents per
gallon west of the Appalachians but for fifty cents per gallon to the east, the tax
rate was respectively 28% and 14%, thus leaving the impression of unfairness
against westerners. In spring, 1792, the state legislature reduced the tax
somewhat but increased the fines levied for non-compliance.178
Violence against government agents trying to set up tax offices or
otherwise enforce the excise began in 1791 and worsened the following summer,
when General John Neville, defending his home against a local militia who were
demanding redress, killed one man and wounded many more. Two years later in
the summer of 1794, militia again attacked and burned the general’s home. In
early August, a newly formed militia of about six thousand men marched through
Pittsburgh demanding the removal of anyone associated with the excise tax.179
Washington responded by forming a large army and marching into
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western Pennsylvania. By the time he reached Bedford in October, 1794 the
insurrectionists had dispersed, but Washington’s troops gathered up suspected
rebels and carted them off to Philadelphia to stand trial. The president’s heavyhanded response was thought to be the work of Alexander Hamilton, whom
some accused of orchestrating the entire affair in order to further his own
designs.180 Jefferson believed Hamilton was at the bottom of a conspiracy aimed
at causing and then crushing an insurrection.
[I]t answered the favorite purposes of strengthening government
and increasing public debt; and, therefore, an insurrection was
announced and proclaimed, and armed against, but could never be
found.181

To Madison, he complained that the army sent into western Pennsylvania was
ineffective and could have been easily destroyed if the locals had desired to do
so. Instead, they let the army pass while their resentment toward the
government deepened.
[T]heir detestation of the excise law is universal, and has now
associated to it a detestation of the government; and that a
separation which was perhaps a very distant and problematical
event, is now near, and certain, and determined in the mind of
every man.182

By the time the Rebellion was resolved, Jefferson had already resigned
his post as secretary of state, replaced by Edmund Randolph has assumed
duties as the nation’s secretary of state. French minister to the United States,
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Joseph Faucher, wrote an account of an interview with Randolph that was
subsequently intercepted by the British and given to Washington. The dispatch
implicated Randolph in a conspiracy to financially support the insurrection, and it
quoted him as opposing the government’s policy, causing Randolph to resign his
post.183
The Whiskey Rebellion thus left a scar on Washington’s administration
and reinforced Thomas Jefferson’s loathing of Hamiltonian Federalism and its
coercive use of the military. As he developed his military policy, Jefferson sought
for ways to prevent such uses of the army and the civil war that might result.

The most defining point of contention between the factions coalescing
around Hamilton and Jefferson during Washington’s administration was the Jay
Treaty (signed, 1794; ratified 1795) negotiated by John Jay and his English
counterpart, Lord William Grenville. It was also the watershed event that led to
Jefferson’s complete disaffection from Washington and the Federalists. To this
day historians debate whether the Jay Treaty was a clumsy American misstep or
a masterstroke of strategic genius. It was, perhaps, both.184
Washington was determined to avoid a war with England, and in 1794 he
tapped Chief Justice John Jay to go to London to negotiate a treaty. When Jay
returned the following year, he brought an agreement that appeared to give
everything to the British while getting very little in return. English imports to
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America would be taxed at most favored nation rates, while American goods
exported to England would be assessed higher tariffs. Pre-Revolutionary War
debts owed to British creditors would be paid, and since most of the debtors were
Virginians (a largely Republican state), it was inevitable that Jefferson’s cohorts
would oppose the agreement. The treaty also left the issue of impressments
untouched, in apparent deference to the Royal Navy.185
In return for all this, the British agreed to evacuate their remaining posts
on American soil, and they agreed to consider claims by American merchants for
cargoes confiscated by the British at sea. These concessions seemed minuscule
compared to what London gained from the agreement, and the Republican
response to the treaty was ferocious. Washington and Hamilton came under
personal attack in the press and from crowds turned out in protest. To some the
proposed treaty seemed like a humiliating surrender to British military
domination. To the Republican leadership, it was “a repudiation of the
Declaration of Independence, the Franco-American alliance, [and] the
revolutionary movement sweeping through Europe…”186
Jefferson led the charge from his mountain retreat at Monticello. After an
abortive attempt to insist that the House of Representatives had to endorse any
treaty proposed by the executive, he bitterly conceded defeat and complained
that it was Washington’s undue influence over the American people that doomed
the Republicans’ efforts to block the treaty. But since Washington was soon to
retire, Jefferson’s many supporters saw the Jay Treaty as the catalyst for starting
185
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a presidential campaign designed to install him as the nation’s next chief
executive.187
Jefferson’s private comments on the treaty included withering criticism of
Washington and his administration and characterized them as traitors to
American liberty. When this assessment found its way into the newspaper, it led
to a permanent break in the friendship Jefferson had enjoyed with the president.
Jefferson’s overstated response to the Jay Treaty burned the bridge between him
and his fellow revolutionaries who clung to Hamiltonian Federalism. But the
Republican passion against the treaty would ultimately be in vain. When
Madison tried to nullify the key provisions of the treaty in Congress, he was
singularly ineffective, primarily because of the difficulty in fighting against
anything that Washington endorsed. The treaty was ratified, but its ramifications
would come to plague the Federalists during the Adams administration.188
John Adams Takes the Helm
The election of 1796 pitted two seemingly unwilling candidates against
each other. The Federalists looked to John Adams, and the Republicans to
Thomas Jefferson. The relationship between the two men was still mostly cordial
when Adams was elected as president and Jefferson as vice president, and there
was a brief period during which it appeared that the two might be able to work
together. But by the time the new administration took office, events were

186

Joseph P. Ellis, American Sphinx: the character of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Vintage
Books, 1998), 188.
187
Ellis, Founding Brothers, 136-145.
188
Susan Dunn, Jefferson’s Second Revolution: the election crisis of 1800 and the triumph of
Republicanism (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004), 66-69, 96-100.

94

overtaking what good will remained between them.189
The French had reacted to the Jay Treaty as Jefferson predicted they
would: they saw it as a pro-British treaty, which in fact it was. Rebuffed in their
demand for equal treatment by the Americans, the French began to prey upon
American merchantmen in the Caribbean in order to pressure President Adams.
The conflict grew and became known as the Quasi-War—a desultory and
relatively small-scale conflict fought exclusively at sea. The military implications
of the conflict were minimal, but the diplomatic ramifications were many as the
Adams administration struggled to find a rational French policy.
As the bifurcation between Federalists and Republicans deepened during
the Adams administration, the former, working at first through the judiciary,
began to encroach upon freedom of speech. When a Federalist judge, Associate
Justice James Iredell of the federal circuit court at Richmond, influenced the
grand jury to issue charges against Congressman Samuel J. Cabell, a
Republican, charging him with lying about the government in a circular letter to
his constituents in Virginia, Republicans throughout the state were outraged.
Jefferson took the lead in fighting against what he viewed as an attack against
the basic rights of citizens. Working behind the scenes, he organized a petition
against the Federalist charges and had it introduced to the Virginian House of
Delegates—an action calculated to emphasize states’ sovereignty. The charges
against Cabell were never pressed, but two trends emerged from the Cabell
Affair. First was the Federalists’ readiness to suppress free speech—a trend that
would lead to the Alien and Sedition Acts. Secondly, Jefferson’s use of a state
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legislature to fight against the Federalist judiciary prefigured his later involvement
in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolves. Before the first year of Adams’
administration had ended, Jefferson was firmly convinced that Federalists
intended to destroy the basic liberties described in the Bill of Rights and his
convictions would inflame him and other Republicans with the desire to rid the
country of Federalism permanently.190

The disaffection between Jefferson and the administration came to a head
over foreign relations. In 1798, President Adams sent a three man delegation to
France to try to find a solution for the conflict between the two former allies.
When Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, John Marshall, and Elbridge Gerry arrived
in Paris, the French refused to negotiate with them. Agents of Talleyrand instead
demanded the Americans apologize for anti-French comments made by John
Adams the previous year. They were also told that if they hoped to be admitted
into negotiations, they would have to pay a substantial bribe to French officials.
When news of the rebuff reached the United States in March, 1798, it
caused a curious set of reactions between Republicans and the Adams
administration. In retrospect it is certain that neither Jefferson nor Adams
desired war with France, but when Adams withheld the details of what would
soon become known as the XYZ Affair in order to calm war fever, Jefferson
attributed exactly the opposite motives to his president. The Republicans
asserted that Adams was manipulating events and information to bring about a
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war with France (and perhaps an alliance with England). Jefferson even claimed
that the Adams administration had made up the whole incident.191 At the same
time, he foresaw a public reaction that would work against the Federalists.
You know what a wicked use has been made of the French
negotiation; and particularly the X. Y. Z. dish cooked up by
Marshall, where the swindlers are made to appear as the French
government…If the understanding of the people could be rallied to
the truth on this subject, by exposing the dupery practiced on them,
there are so many other things about to bear on them favorably for
the resurrection of their republican spirit, that a reduction of the
administration to constitutional principles cannot fail to be the
effect.192

When Congress compelled Adams to release the dispatches describing
the treatment of the American delegation, the country erupted with war fever.
With the tide of public opinion surging in favor of the administration, Jefferson
tried to calm the storm by insisting that no official agents of the French
government had been implicated in the affair (and that, by extension, America
could not hold Paris responsible), and that Adams’ indiscreet comments in 1797
were the main obstacle to peace. He made it clear that he and his fellow
Republicans believed war with France would be ill-advised—merely another
opportunity for Hamiltonian monarchists to increase their influence and cuddle up
to England.
Despite Jefferson’s warnings, war fever raged. Congress appropriated
money to construct a navy, created the Navy Department, and began to
commission privateers to capture French ships. But what alarmed the
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Republicans even more was the administration’s plans for the army. Even if
Federalists and Republicans could have agreed in principle on the need for some
professional military force, the real fundamental break between the two parties
came over the size of that establishment. By 1798 Alexander Hamilton had been
promoted to major general and served as inspector general—in essence second
in command—under Washington. His new mission was to prepare for a war
against France.193 As a result of the war fever following the XYZ Affair, Hamilton
called for a militarization program that was unprecedented in scope. At the same
time that Congress passed the infamous Alien and Sedition Acts, it also created
a 10,000 man Provisional Army to be raised in the event of war. The legislation
also allowed the president to accept volunteer companies into national service—
a procedure somewhat akin to issuing a letter of marque to a privateer. Four
months later, Congress authorized Adams to raise a “New Army” of twelve
infantry regiments and six troops of dragoons. It also made provision for an
“Eventual Army” that the president could mobilize in an emergency.194
Hamilton focused his attention on the New Army, which was the only one
mobilized for the crisis with France. With the old regular Army deployed in the
west, the New Army would be the one to fight any invasion by France.
Washington agreed to be the commander of the combined military forces, but he
insisted that Hamilton be his second in command, and Washington would
actually take the field only in an emergency. Although John Adams distrusted
193
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Hamilton, his hand was forced, and Hamilton took charge of the New Army. Ever
suspicious of the Republicans as potential Jacobins, Hamilton forbade any of that
party to be in the officer corps. Thus, the New Army was explicitly a political
army. Hamilton also made clear his sentiments during the political conflict over
the Alien and Sedition Acts when he voiced his desire to take the New Army on a
march through Virginia to quell the opposition.195 In the event the only real action
that Hamilton’s creation ever saw was putting down a small tax revolt in
Pennsylvania in 1799, which became known as Fries’ Rebellion.
Jefferson viewed the Federalist military as a direct threat to democracy.
Shortly after the election crisis of 1800-01, in which Jefferson and Burr tied in the
number of votes received, Jefferson reflected on what might have happened
during the impasse had the Federalist New Army still been functioning: “How
happy that our army had been disbanded! What might have happened otherwise
seems rather a subject of reflection than explanation.”196 (He was referring to
rumors that some Federalists favored resolving the election deadlock by
restoring their party to control of the government by force of arms.) In order to
fund the Adams administration’s military initiatives, Congress went on to impose
a direct tax on land, houses, and slaves in order to fund the accretions in the
army and navy—another step that Jefferson saw as a violation of the principles
of the Revolution.197
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Hamilton’s view of the size and use of the military was anathema to
Republicans, and much of the Jefferson’s first term would be taken up with
disestablishing the Hamiltonian military construct. Jefferson viewed both the
army and navy as an expense which would lead to further corruption within the
government. And whereas a sea-going navy had a place in Jefferson’s military
policy, a huge army did not. He saw it through the eyes of Bolingbroke as a
threat to liberty, which, in the hands of a Hamilton, it was. If any Republicans still
needed proof of the Federalists’ nefarious intentions toward American liberty,
they were about to get it.

To understand the full context of Jefferson’s military policy, one must
come to grips with the Adams administration’s infamous legislative attempt to
prevent any insidious behavior by French spies or their sympathizers in the
United States. While the threat of foreigners illegally influencing politics was real,
the Alien Act allowed the president to imprison or deport citizens of foreign
nations, and it increased the time requirement for naturalization from five to
fourteen years. While this portion of the legislation was arguably constitutional,
the Sedition Act, which allowed the government to fine or imprison anyone who
encouraged resistance to federal laws or who criticized the government, clearly
was not.
Concerning the Alien and Sedition Acts, Jefferson wrote:
“For my own part, I consider those laws as merely an experiment
on the American mind, to see how far it will bear an avowed
violation of the Constitution. If this goes down, we shall
immediately see attempted another act of Congress, declaring that
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the President shall continue in office during life, reserving to
another occasion the transfer of the succession to his heirs, and the
establishment of the Senate for life.”198
Jefferson was likely exaggerating for effect, but not by much. He watched
with horror as Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts—the latter obviously
unconstitutional, since it restricted freedom of speech—and he saw a mortal
threat to the republic. The excesses that could be justified under the rubric of
national security could easily propel the young nation down the same path as the
French Revolution. To Jefferson the Alien and Sedition Acts were reprehensible
abuses of power, and with the government contemplating a sizable military
establishment, all the components of tyranny were in place. He correctly judged
this threat as far more substantial than that of a foreign invasion.
In response to the hateful legislation, Jefferson and Madison turned to the
pen. Working from Monticello, Jefferson composed the Kentucky Resolve—a
document that revealed the vice president’s occasional lack of discretion, since it
stated openly that if a state disagreed with federal legislation, the state could
secede: “…to sever ourselves from that union we so much value, rather than
give up the rights of self-government which we have reserved, & in which alone
we see liberty, safety & happiness.”199 Madison, writing the Virginia Resolution,
took a calmer and more politic approach. He declared the Alien and Sedition
Acts to be unconstitutional, not only because they sought to restrict freedom of
expression, but also because they usurped prosecutorial power from the states.
Jefferson followed the advice of his friend to restrain his language a bit, but the
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vice president clearly believed that states could and might have to assert
themselves against the power of the central government. Although he avoided
the term “nullification,” Jefferson clearly implied that states had such power.200

In order to pay for all of its planned military upgrades, the Adams
administration needed money. At the same time that they passed the Alien and
Sedition Acts, Congress levied a House Tax, the intent of which was to raise $2
million. Of that sum, Pennsylvania was to contribute $237,000. Since there were
few slaves in the Commonwealth, the tax burden would have to fall on dwellings.
This tax was variously known as a Window Tax (since number and size of
windows was a criteria), the Hot Water Tax (due to reports of women dumping
hot water on assessors counting windows), and the Milford Tax (commemorating
the perceived center of the resistance).
John Fries, the son of an immigrant, was a cooper and an auctioneer in
Trumbauersville, Pennsylvania. Ironically, he had been part of the State Guard
that was sent to quell the Whiskey Rebellion in 1786. But in 1798 he rose to lead
the resistance against the hated House Tax. Under his leadership an armed
band traveled the countryside harassing tax assessors and threatening the lives
of anyone who attempted to collect the tax. When Fries learned that some men
from Millerstown had been arrested for tax revolt, he set off to forcibly recover the
prisoners. Outnumbered by Fries’ men, the marshal complied with the rebel’s
demands and surrendered the prisoners.
Despite this triumph, the government was able to rally support, and
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throughout the spring of 1799 marshals and local troops were able to arrest most
of Fries’ compatriots. Fries himself was captured in April when his little dog,
“Whiskey”, betrayed his hiding place. Fries was taken to Philadelphia and tried
for his crimes. He was eventually sentenced under the Sedition Act to be
hanged for treason, but President Adams pardoned Fries and the other men two
days before their execution date.201
What concerned Jefferson most about the whole affair was the
Federalists’ disproportionate response to the rebellion. Major General Alexander
Hamilton urged the War Department to move against the uprising with a huge,
powerful force: “Whenever the Government appears in arms it ought to appear
like a Hercules, and inspire respect by a display of strengths.”202 Although no
blood was shed during the suppression of the uprising, Republicans watched
with horror at the use of the military to coerce civilians.
The innate fear of the military derived partly from radical Whig ideology,
but also from experience. Throughout the early national period there were
incidents and allegations of military officers inappropriately using soldiers to
interfere with elections, appointments, and other political issues.203 The
Federalist response to Fries’ Rebellion reinforced Republican fears that America
could degenerate into the terror that had gripped France.

Conclusion--The Revolution of 1800
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The mood of suspicion and conspiracy that pervaded the election of 1800
likewise colored Jefferson’s concerns about national security. In January, 1799,
Jefferson wrote to James Monroe,
I shall seldom write to you, on account of the strong suspicions of
infidelity in the post offices. Always examine the seal before you
open my letters, & note whether the impression is distinct.204

In another letter to Elbridge Gerry he implores his correspondent to destroy parts
of the letter after reading it and notes that he and Gerry must behave as secretly
as if they were revolutionaries trying to destroy the country.205
Modern political factionalism has nothing on the first generation of the
American republic. The bitter wrangling, mud-slinging, and character
assassination that went on as the country prepared for the election of 1800 was
scarcely a step away from violent upheaval. Hamilton’s desire to form a
“Christian Constitutional Society” to counteract the “Jacobin clubs” and
“democratic societies” pointed to a deep polarization between the Federalists and
the Republicans.206 Fortunately for the latter, Adams, in a bold and independent
move, sent a delegation to France in 1799 to see if he could head off a war.
When the effort resulted in peace with France, it served to split Federalists into a
Hamiltonian wing and an Adams wing.
The religious fervor expressed in the country’s newspapers became an
important part of the election of 1800, given Jefferson’s record of
disestablishmentarianism and his long sojourn among the French—seen by
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Federalists as the very definition of ungodliness. Beyond mere criticisms of this
modern day “Rehoboam”—interesting for the implied threat of secession in the
event of his election—Jefferson came under slanderous attacks accusing him of
everything from robbery to treason.207 New England clergymen spurred on their
flocks with warnings that Jefferson’s victory would lead to Bible-burning, Jacobin
paganism, and the legalization of prostitution.208
In the months running up to the election both Federalists and Republicans
fell into bitter partisan and personal attacks on the candidates. In a letter to Uriah
McGregory, 13 August 1800, Jefferson complained of the slander of Reverend
Cotton Mather Smith, who claimed Jefferson “had obtained my property by fraud
and robbery; that in one instance, I had defrauded and robbed a widow and
fatherless children of an estate to which I was executor, of ten thousand pounds
sterling, by keeping the property and paying them in money at the nominal rate,
when it was worth no more than forty for one; and that all this could be
proved.”209
Jefferson had to endure attacks upon his character, his family
background, and his alleged treasonous connections to France:
Tom Jefferson…who, to make the best of him, was nothing but a
mean-spirited, low-lived fellow, the son of a half-breed Indian
squaw, sired by a Virginia mulatto father, as was well-known in the
neighbourhood where he was raised wholly on hoe-cake (made of
coarse-ground Southern corn), bacon and hominy, with an
occasional change of fricasseed bullfrog, for which abominable
reptiles he had acquired a taste during his residence among the
206
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French at Paris, to whom there could be no question he would sell
his country at the first offer made to him cash down, should he be
elected to fill the Presidential chair.210

The strong political feelings in 1800 were almost apocalyptic, each side
believing that disaster was just around the corner:
“From the pulpit rang cries of despair and doom; dishonesty as well
as panic had invaded the marketplace; liars and libelers made a
travesty of freedom of the press; violence, hysteria, and paranoia
infested the public councils…Federalists felt betrayed by an
ungrateful people for whom they had labored long and well, and
feared that the horrors of Jacobinism and anarchy were hourly
imminent…Republicans felt betrayed by the twin evils of money
and monarchy, and feared that liberty was about to breathe its
last.”211
Despite the feeling of urgency among Federalists not to allow Jefferson’s
Republicans to gain power, Adams’ decision to make peace with France split the
Hamiltonian Federalists from the Adams Federalists, handing a considerable
advantage to the Republicans. Adams wanted peace with France as much as
Jefferson did, but his decision to seek it in the face of contradictory sentiments
among his Federalist allies was both audacious and disastrous for his political
fortunes.212 Jefferson’s party also benefited from superior political organization,
with the result that Adams would be swept out of office. The election of 1800
resulted in a tie between Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr—a tie resolved by
the smallest of margins when Alexander Hamilton (a political rival of Burr’s) threw
his influence in favor of Jefferson. Burr rankled after coming so close to the
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presidency, and in his later plots he frequently made reference to getting
vengeance for being cheated out of the office. Hence, Jefferson took office
without a clear mandate, and in a time of the strongest political sentiments on
both sides. The danger of insurrection or even civil war was real.

As Thomas Jefferson prepared to take office as the nation’s chief
executive, a unique and peculiar mix of factors combined to threaten the course
of the young republic. First, America was home to a generation of
revolutionaries. The men who populated the republic at the turn of the century
remembered the revolution against British rule as the high point of their lives. It
defined them, and while the majority of them were in agreement in their anger at
the shared deprivations described in the Declaration of Independence, they did
not all agree on a vision for what was to replace British rule. Men who could
muster the courage to rebel once could do so again, particularly if they felt their
private interests were threatened.
Secondly, no one was certain whether the American republic could survive
the party factionalism of 1800. As John Adams sneaked out of the capital on the
morning of Jefferson’s inauguration, there was fear that a general purge might
follow the triumph of the Republicans. With a fearful example of excess
unfolding across the Atlantic, Federalists braced for the worst. Without the
tradition of two-party peaceful rivalry that would come in the future, Federalists
feared that Jefferson’s accession to power might spark widespread violence. In
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the political conflicts of the past four years, both Federalists and Republicans had
appealed for an armed solution at one time or another.
Thus although Jefferson viewed his victory as “the revolution of 1800”, he
also had every reason to go slow and build bi-partisan support for his vision. On
the one hand he had to undo the High Federalism of Hamilton, but on the other
he had to assure everyone but the “die-hard monarchists” that they could find a
role in the new political economy. His view of national security following such a
close election thus transcended purely military issues.
His entry into the presidency would occur at a time when threats to the
Constitution abounded both without and within the United States. The threat of
foreign invasion was real, and in combination with attempts to subvert the Indian
tribes against the nation, it posed a serious, perhaps insurmountable military
problem. But at the same time, there were serious threats from domestic
sources. Unscrupulous men, some of whom felt no strong loyalty to either the
Constitution nor to Jefferson, were ready and able to act as agents for foreign
governments. Jefferson’s triumph left a large, vocal, and potentially violent body
of Federalists who might be willing to take up arms against their own nation.
Finally, the several states that composed the fledgling republic were resolved to
limit the reach of the central government and, if provoked, would threaten
secession and perhaps civil war.
Thus, as Thomas Jefferson prepared to take the reins of government in
1801, the United States of America faced one of the most dangerous moments of
its history. The solutions to such a multifaceted national security problem were
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not easy to deduce, and Jefferson would have to develop a military and security
policy that would protect the nation from both internal and external threats.
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CHAPTER THREE
Laying the Foundation—Institutional Changes During Jefferson’s First Term:
1801-04

Introduction
Jefferson Takes Over
Jefferson and West Point
Jefferson and the Navy
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It is commonly held by historians that Thomas Jefferson emasculated the
army, cutting appropriations and purging Federalists from the officer corps.213
Ideologically and practically opposed to the military establishment, Jefferson,
according to tradition, presided over a disastrous reduction of the army, which in
turn constrained the nation’s foreign policy during Jefferson’s administration, and
led to the army’s marginal performance during the War of 1812. By over-relying
on the state militias, he ensured that both they and the rump regular Army would
be equally inadequate when put to the test of war. His stance concerning the
question of the need for a standing army was infamous—he claimed that the
young republic could not maintain a standing army because “we have no paupers
to compose it.”214
But a careful examination of Jefferson’s record tells a radically different
story. His effect on the size and training of the army at the beginning of his
administration was actually marginal and resulted initially in a military force not
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easily distinguished from that of the Adams administration. Jefferson, despite
some of his unfortunate quotes, was not ideologically or practically opposed to
the military; on the contrary he displayed a moderate and balanced approach to
military affairs. Indeed, during the years of Jefferson’s presidency, the army was
expanded threefold. Further, the record is clear that he did not purge the army of
Federalists, but only of those suspected of graft, incompetence, or extreme
political views.
If we strip away the political accusations of both sides and penetrate
beyond the ideological statements of both Federalists and Republicans, it is
possible to comprehend both the points of agreement and the essential
differences between Jefferson’s views on the one hand, and those of Adams,
Hamilton, and Washington on the other. In short, while all parties perceived
foreign and domestic threats, Washington and his Federalist successors were
focused on external threats to the country. Jefferson was far more concerned
about the effects of his military policy on the domestic front. National security in
Jefferson’s mind was not a matter of defending the shores, but rather one of
defending the integrity and liberty of the nation from threats within.
Jefferson’s first address to Congress in 1801 announced the imminent end
to hostilities between England and France and looked to that happy occasion as
the context for “demolishing useless structures of expense, lightening the
burthens of our constituents, and fortifying the principles of free government.”215
The preliminary articles of the Treaty of London, 1801 led eventually to the illfated Treaty of Amiens in 1802, by which, along with minor territorial
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adjustments, England and France would be at peace. Although it was easy to
underestimate the troubles that French and Spanish colonial interests would lead
to, the potential “peace dividend” that the English-French treaty promised would
be central to Jefferson’s military policy. The storms of 1805 were a distant and
perhaps unforeseeable danger, and the time seemed right for Jefferson’s new
administration, which was ideologically opposed to war and a large, expensive
military establishment, to disarm—or at least pare the military down to size.
Even the immediate crisis of Tripoli’s declaration of war on the United States was
a relatively minor affair, and one that would have little to do with army
appropriations. In the words of Dumas Malone, “…beyond any doubt the
President, during his first year in office, acted as though he expected no early
breach of the peace, pursuing his program of economy and democratization to
the utmost while the sun was shining.”216
“The energies of the nation, as depends on me, shall be reserved
for improvement of the condition of man, not wasted in his
distinction. The lamentable resource of war is not authorized for
evils of imagination, but for those actual injuries only, which would
be more destructive of our well-being than war itself. Peace,
justice, and liberal intercourse with all the nations of the world, will, I
hope, with all nations, characterize this commonwealth.”217

The ideological dimensions of Jefferson’s world view and, incidentally, of
his military policy, derived from Viscount Bolingbroke’s Tory opposition to the
ministry of Sir Robert Walpole. In the eighteenth century, the Whigs represented
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the new capitalism of pre-industrial England. They maintained their control of
parliament through patronage, bribery, and coercion. Whig ideology saw as
advantageous both war and high taxes, and the king was able to maintain his
control of the Commons by filling it with soldiers and pensioners, whose loyalty to
the crown could be counted on. Bolingbroke railed against this system, defining
it as corrupt and a threat to English liberties.
Bolingbroke and the Tories believed that, in the context of the mixed and
balanced government of England, court influence and a standing army were
destructive of virtue and good governance.218 These same ideas were revitalized
in the Republican party during the 1790s, and Jefferson carried them into his
administration. The opposition’s perspective was that war was not simply evil in
and of itself, but rather the Hamiltonian Federalists pursued war as a means to
increase personal power at the expense of liberty. Jefferson believed that war
served to distract the people from domestic issues, and it invariably led to higher
taxes. Standing armies and navies, because they made the decision to go to war
easier, were likewise to be avoided or at least viewed with suspicion.
Another cause for grave concern was the New Army, organized and
commanded by Alexander Hamilton during the war fever in Adams’
administration and used only to quell the abortive Fries’ Rebellion. Although
Congress disestablished the politicized force following the Convention of 1800
(which ended the Quasi-War), Jefferson and the Republicans could point to the
New Army as a prime example of a standing army being used for political
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purposes that were destructive of civil liberties. In response to the crisis over the
Kentucky and Virginia Resolves, Hamilton is reported to have considered
marching the New Army against Virginia.219
John Adams had chosen peace with France in 1800, thus splitting the
Federalists into the pro- and anti-war factions. When Adams was able to secure
the peace, he worked with Congress to halt defense spending and reduce the
size of the army. Along with disbanding the New Army, Congress also stopped
recruiting for the recently authorized new regiments and ordered those already
recruited to be discharged by the summer of 1800. By the time Jefferson took
over, the regular army consisted of two cavalry troops, two artillery/engineer
regiments, and four regiments of infantry, for a total strength of 3,429.

Jefferson Takes Over
The essence of the argument between Hamiltonian Federalists and
Jeffersonian Republicans was the ranking of importance between two potentially
opposed objectives: the success of the nation, and the promotion of liberty.
Ultimately both parties wanted both, but the High Federalists saw the former as
an urgent necessity and the latter as an agreeable, albeit theoretical ideal.
Jefferson and his followers, influenced by Bolingbroke, regarded the success of
the American nation as a matter of avoiding provocation, while the fostering of
civil liberty was a holy and difficult mission, fraught with emergent challenges
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from corrupt and bellicose foes. Each side viewed the other as the primary
obstacle to success.
In 1957 Samuel P. Huntington characterized the first two centuries of
American politics as uniformly liberal. He noted that from the country’s founding
to the end of World War II there were only two instances of a conservative
radicalism—the Federalists of Washington’s and Adams’ administrations, and the
slaveholding Southern aristocracy before the Civil War. While the latter ideology
was destroyed in the aftermath of the Civil War, the former was dissolved by the
liberal ascendancy after 1800. Huntington went on to note that this American
liberalism pursued a military policy that was best described as “hostile, static, and
dominant”, while the conservative military policy was “sympathetic, constructive,
and thwarted.”220
“It is no coincidence that the two statesmen who displayed the most
penetrating insight into military policy and the deepest appreciation
of the military function were the two great spokesmen of the
conservative groups: Alexander Hamilton and John C. Calhoun.
They stand in sharp contrast to liberal leaders not just in their views
on military policy but in their interest in military affairs. In more than
a hundred and fifty years American liberalism never produced a
governmental leader with comparable ability and interest in military
matters. Hamilton and Calhoun, however, were isolated from the
mainstream of American intellectual and political development.
Their military policy, like their political philosophy, was never
popular with the American people. The avalanche of liberalism
brushed them aside into a discredited cranny of history.”221
In the context of this bitter ideological rivalry, the issue of public finance
was continuously the center of debate. Dumas Malone, despite his adoration of
Jefferson, admits that the president’s views on modern finance were
220
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anachronistic and flawed. Jefferson viewed the nation’s debt as altogether a bad
thing, analogous to personal debt. It was, in essence, something to be avoided
and done away with; at best it might be a temporary, necessary evil. As regards
military strategy, Jefferson believed that freedom from national debt was a
prerequisite to a success in war.
“I consider the fortunes of our republic as depending, in an
eminent degree, on the extinguishments of the public debt before
we engage in any war: because, that done, we shall have revenue
enough to improve our country in peace and defend it in war,
without recurring either to new taxes or loans.”222

That Jefferson could get away with governing for eight years with such a view of
financial matters can be attributed in part to the success of American commerce
during that period, with the consequent revenues for the government. In such a
context, Jefferson was free to despise debt. Hamilton, on the other hand, viewed
national debt as analogous to modern corporate debt: a fact of life that was
inevitable, beneficial, and the foundation of modern finance.223
The difficulty for any Jeffersonian apologist then is that if by all accounts
his understanding of finances and economy was flawed, how can one interpret
his resulting policies as anything but equally flawed? Jefferson’s reduction of the
military was aimed above all at economy. If this economy was based on
fallacious reasoning, we must ipso facto conclude that Hamiltonian Federalists
were right in condemning Jefferson’s handling of the military.
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In fact, the path to interpretation of Jefferson’s administration is much
more subtle than that. Hamilton’s grasp of finance was more modern, but the
policies that flowed from that understanding were potentially dangerous. The fact
that public debt could be a unifying influence and the necessary foundation for
national credit does not lead to the conclusion that Hamilton’s conceptions of a
huge military establishment were equally beneficial. His pragmatism and
competence in economic matters did not translate into an ethical and evenhanded use of the military, as evidenced by his handling of Fries’ Rebellion.
Hamilton’s views about the military, corruption, and individual liberties were a
serious danger to the success of the American nation. A Hamiltonian military
establishment set loose on the public by a government that would sponsor
legislation like the Sedition Act was a heartbeat away from military dictatorship.
Furthermore, although Jefferson’s grasp of modern finance was wanting,
he himself acknowledged, albeit with regret, that his administration could not
undo Hamilton’s fiscal system.
“We can pay off his debts in fifteen years, but we can never
get rid of his financial system.
“When the government was first established, it was possible
to have kept it going on true principles, but the contracted, English,
half-lettered ideas of Hamilton destroyed that hope in the bud.
“It mortifies me to be strengthening principles which I deem
radically vicious, but this vice is entailed on us by the first
error…What is practicable must often control what is pure
theory.”224

224

Jefferson to Gallatin, Washington, 1802, Washington ed., iv, 263.

117

In fact, far from dismantling the system that he ideologically opposed,
Jefferson grew both to understand it and to manipulate it to political advantage.
“It is certainly to the public good to keep all the banks competitors for our favours
by a judicious distribution of [public funds in deposit] and thus to engage the
individuals who belong to them in support of the reformed order of things…”225
Thus, Jefferson elected not to take on the fiscal system per se, but rather
to counteract its innate evil. To do this he had to eliminate the national debt.
The thrust of his efforts along these lines would be to simplify the accounting of
that debt,226 and to cut the most offending waste out of government expenditures.
From Jefferson’s perspective, the military establishment was the worst offender.
Energizing Jefferson’s initial efforts to reduce the cost of the military was
Albert Gallatin, his Secretary of the Treasury. Gallatin believed that it was his
primary duty to reduce the national debt—that, indeed, he had been appointed
for that very mission.227 When he took office the national debt stood at
$83,000,000, and Gallatin developed a general program by which the entire debt
could be retired by 1817. He sent the president a proposal by which, he claimed,
the nation could save hundreds of thousands in the Departments of War and the
Navy, as opposed to saving mere thousands elsewhere. Jefferson viewed the
existing army of four regiments as, on the one hand, too small to afford any sort
of real defense or deterrence against foreign invasion, and on the other hand, too
large a burden and threat to an otherwise peaceful nation. Instead, he urged
Congress to reform the state militias with a view to making them an effective
225
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defense in the event of invasion. As his administration continued, Jefferson
privately agreed that militias were no substitute for a regular army.
Jefferson’s outlook on the military establishment and the nation’s military
strategy against the threat of invasion was conditioned by the geopolitical and
technological factors of his day. War in the early 19th century was a gradual
affair. Blitzkrieg was unheard of, undreamt, and technologically unfeasible.
Instead, Jefferson and his advocates conceived of a threat of invasion unfolding
at a pace that would allow for the generation of public awareness and resolve to
form. This would lead to a voluntary tax on the nation’s monies and manpower.
Militias would form and “rush” to the scene of the crisis. Reinforcing the coastal
defenses that were built (or were being built) around the critical ports, those
militias would either defeat the invading forces, or at any rate delay them long
enough for the small but effective regular army to arrive and complete the defeat
of the enemy. Jefferson’s ideal military establishment, then, would be composed
of a small, well-trained and equipped regular army, supplemented by state
militias.
Despite the political rhetoric, both Federalists and Republicans
acknowledged the need for a regular army. Only Elbridge Gerry and a handful of
other Republicans wanted to completely abolish the regular army. The Uniform
Militia Act of 1792 had created a huge and totally ineffective militia without
national regulation or standards—a de facto admission that the nation would
have to depend upon a regular army.228
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This sentiment was reflected in the landmark piece of legislation
sponsored by the administration that resulted in the Military Peace Establishment
Act of 1802. Congress reduced and reorganized the army, doing away with two
infantry regiments (leaving a total of two). The act also separated the artillery
and engineers, creating a regiment for both and assigning the engineers the task
of establishing a military academy. Army authorizations were brought down to
just under 3300, a 60% reduction of the original authorized strength. This figure,
however, reflected a simple rationality: it brought the army’s authorized strength
in line with its actual recruited strength. Hence, Jefferson’s legislation did not
significantly reduce army strength.
The Military Peace Establishment Act also provided for the continuation of
the rank of brigadier general. This allowed Jefferson to retain the services of
James Wilkinson, the sole senior military leader that he felt he could count on to
serve the administration’s goals. While thus protecting his favorite, Jefferson
simultaneously swept away the more questionable members of the General Staff,
which was dominated by vociferous and irreconcilable Federalists. Of the seven
officers on the general staff, three were discharged within a year. By civilianizing
the office of Quartermaster General, Jefferson was able to appoint John Wilkins
to the position. Major Thomas Cushing was appointed both Adjutant General
and Inspector General despite his Federalist sympathies, and Caleb Swan, the
paymaster general, was also retained.229
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With regard to the officer corps, Jefferson did have concerns about the
total dominance of Federalists within the service. Secretary of War Henry
Dearborn called for a thorough purge and told House Speaker Joseph B Varnum:
“We have been much more liberal toward them, than they would be towards us,
and in future I think we ought to give them measure for measure.”230 Elbridge
Gerry reflected the sense of Republican paranoia of that time by warning
Jefferson to have loyal troops guard the key fortresses, magazines, and arsenals
to prevent seizure by the Federalists. Whether Jefferson was equally worried is
unclear, but he was determined to make certain that the army would respond to
its new master. To ameliorate the situation, he removed eighty-eight officer slots
and simultaneously added twenty new authorizations for ensigns, thus removing
a total of sixty-eight authorizations. Much has been made of what some describe
as a sort of purging of Federalist officers from the army. Historians have argued
over the extent of the purge. Theodore J. Crackel insists that Jefferson brought
about a social and political reformation of the army, while William B. Skelton
rejects the notion and suggests a more balanced program of modernization.231
The facts of the so-called purge do indeed reveal a fairly moderate program.
Donald Jackson published an article in 1979 in which he described the
process by which Jefferson removed serving officers.232 The new president was
given a roster of all serving officers, with each name annotated with a series of
codes describing the officers political affiliation (if any) and his military
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competence. Jackson’s article revealed that the previously unknown staff officer
who provided the evaluations was Meriwether Lewis. Jefferson had known Lewis
for years and hired him as his personal secretary in 1801. Lewis had served in
the militia during the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 and eventually joined the regular
army. He spent some time in Knox’s Legionary Army and then transferred into
the First Regiment in 1796. Serving as a staff officer thereafter, Lewis had the
opportunity to travel widely and had come to know most of the army officers then
serving by the time he became Jefferson’s aide.
Jackson shows that in the process by which Jefferson trimmed down the
officer corps, military competence was of greater import than political persuasion.
Of the 131 officers retained in service by June 1, 1802, eight were Republican,
twenty-five were Federalist, and the others were either nonpolitical or of unknown
affiliation. Jackson concludes:
“It is clear that in the winnowing process, military
qualifications were given greater consideration than party
preference. There are, however, two ways to state this conclusion.
We can say that Jefferson and his advisers followed the practice of
ignoring party preference, selecting the officers to be retained on
the basis of military proficiency. It may be more realistic to phrase
the conclusion in a different way: no matter how much Jefferson
might have wished for an army heavily weighted with Republicans,
there was no way that he could have it in the early years of his
administration.”233

Whichever interpretation is correct, it is clear that no purge of Federalists
occurred. Instead, the army was reduced by a small margin in an even-handed
way. There were other ways, however, in which Jefferson began to shape the
army according to his desires. With Dearborn supervising, the army began to
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recruit more from the countryside instead of from northeastern cities.234 Training
programs began to favor the use of light rifle infantry, flying artillery, and
skirmishers. Although American doctrinal innovation tended to trail Europe by a
generation, the writings of Jacque Antoine Hippolyte, Comte de Guibert235 (17431790) began to influence the officer corps at this time.
The army began to look different as well. In place of queues and powder,
army officers were commanded to have cropped hair, and to replace buckles and
breeches with trousers. Wilkinson came into sharp conflict with one of his
regimental commanders, Colonel Thomas Butler, over this issue. Butler refused
to remove his queue and was court-martialed twice but died before punishment
could be carried out. So proud of his queue was this officer that he had himself
buried in a coffin with his queue protruding through a hole in the bottom.236
When Butler died Jefferson and Dearborn wanted to fill the empty
command slot with a Republican and anti-Wilkinson man in order to balance the
commanding general’s power within the army. Instead they had to accept the
promotion of Colonel Thomas Cushing, and Cushing’s spot was filled with
Richard Sparks (another Wilkinson man) at the insistence of the Senate.
Jefferson reluctantly relented.237
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Despite Jefferson’s desires it was difficult to significantly reform the
professional culture of the army—or rather, the lack thereof. William B. Skelton
observes:
“[T]he nation came to accept a small regular army as a permanent
feature of the emerging federal system. Nevertheless, the social
and political environment obstructed the professional consolidation
of the officer corps. The army fluctuated in size and organization
because of popular distrust of military power and the generally
unsettled nature of national administration. Relatively few officers
made a long-term commitment to military service, and military
leaders failed to develop effective procedures to instill group
values, build internal cohesion, or develop and transmit
professional knowledge. Thus, the dominant characteristics of the
officer corps were administrative instability, dissension, and a high
rate of turnover. The line between the military and civilian spheres
remained vague, as expansions of the army brought civilian leaders
directly into high command positions and officers of all ranks
engaged in a range of political and quasi-political activities.
Although reformers sporadically attempted to rationalize military
procedures and develop professional standards of conduct, their
efforts made little impact on the bulk of the officers.”238

Jefferson’s army was, for the most part, a peace time military institution.
His administration began at the same time that Britain and France achieved a
temporary peace, so it appeared for a brief time that the international threat might
lessen. The war with Tripoli (1801-05) was a purely naval affair, and there were
no major Indian campaigns to worry about, either. The threat of war with Spain
was, until 1807, the greatest land threat.

Jefferson and West Point
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The most enduring legacy of Thomas Jefferson’s national security policy
was the establishment of the United States Military Academy. Founded as part
of the Military Peace Establishment Act of 1802, the Academy was to be an
extension of the newly commissioned Corps of Engineers. The founding of the
school was the culmination of a conflict over constitutionality and military policy
that began in 1776, at the beginning of the republic’s struggle for independence.
The most salient aspect of the debate was that Jefferson, the most vociferous
opponent of a military academy—ostensibly on the grounds of his strict
constructionism—became the father of it during his administration. The purpose
of this chapter is to trace the development of Jefferson’s national security policy
as it pertains to the Academy and to determine how the academy fit into
Jefferson’s overall strategy.
In the early days of the Revolution, John Adams approached Henry Knox
and solicited his opinion concerning the need for a military academy. Knox was
strongly in favor of the idea, as a remedy to the “unmeaning puppies for officers”
found in the Continental Army.239 He proposed the need for a military academy,
expressing the commonly held belief that in order to compete with European
invaders, the new republic would have to develop a professional army.
“We ought to have academies, in which the whole theory of the art
of war should be taught, and every encouragement possible be
given to draw persons into the army that may give lustre to our
arms. As the army now stands, it is merely a receptacle for
ragamuffins.”240
Shortly thereafter, Knox formally recommended to a Congressional Committee:
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“…an Academy be established on a liberal plan…where the whole
theory and practice of fortifications and gunnery should be taught,
to be nearly on the same plan as Woolwich, making an allowance
for the difference of circumstances.”241
In 1778, Florberque de la Rocatelle, a French volunteer with the Continental
Army, advised Washington to establish a school of military art where a regiment
of artillerists, engineers, bombardiers and cannoneers should be stationed.242
Nevertheless, the Revolutionary War would end with no military academy
established. The ineffectual Continental Congress would not move on the issue,
and the nation’s leaders were distracted by the immediate problem of war.
Concurrent with the nascent idea of establishing an academy, West Point
itself became a key strategic point along the Hudson River valley. As the war
progressed, the site was fortified and considered a high priority for defense.
Washington gave priority to building and improving the ring of forts that protected
West Point. After the fall of Forts Montgomery and Clinton, Brigadier Louis
Lebegue Duportail sought to strengthen the position and sent Colonel Thaddeus
Kosciusko to work on the project. By mid-1778, Forts Arnold, Wyllys, Webb, and
Putnam were begun, and the guns captured from Burgoyne after the surrender at
Saratoga were posted on the walls. A chain was extended across the Hudson to
interdict enemy river traffic. In addition to fortifying a key waterway, West Point
also became home to a small number of invalided soldiers.
After Benedict Arnold’s abortive attempt to put West Point into British
hands (1780), the focus of the war moved south, and West Point languished from
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inattention. As the war ended, Washington, Knox, and Hamilton all believed that
the post should be maintained as the most defensible point on the Hudson. Final
resolution of the matter had to await a change of constitution, but in 1790
Congress finally purchased West Point for just over $11,000.
With the war ending in 1783, Congress pondered the question of how to
structure the nation’s military establishment. In response to inquiries from
Washington and Congress, Steuben advocated the establishment of an academy
and a “manufactory” for military supplies, both of which were to be operated
under a director general. He recommended a student population of 120 officer
cadets, who would be required to be over fourteen years old and would pay the
government three hundred dollars for tuition. High salaried professors would
instruct in natural philosophy, eloquence, belle lettres, civil/international law,
history, geography, math, civil architecture, drawing, French, horsemanship,
fencing, dancing, and music. There was to be additional instruction for cadets
headed for the artillery and engineers.243
Under Secretary of War Knox and his successor, Timothy Pickering, West
Point was continually used as a training base. In 1794, following the formal
creation of the Corps of Artillerists and Engineers, West Point became the center
for training. Pickering employed foreign officers to train the cadets there,
because resident expertise in the scientific aspects of war was not to be had
among American officers. Although this practice was continued under
Pickering’s successor, James McHenry, the training was generally ineffective,
because the American officer cadets rankled under the leadership of foreigners.
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Despite Washington’s sentiments, those of his senior officers, and
desultory attempts to start an academy of sorts, there had still been no decisive
legislative action to establish an academy by the 1790s. Following Harmar’s and
St. Clair’s humiliating defeats at the hands of the Indians, Washington convened
his cabinet in 1793 and surfaced again the question of an academy. The general
feeling of those in favor of it was that it was the scientific aspects of warfare—in
particular the artillery and the engineers—that most required the formalized
training found only in an academy. Although the proposal seems, in retrospect,
to be a fairly reasonable one, the political conflict between Hamiltonians and
Jeffersonians had already begun to shape all political decision making. Jefferson
found himself opposed to the idea of an academy on constitutional grounds.
It was proposed to recommend the establishment of a Military
Academy. I objected that none of the specified powers given by the
Constitution to Congress would authorize this. The President [said],
though it would be a good thing, he did not wish to bring on
anything which might generate heat and ill humor. It was, therefore,
referred for further consideration and inquiry. [At the next meeting] I
opposed it as unauthorized by the Constitution. Hamilton and Knox
approved it without discussion. Edmund Randolph was for it, saying
that the words of the Constitution authorizing Congress to lay taxes
&c., for the common defence, might comprehend it. The President
said he would not choose to recommend anything against the
Constitution; but if it was doubtful, he was so impressed with the
necessity of this measure, that he would refer it to Congress, and
let them decide for themselves whether the Constitution authorized
it or not.244

It may thus be said that Jefferson—the future “Father of West Point”—was
the most important roadblock to the idea. Rather than engender further party
conflict, Washington referred the matter to Congress, who in 1794, established
243
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the Corps of Artillerists and Engineers and provided as well for books, supplies,
and authorizations for officer cadets. Still, it was late in the Adams administration
before any action was taken to actually begin the training and education of
officers, and by the time the Federalists left office, there had been virtually no
progress at all.
In the last years of the Adams administration, Hamilton resurrected the
proposed military academy. Consulting both foreign and domestic military
officers, he derived a plan whereby there would be a Fundamental School that all
officer cadets would attend for two years. There they would learn mathematics,
science, geography, and rudimentary engineering. Afterward, they would attend
special schools depending on the branch of service to which they were headed:
infantry, cavalry, artillery/engineers, or navy. Working with Secretary McHenry,
Hamilton got a bill into committee, but by 1800 the rancor between Federalists
and Republicans, as well as the split between Adams and Hamilton, doomed the
legislation.245
Samuel Dexter became the last Secretary of War in the Adams
administration, and he served from 13 May, 1800 through 31 January, 1801.
Determined to act in spite of Congress’ hostility, Dexter looked to the
authorizations of 1794 and another in 1798 for the authority to establish a school
for the artillery and engineers. With Adams’ approval, he recruited Captain
William A. Barron, a mathematics teacher, and also made overtures to a civilian,
Jonathan Williams, a relative of Benjamin Franklin, who was quite knowledgeable
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concerning military affairs, having recently translated two French military texts
into English. But with the defeat of Adams in November, Dexter’s efforts
languished.
When the Republicans took over in March, 1801, most Federalists
believed the opportunity to create a military academy was lost. Instead, the
Jefferson administration began signaling within weeks that it was their intent to
create the academy. Secretary of War Henry Dearborn offered to Englishman
George Baron a teaching position at the new academy and provided him details
as to pay and benefits. Dearborn then instructed the commander at West Point
to be prepared for a military school to be established there.246
While getting the ball rolling at West Point, Jefferson and Dearborn also
supervised the proposed legislation that would become the Military Peace
Establishment Act of 1802. In March of that year, the Act authorized a separate
Corps of Engineers and assigned them the duty of establishing a military
academy. The Congressional action so long sought after by the Federalists
became a reality under Jefferson’s Republicans instead.
Jefferson and Dearborn chose Jonathan Williams, a merchant and a
relative of Benjamin Franklin, to be the new academy’s first superintendent.
Although Williams was a Federalist, he took pains to assure the new president
that his views were moderate and that he was willing to serve. Jefferson viewed
Williams favorably because of the latter’s experience in Europe and his
enthusiasm for science and natural philosophy. With an energy that eluded the
Federalist administrations before them, Jefferson and Dearborn put matters in
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order quickly with the intent of beginning classes for a new batch of cadets by
September, 1801.
One of the most urgent questions concerning Thomas Jefferson’s military
policy is why he so dramatically reversed his opinion regarding the
constitutionality of a military academy. The most obvious factor that influenced
Jefferson’s earlier negative position was his growing fear of Hamiltonian
Federalism and its possible use of the military establishment against civil
liberties. Hand in hand with this motivation was Jefferson’s concern for frugality
and avoidance of debt.
Prominent historians have long explained Jefferson’s reversal on his
desire to introduce science and engineering education to the army and to the
nation at large. A devoted student of science himself, Jefferson was certainly a
child of the Enlightenment and strongly believed in the efficacy—indeed, in the
urgency—of scientific education. Thus, his decision to establish a separate
Corps of Engineers and to commission them to establish a military academy was
thought to be an expression of this passion. Henry Adams’ brief comment on the
establishment of West Point reflected this idea:
“Great as the influence of this new establishment was upon the
army, its bearing on the general education of the people was still
greater, for the government thus assumed the charge of introducing
the first systematic study of science in the United States.”247
Stephen Ambrose stresses that Jefferson had, since the 1770s, desired a
national university for the teaching of law, chemistry, modern languages, and
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natural history. Unsuccessful in 1779 in replacing the instruction in the classics
with more relevant subjects, he nevertheless joined with Washington, Adams,
and many others in advocating reform. Jefferson saw a national university as a
means to overcome sectionalism and desired to foster national unity based not
upon the classes and prejudices of l’ancien regime, but rather upon science and
education.
“When Jefferson assumed the Presidency in 1801, he was eager to
found a national institution that would eliminate the classics, add
the sciences, and produce graduates who would use their
knowledge for the benefit of society. Within this framework,
Jefferson realized that a military academy had the best chance of
success.”248
There is some evidence that would point to this conclusion. America’s
colleges, patterned on English universities, were designed primarily to produce
lawyers and ministers. They favored the teaching of ancient languages, religion,
and other liberal arts, rather than science. But the reality of the new republic was
that the education system was vitally connected to the growth and development
of the nation, and scholars in Latin and Greek were not likely to be in as high
demand as engineers. Ambrose points to four trends in the evolving American
philosophy of education:
“From the Renaissance there remained the ideal of education as a
means of producing scholar-gentlemen; from the Reformation, the
belief that education was a means of moral, ethical, and religious
development; from the American Enlightenment, the notion that
education was the business of the state, to be used to produce civil
leaders; from the scientific revolution, the utilitarian idea of using
education to master the physical world for man’s progress
therein.”249
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Years after he left office, Jefferson, writing to John Adams, made clear
where his priorities for education lay:
“When sobered by experience, I hope our successors will turn their
attention to the advantages of education. I mean of education on
the broad scale, and not that of the petty academies, as they call
themselves, which are started up in every neighborhood, and
where one or two men, possessing Latin and sometimes Greek, a
knowledge of the globes, and the first six books of Euclid, imagine
and communicate this as the sum of science. They commit their
pupils to the theatre of the world, with just taste enough of learning
to be alienated from industrious pursuits, and not enough to do
service in the ranks of science…I hope the necessity will at length
be seen of establishing institutions here, as in Europe, where every
branch of science useful at this day, may be taught in its highest
degree.”250

Others point to the simple fact that as president, Jefferson realized that
the responsibility for a competent military force had fallen on him, and he
established West Point to address the lack of military competence.
“Although he was a prolific writer, Jefferson left no precise
explanation as to why he reversed himself, and the reasons are
probably as multifaceted as the man. While not a soldier himself,
Jefferson clearly saw the country’s present and future need for
officers proficient in the military sciences, even if the immediate
danger of war with France had passed.”251
Once Jefferson became the nation’s chief executive, the ideological
passions of the past began to inform his military policy less than the weight of
responsibility that he now had for the nation’s security. When writing to James
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Monroe in 1813, he urged that “We must make military instruction a regular part
of collegiate education. We can never be safe till this is done.”252
Norman T. Remick, in his book West Point: character, leadership,
education, claims that Jefferson founded West Point because by the time he was
president he realized the need for a standing army and needed some way to
ensure that army would not be a threat to democracy. Hence, he founded West
Point specifically to educate the future leadership of the army in character and
virtue.253
Theodore J. Crackel makes the best argument along these lines. Crackel
refutes the notion that Jefferson’s main intent was to establish a school for
science and engineering. He correctly points out that West Point was neither.
The curriculum throughout Jefferson’s administration contained the most
rudimentary math and science, and the closest it came to engineering was
instruction in drawing. Instead, Jefferson founded West Point as a part of his
overall plan to reform the army and ensure its loyalty. With the power to appoint
cadets he would be able to increase the population of Republicans and further
dilute the Federalist influence in the army.254
Regardless of what Jefferson’s motivations may have been, the Academy
fell far short of expectations during its first decade of existence. With Jonathan
Williams as the first superintendent (temporarily replaced by Colonel Decius
Wadsworth from summer, 1803 through winter, 1805) the Academy remained
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small. Under-funded and physically removed from the national government, it
languished on the verge of extermination. Something less than fifty cadets
attended as classes began, and the entire Corps of Engineers consisted of seven
commissioned officers whose duties included not only running the Academy, but
also inspecting and supervising fortifications all along the eastern seaboard.
Cadets ranged in age from teens through middle-age, and discipline among the
other regular army soldiers at West Point was virtually nonexistent.
Whatever motives may have contributed to Jefferson’s decision to found
the Academy, none were satisfied with results in his lifetime. West Point’s failure
to contribute to the development of American scientific education was matched
by its lack of impact on the army’s efficiency. It had no appreciable effect on the
nation’s performance in the War of 1812, and it was not until after 1815 that
substantial improvements in discipline, funding, and curricula would take begin.
But if the Academy fell short of expectations in Jefferson’s lifetime, it certainly
had a significant impact on the course of American history thereafter.

Each of the theories advanced to explain how West Point figured into
Jefferson’s policies have merit, but even more so when combined. Jefferson was
a complex man, and his reasons for breaking with his own party’s past positions
on a military academy were likewise multi-faceted. He was certainly a believer in
progressive education. It is equally clear that he was seriously determined to
change the leadership culture of the military away from its Hamiltonian roots.
Finally, as he took the reins of government, Jefferson acquired a new sense of
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responsibility to make the nation secure against military threats. It was the
combination of these factors that led him to establish on the heights overlooking
the Hudson Valley a uniquely American military institution.

Jefferson and the Navy
The most conspicuous mistake of the Jefferson administration in the realm
of military policy was the creation of a navy that was composed of a
disproportionate amount of gunboats in lieu of a more conventional, sea-going
navy of frigates, sloops, and schooners.255 The gunboat navy was singularly
ineffective during the subsequent War of 1812, and Jefferson’s decision, in
retrospect, seems to reveal a startling ineptitude in public policy. Federalists and
navalists roundly condemned the president for disestablishing the navy at a
critical time in the nation’s history, and their criticism lives on today, spilling from
the pens of Jefferson’s modern critics. Indeed, it is difficult to look at Jefferson’s
gunboat navy without a sense of disbelief: the president was wagering the
nation’s defense on what can only be judged an absurd theory—that gunboats, in
conjunction with coastal defenses, could stave off European frigates and shipsof-the-line.

255

As a reminder to readers who lack a naval background, the following ship types are defined.
Ship-of-the-line: a battleship normally of 74 guns; frigate: a fast medium size ship capable of
chasing merchant shipping, normally 36 to 44 guns; schooner: two or three masted ship; brig:
two-masted square-rigged ship; corvette, sloop: small warships with a single gun deck and 10 to
18 guns.

136

As is often the case in history, however, the truth is a bit more complex
than Federalist rhetoric or Mahanian condemnation would have it.256 The
purpose of this section is to examine Jefferson’s naval policy, how it was affected
by Congressional action, and what feasible alternatives were available to the
president.
The Confederation government sold the Continental Navy’s last ship in
1785—precisely the same year that Algiers began preying upon American
merchant shipping in an effort to squeeze more tribute from the United States.
Little could be done as the new nation struggled to rewrite and ratify its
constitution and then get on with the business of learning how to translate the
words into practical government. It was not until 1793 that President Washington
finally reported to Congress that with the utter failure of diplomacy to solve the
problem with Algiers, the nation needed a navy to compel peace. Congress
accordingly passed a bill over the objections of anti-nationalists authorizing four
44-gun and two 36-gun frigates (United States, Constitution, President,
Chesapeake, Constellation, and Congress). The opposition against this measure
ranged from those who thought the proposed force too small (and thus a waste
of resources) to those who feared that a sea-going navy would provoke war with
European powers. Most opposed to the bill recommended that, like Europe, the
United States continue paying whatever tribute was necessary to maintain peace
with the Barbary powers. The authorization was passed only with the proviso
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that construction of the six new ships would cease if peace with Algiers were
attained.257
Construction proceeded slowly, and none of the six ships was completed
by the time a peace treaty was ratified on March 2, 1796. Anticipating the peace
and constrained for resources, Congress, a year earlier, had authorized the
completion of two forty-fours (United States, Constitution) and one thirty-six
(Constellation) and had redirected funds to facilitate the work.258
Federalist ambitions regarding a navy were shaped, of course, by
Alexander Hamilton’s vision for America. With a huge merchant marine—the
second largest in the world259—there was a perceived need for a navy to protect
it, at least among northeastern Federalists and the tidewater South. Although the
agrarian interior of the country saw no need for a navy, the Federalists argued
that building and maintaining a navy would be a unifying influence and would
benefit the whole country by drawing men and materials from every region.
Hamilton’s strategic calculations transcended mere defense of shipping lanes,
however. He realized that the young republic lacked the resources to build a
navy that could compete ship for ship with England or France, but he reasoned
that a small American fleet could “become the arbiter of Europe in America, and
be able to incline the balance European competitions in this part of the world as
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our interests may dictate.” Specifically, he saw the utility of a fleet-in-being that
could threaten European commerce and bases in the West Indies.260
Nevertheless the Federalists were unable to realize their ambitions until
the Adams administration and the turmoil with France. The XYZ Affair stimulated
Congress to action, and on March 27, 1798, Adams signed into law an act that
directed the completion of the three frigates. The following month Congress
followed up with an additional authorization for twelve more vessels of twenty-two
guns or less. They also created the Navy Department, relieving the War
Department of the burden of administering a navy.
By May, 1798, war fever ran high but resources were few. Congress
authorized the seizure of French war vessels and the president to acquire twelve
more vessels as either gifts or loans. Adams was also permitted to issue six
percent bonds to fund the project. By the end of the summer, Congress had also
voted to appropriate $600,000 to build three more frigates. Secretary of the Navy
Benjamin Stoddert instead used the money to complete the three frigates under
construction. In 1799, at the prompting of Stoddert, Congress appropriated
$1,000,000 for six seventy-four gun ships-of-the-line and six sloops. In the
event, none of the contemplated vessels were built due to the change of
administrations. All this was anathema to Jefferson, who abhorred both the
unnecessary war with France and its accompanying debt.261
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The “revolution of 1800” and the near simultaneous peace with France
doomed the Hamiltonian vision for the navy. Jefferson saw his election as the
opportunity to eliminate the deficit spending of the Federalist era and retire the
national debt as quickly as possible: “The maxim of buying nothing without the
money in our pockets to pay for it, would make of our country one of the happiest
on earth.”262 At the same time he moved to eliminate internal taxes, thus
requiring his administration to curb spending and do away with excess wherever
it could be found. Of the discretionary spending available for review, the military
in general and the navy in particular was the most significant.263

By act of Congress in March, 1801, Jefferson was given the discretion to
sell most of the ships recently acquired, while retaining some. The new president
used this power to rid the navy of all but the United States (44), Constitution (44),
President (44), Chesapeake (36), Philadelphia (36), New York (36), Constellation
(36), Congress (36), Essex (32), Boston (28), John Adams (28), Adams (28),
General Greene (28), and the schooner Enterprise. He suspended the
construction of the seventy-fours, and he announced his intention to drydock
most of the retained ships.
The war with Tripoli modified Jefferson’s naval program by forcing him to
retain enough ships to fight the war and by pointing to the need for smaller ships,
including gunboats, that could ply the coastal waters of the Mediterranean
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powers to intercept small craft. In February, 1803, Congress authorized four 16gun ships (two brigs, two schooners) and fifteen gunboats. The following year
they authorized two more small ships—sloops Wasp and Hornet—and allowed
the administration to borrow or rent additional gunboats from Mediterranean
ports.264

With the Tripolitan War over in 1805 and the new struggle between France
and her enemies not yet manifesting a renewed threat to the United States,
Jefferson moved to implement a cost-cutting naval program built on the defense
of ports. Instead of relying principally upon a sea-going navy to deter, intercept,
and neutralize enemy depredations, the new plan was built around the gunboat.
Gunboats were small craft—50 to 70 feet in length--designed primarily for coastal
and inland waters that carried from one to several guns. Simple vessels in
design, they required much smaller crews than a man-of-war, and according to
Jefferson’s model, they could be crewed by militia and merchant marines rather
than by professional navy personnel. Best of all, they averaged in cost a mere
$10,000 per boat, so that twenty or thirty could be built for the price of a single
frigate. In March, 1805 Congress enacted authorization for 25 gunboats for
coastal protection. The following spring saw 50 more gunboats authorized,
followed by another 188 in December, 1806. In all Jefferson intended to
construct 256 of these small craft, but only 176 were ever built.
In February, 1807 Jefferson communicated his “Special Message on GunBoats” to Congress. He defended the policy of relying on gunboats and
264
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described a system of coastal defense built upon 1) land batteries employing
heavy cannon and mortars; 2) movable artillery to cover points not defended by
batteries; 3) floating batteries; and 4) gunboats working in coordination with
batteries. In his message Jefferson insisted he had support for the gunboat
policy for which “professional men were consulted as far as we had opportunity.”
He specifically cited Generals Wilkinson and Gates, along with Commodore
Barron and Captain Tingey, and he claimed that “no difference of judgement
appeared on the subjects.”265
It is difficult to imagine that such a radical shift in naval policy could have
produced such unanimity as Jefferson claimed. But if his account of this happy
concord is less than forthcoming, his remaining arguments in favor of gunboats
leave even more to be desired. He pointed out that the nation had used
galleys—a sort of forerunner of the gunboat—with great success, and from this
he inferred the efficacy of relying on the new concept. His logic is dubious. No
one doubted that smaller craft were useful on rivers and as a supplement to
larger ships along the coast. But to infer from this that gunboats en masse could
substitute for a sea-going navy was a huge leap—one ultimately shown to be
fallacious. Jefferson bolstered this argument by pointing out that the gunboat
was “in use with every modern maritime nation for the purpose of defence.”
Again, this point would not have been in dispute, but to build upon it his gunboat
strategy was a classic non sequitur.266
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The most egregious error in Jefferson’s special message, however, and
one that historians have for the most part allowed him to get away with, was his
reference to a recent naval campaign in the Liman firth in the Black Sea.
“The remarkable action between the Russian flotilla of gun-boats
and galleys, and a Turkish fleet of ships-of-the-line and frigates, in
the Liman sea, 1788, will be readily recollected. The latter,
commanded by their most celebrated admiral, were completely
defeated, and several of their ships-of-the-line destroyed.”267
The reference is to an engagement that occurred in the spring of 1788
during the Russo-Austrian-Turkish War. In a joint land and sea campaign, the
Turks were attempting to defend the key fortress of Ochakov on the Black Sea
coast from Potemkin’s attack. On June 17-18, Kapudan Pasha Hassan, the
Turkish admiral, sailed into the shallow Liman firth. Opposing him were two
Russian squadrons: a rowing squadron under Prince Karl Nassau-Ziegen, and a
sailing fleet under the joint command of Brigadier Panaiothos Alexiano and Rear
Admiral John Paul Jones, the American hero, recently hired by Catherine to fight
the Turks. The Russian fleet was composed of 58 vessels with 400 guns, while
the Turks had twice that number. Jones’ squadron boasted only one frigate and
one large warship, while Hassan Pasha had ten ships-of-the-line. The Russians
maneuvered carefully throughout the day-long battle and eventually set fire to the
Turkish flagship. The Turks withdrew and attempted to escape the firth under
cover of darkness, having lost only a few ships during the naval battle. But
through the genius of Alexander Suvorov—one of Russia’s most brilliant and
eccentric soldiers—the Russians had emplaced a battery commanding the
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escape route and proceeded to hammer the Turkish fleet. The rowing fleet,
consisting of mostly galleys, attacked the beleaguered Turks at the same time,
and by the time Hassan Pasha’s survivors limped out to sea, they had lost five
frigates and three ships-of-the-line. Russian losses amounted to one floating
battery.268
Jefferson’s conclusions from this battle were not justified. A full history of
the naval clashes during the war between the Russians and Turks does not point
to the superiority of gunboats over traditional warships. Rather, it shows a more
balanced lesson: that men-of-war can work effectively with gunboats in coastal
waters. Gunboats served throughout that conflict as an effective supplement to
the ships-of-the-line, frigates, and sloops on either side, but they certainly did not
supplant them. Further, the remarkable Russian success in the Liman firth was
brought about by equally remarkable circumstances that preclude any general
inferences. The waters of the firth were dominated by the battery at the Kinburn
spit, and Suvorov—the army commander—was skilled enough to plan for the
entrapment of the Turkish fleet. The firth itself is shallow and puts larger ships at
a disadvantage to smaller, more maneuverable craft, but such a condition does
not necessarily pertain to other battles and cannot be relied upon for a system of
maritime defense. Jefferson’s misuse of history to prove his point shows a
conspicuous bias in his reasoning.
Hand-in-hand with his fascination with gunboats was Jefferson’s belief that
the fleet could be manned by naval militia, in lieu of professional navy sailors. In
December, 1804 he penned a bill designed to establish a naval militia composed
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of all sea-faring men aged 18-45 who would then be mobilized in an
emergency.269 Jefferson and his Republican allies in Congress believed that
such a militia would easily produce the numbers of skilled seamen needed to
man the gunboats when required. In the event, the theory proved groundless. In
1807, pursuant to the Chesapeake incident, a British squadron anchored in
Hampton Roads and threatened the city of Norfolk, whose mayor had refused
their request for fresh water. Captain Stephen Decatur attempted to deploy the
sixteen gunboats available, but to his chagrin, he could not muster enough men
to do the job. As the weeks dragged on and war fever ebbed, so also did the
men’s interest in serving and crewing the gunboats. In the only serious test of
Jefferson’s naval militia theory, it had conspicuously failed, although Jefferson
did not acknowledge it and continued to pursue his scheme.270
Jefferson’s detractors have not been shy in criticizing the gunboat
program: “Only once in American history has a president deliberately opted to
weaken the navy in the midst of an international war that threatened to engulf his
country.” 271 Alfred Thayer Mahan, writing at the time that America was about to
launch into great power status, roundly condemned Jefferson’s naval policy
because it did not include large, sea-going battleships. For any power that
intends to compete in the world against great powers, such a force is the sine
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qua non of both military and economic power.272 The point that eludes Mahan,
as it did Jefferson’s other detractors, including Harold and Margaret Sprout, is
that early 19th century America was not and could not be a great power. With a
small, rural population, virtually no infrastructure, and an economy that was just
getting ready to expand, the young republic had no hope of competing with
European powers for dominance or even parity on the seas. Anti-Jefferson
historians conclude that the country was weak during his presidency because of
the lack of a navy. The reverse is actually the case: Jefferson chose not to have
a navy because the country was weak.
The claim that Jefferson was anti-navy requires qualification. The heart of
the matter is this: he was not anti-naval in principle. Indeed, it was Jefferson
who, as ambassador to France, had argued during the crisis with Algiers that the
United States should build a navy and send it against the pirates. His ideology
was not averse to warships, but rather was centered on a perceived need to cut
the budget. The American navy was expensive, and it was an expense that
teetered on controversy—was it necessary? could it provoke war? was it too
small and thus a waste of money? By reducing the size of the navy—in part in
cooperation with the Federalists following the peace with France—Jefferson and
Gallatin were able to reduce the navy’s budget from $3,385,000 in 1800 to
$900,000 in 1802. Still, as Frederick Leiner points out, these savings were in
part illusory, because the administration and Congress chose to fund the
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Tripolitan War with a special “Mediterranean Fund”, which alone absorbed some
$2,000,000 in 1804.273
In conjunction with his marginalization of the frigates, Jefferson sponsored
a proposal to build a huge dry-dock system in Washington. Benjamin Latrobe
prepared plans, but Congress ultimately refused to fund the project. Not only
was the concept criticized as ridiculous by Jefferson’s opponents, but building the
facility would require the purchase of private lands as well as the removal and
relocation of some of the capital’s population.274 Even Gallatin strenuously
opposed the concept, and those favorable to the idea urged the president to
mitigate the risk by building several smaller facilities. Jefferson nevertheless
bulled the proposal forward, where it eventually died in Congressional committee.
The results of the gunboat policy were frustrating and depressing. In
1806, when the HMS Leander, attempting to fire a warning shot at an American
merchantman near New York City, hit it instead and killed one of the crew,
Jefferson was inundated with cries for action. But with two of the three serving
frigates deployed to the Mediterranean and the third under repair, and with the
vaunted gunboats not yet deployed near New York City, Jefferson was powerless
to do anything but lodge a complaint.275
Even Jefferson himself realized that he had miscalculated the efficacy of
the gunboat fleet. He considered building a sea-going navy toward the end of his
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second term, but nothing ever came of the idea. 276 After the British victory at
Trafalgar (1805) there was obviously no hope of competing with them, and
Congressmen had to wrestle with the fear that the ships they might authorize
would be at the mercy of the English.
The lack of a credible sea-going navy led to a crisis following the
Chesapeake incident (1807), because Jefferson had no credible military options
with which to respond to Britain’s provocations. With no ships to punish British
merchant shipping or to resist her men-of-war, Jefferson resorted to an economic
instrument of coercion, the embargo. Although popular at first, the embargo
against Great Britain became burdensome to the Federalist northeast and
ultimately required Jefferson to deploy federal troops to enforce it in New York
and Vermont. Jefferson’s critics point out, with some logic, that the disastrous
embargo policy emanated from the lack of a navy.

It is a formidable task for an historian to try to defend Jefferson’s gunboat
policy. Nevertheless it is an easy matter to expose the harsh criticism of
Jefferson as unjustified. The attempt to portray Jefferson as a radical antinavalist or as a “whimsical, phylosophic President”, as Federalist Senator Plumer
called him, lacks objectivity and a genuine appreciation for the facts.277
To begin with, it was not the call for gunboats that is in question, but rather
the unwillingness to fund a sea-going navy as well. Gunboats had great utility
throughout 18th and 19th century America, and in 1802 there was an urgent need
276
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for shallow draft war vessels that could ascend the Mississippi in response to
Spain’s provocations.278 Further, as the war with Tripoli continued, the
Mediterranean fleet communicated a need for smaller craft to supplement the
frigates, because the enemy was hugging the coastline and escaping the larger
ships.279
The initial experiments with gunboats were not promising—one being lost
with all hands in the middle of the Atlantic, another captured by the British, and
yet another blown from its moorings to land in a Georgia cornfield! Critics began
referring to gunboats as the “whirligigs of the sage of Monticello” or simply as
“Jeffs”. With the outbreak of war in 1805, it became clear to Secretary of the
Navy Robert Smith as well as Gallatin that gunboats alone would not suffice to
keep the British and French from molesting American shipping. Jefferson
apparently agreed, and he reluctantly called for construction of larger warships.
The problem, however, was that the Republican Congress would not fund
them.280
It is a fair criticism to suggest that had Jefferson been more vociferous in
support of a balanced fleet, he may have convinced his fellow Republicans to
follow suit and appropriate funds for badly needed frigates and perhaps even
ships-of-the-line. But ultimately Congress was responsible for its own failures,
and while they continued to buy gunboats, they ignored Jefferson’s simultaneous
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proposals for larger ships. In the words of Jeffersonian apologist, Professor
Gene A. Smith:
“Even though the nation needed to stress defense, Jefferson knew
that the rabidly anti-navy Republican Congresses of the first
decade of the nineteenth century did not support the construction of
sea-going vessels for that purpose. They instead embraced
gunboats as an alternative for defending the country…Thus, the
president was forced to reconcile the defense problem in the only
way Congress would approve—the gunboat program. What
becomes apparent is that Jefferson’s attitude toward the navy has
been stereotyped, just as his gunboat program has been
erroneously over-simplified.281
Gunboats certainly had a role to play both before Jefferson’s
administration and after. They were instrumental in the federal government’s
attempts to suppress the international slave trade near New Orleans after
Jefferson signed the ban into law in 1808. Under the command of David Porter,
the craft were used to seize illegal shipments in coastal waters. Ultimately the
enterprise was a failure, due in part to the increasing value of the slave trade, but
also because Porter consistently failed to find enough sailors to man the craft
adequately. As at Norfolk in 1807 the naval militia concept, so attractive in
Republican theory, was a failure in practice.282
During the War of 1812, the “Jeffs” went into action to assist in the
defense of New Orleans when the British invaded in December, 1814. Integrated
into a system of shore defenses, the gunboats did an admirable job delaying the
invading flotilla for nine crucial days, thus facilitating Andrew Jackson’s famous
victory. Though undermanned and ultimately destroyed or captured by the
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British, they did come close to performing the function envisioned by Jefferson a
decade earlier.283 Unfortunately, in the actions around Washington DC and
elsewhere throughout the war, gunboats proved singularly ineffective.
Despite the Republican Congress’ hostility to a navy, there were real
strategic reasons for having a small but capable fleet. Alexander Hamilton had
made a reasonable argument that a moderately sized sea-going fleet in
American waters could threaten European holdings in the West Indies as
diplomatic leverage in the conflicts between the Old World and the United States.
“A nation, despicable by its weakness,” he claimed, “forfeits even the privilege of
being neutral.” Jefferson, however, argued that the same dynamic could be
achieved on land without a navy. American war plans included contingencies
against British Canada, French Louisiana, and Spanish Florida, where American
militia armies could overwhelm smaller European garrisons—or so it was
thought. Jefferson foresaw the need for a small navy, strong enough only to
deter European powers whose navies were equally small.
“It will be enough if we enable ourselves to prevent insults from
those nations of Europe which are weak on the sea, because
circumstances exist, which render even the stronger ones weak as
to us…Providence has placed their richest and most defenceless
possessions at our door.”284

Jefferson’s naval views, combined with his pacific tendencies, led him and
many others to misinterpret the Battle of Trafalgar. With the catastrophic
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destruction of French naval ambitions at the hands of the masterful Nelson, it
was clear to many in both Europe and the United States that for the foreseeable
future, it would be impossible for any single nation to create a fleet that could
face the British in line of battle. For some, including Jefferson and most
Republicans, this fact led to the conclusion that the construction of sea-going
men-of-war would be a colossal waste of resources. Instead, it should have
pointed to a shift in strategy from an emphasis upon ships-of-the-line in favor of a
fleet of fast-moving frigates. Just as the French began to wage an effective
guerre de course by preying on British merchant shipping, so an American navy
could have held enemy sea lines of communication at risk in the event of war.285
More important to the debate on naval strategy was the British attack and
defeat of the Danish fleet at anchor in Copenhagen. In April, 1801, a British fleet
commanded by Horatio Nelson engaged and destroyed the enemy fleet that was
anchored under armed fortifications. Without losing a single ship, Nelson
destroyed numerous Danish ships and compelled the surrender of the rest. The
quick action of the British prevented the Danes from linking up with Russian
ships and showed how vulnerable enemy fleets could be to sudden attack from
the Royal Navy. It was this threat that was more of a serious challenge to an
American sea-going navy than a Trafalgar-like decisive battle. With coastal
fortifications that varied from fair (New York) to nonexistent in some ports, the
United States had to worry about a sudden British raid destroying ships or
284
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facilities. Jefferson had the foresight to call for a widespread effort to strengthen
the fortifications and guns around critical American ports, but such work would be
long and expensive—and ultimately not proof against a determined enemy.
Thus, Jefferson had to figure into the strategic equation the chance that an
expensive sea-going navy might get ‘Copenhagened’ at the start of a war.286
Naval theorists of the ilk of Alfred Thayer Mahan have focused upon the
sea battle and the fleet that wins it as the whole of naval strategy. Mahanian
theory came to view the destruction of the enemy’s fleet, a la Trafalgar, as the
proper focus of strategy. Once “command of the sea” had been thus attained,
the victorious nation could enjoy secure commerce while being able to strangle
the shipping lanes of her adversaries at will. This theory, like similar theories
emphasizing the decisive land battle, was erroneous. As the brilliant Julian
Corbett made clear at the turn of the twentieth century, the sea cannot be
“commanded” by winning a battle with ships-of-the-line. Rather, to get at an
enemy’s commerce required frigates that could chase merchantmen and
disperse along sea lanes, rather than massing for linear battle. Thus, dispensing
broadsides in line of battle and interdicting (or protecting) commerce were two
opposite pursuits—requiring two different types of ship.287
After Trafalgar, a nation that contemplated future conflict with Great
Britain, while perhaps not being able to win big naval battles, could instead opt
for a strategy of guerre de course by constructing small-to-medium size ships
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that could attack merchantmen. By avoiding battle and instead holding enemy
shipping at risk, an adversary could wreak economic havoc on England, driving
insurance rates up, and distracting the British fleet. Jefferson and the
Republicans in Congress would have been well advised to balance their
appropriation of gunboats with a modest fleet of frigates that could menace
British (or French, or Spanish) trade. It is a matter of record that American-built
frigates in the early 19th century were among the best in the world, being slightly
longer and faster than European designs, and usually going to sea up-gunned
and with large crews. They were thus well designed for single-ship engagements
and could normally out-gun adversaries and board them with a surplus of
sailors.288

The Republican gunboat policy was a strategic mistake that would cost
the nation dearly. But to hold Jefferson solely responsible for the flawed plan is
inaccurate for two key reasons. It was first and foremost a Congressional
failure—one that was admittedly abetted by Jefferson. Secondly, given the
fundamental weakness of early 19th century America, there were few strategic
options available to the administration. It is unlikely that even a robust
shipbuilding program would have resulted in a fleet capable of defending against
British depredations in the War of 1812. It is, however, more to the point that a
modest fleet existent in 1807 would have given Jefferson and the country more
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policy options than the ineffective embargo to protest against British impressment
of American sailors.
In the end analysis, the gunboat navy was a mistake but one that was in
some ways unavoidable, given the Republican Congress’ aversion to the military
establishment left by the Federalists. Although Jefferson was at the helm at the
time, there is little any administration could have done to make America strong
on the seas prior to the War of 1812. The disasters that the gunboats failures led
to were certainly of a smaller scale than what happened to the French at
Trafalgar or the Danes at Copenhagen.
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In addition to the broad changes to the national military posture that
Thomas Jefferson instituted during his first term, he also supervised three key
strategic operations: the war with Tripoli, the nation’s Indian policy, and the
Louisiana Purchase. Each of these enterprises confronted the president with
unique and critically important challenges that would have long-lived and
profound ramifications for the American people and the international community.
The war with Tripoli was a limited venture that required patience, measured
response, and, ultimately, conclusive military operations in a theater of war that
defied attempts at decisive action. Because the war was limited in terms of
expected benefits to the nation, Jefferson had to balance traditional military
concepts of employing overwhelming force with the need to limit expenditures.
The Indian problem challenged the president to find a balance between his
impulses toward beneficent sympathy for native culture on the one hand, and his
countrymen’s paranoia concerning a classic clash of civilizations and the dangers
of foreign intrigue among the Indians on the other. His solutions have been
criticized by historians, most of whom lack a realistic appreciation of the historical
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context, and none of whom have suggested reasonable alternatives to
Jefferson’s policy. Finally, the Louisiana Purchase tested the new president’s
strategic savvy in geopolitics while simultaneously presenting a singular
opportunity for national growth that intruded into the shadowy borderlands of
unconstitutionality. Jefferson—honest and introspective regarding the
constitutional limits of his office—decided to seize what would become the most
biggest opportunity in the history of the United States. An examination of how
Jefferson dealt with these three challenges will reveal his depth of strategic
insight, the tortured dialectic between his nationalistic impulses and his belief in
the limits of power, and his occasional shortfalls in character and leadership.

War With Tripoli
Although the newly elected President Jefferson sought to reduce military
expenditures, he became more intolerant of the antics of the Barbary powers. In
September, 1800, the American frigate, George Washington, arrived in Algiers to
deliver tribute to the Dey. Instead of consummating the deal, the Algerian leader
demanded that Captain William Bainbridge carry tribute, along with his harem,
court officials, and a variety of zoo animals to Constantinople…under the flag of
Algeria. Outgunned and outnumbered, Bainbridge had to comply. When his ship
returned home the following year, Americans, including the new president, were
outraged.289
Tripoli also had threatened war with the United States if it did not receive a
promised warship and more annual tribute. Likewise the other Barbary powers

157

were beginning to rankle for more timely deliveries of tribute from the Americans.
In July, 1800, the Bashaw of Tripoli, Yusuf Karamanli, tiring of pestering the
American consul, James Cathcart, for more tribute, allowed his corsairs to
capture a brig, the Catherine, which he stripped of its goods, valued at $50,000,
before letting the ship and crew go free. It was intended as a warning that if the
United States did not treat Tripoli with equal respect, vis a vis Algiers and Tunis,
that there would be war.290
Three weeks into his administration, the “half-way pacifist” President
Thomas Jefferson ordered preparations for an undeclared war against Tripoli.
After years of fruitless and frustrating negotiation with the rapacious rulers of the
Barbary Coast, and after his country had paid more than a million dollars in
bribes, Jefferson had had enough: “Tripoli…had come forward with demands
unfounded either in right or in compact…The style of the demand admitted but
one answer.”291 A country that had thrown off British tyranny would not simply
exchange it for another form from the Muslim pirates. In May, 1801, the new
president convened his cabinet to discuss the possibility of sending a squadron
to the Mediterranean.292
The two primary issues up for discussion were the constitutionality of
prosecuting armed intervention without Congressional approval, and the nature
of American operations in the Mediterranean. Secretary of the Navy Samuel
Smith made the point that if Tripoli declared war on the United States (an event
289
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that had already happened on May 14, but which was unknown to the
government yet), then no Congressional approval was required to defend
American interests. Given that assembling Congress would take at least weeks
and maybe months, Smith’s point seemed reasonable.293
Smith, Madison, and Gallatin also argued for a rigorous offensive against
enemy pirate ships and ports. But Jefferson was inclined to listen to the counsel
of his attorney general, Levi Lincoln, who said that the squadron should go no
further than protecting American merchant shipping and should not pursue
enemy warships. Given the communications gap between the national command
authority (the president) and the fleet, such an approach was faulty. At the time
of the cabinet meeting, the government was unaware that Tripoli had declared
war, nor could the status of the other powers be certain. A more effective
directive might have left the character of operations up to the naval commander
of the squadron, whose mission would have been to protect American shipping
through whatever means necessary. President Jefferson—certainly not alone
among American presidents—had intruded into operational matters instead of
confining himself to strategic direction.294
In fact the relationship between presidential direction of the war and the
individual initiative of the theater commanders would become a major issue—one
that would ultimately characterize the conclusion of the conflict. American history
since the early 18th century has seen the struggle between president and field
292
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commander evolve from one extreme to the other—from LBJ’s supervision of
target lists in Vietnam to FDR’s diplomatic handling of his feuding senior
commanders to George W. Bush’s generous delegation of operational decision
making to Tommy Franks. The “right” combination is elusive, because oversupervision translates to operational opportunities lost, while too loose a leash
can result in field commanders taking liberties with national policy. Jefferson
initially chose to restrict the behavior of his squadron commanders fighting
Tripolitan piracy, but he ended up with an extremely loose cannon in the person
of William Eaton, whose antics were crucial to the winning of the war against
Tripoli.
Eaton was a former soldier, having served with distinction under Anthony
Wayne, and he was able to secure a post as consul to Tunis during the crisis
with Algiers. A voracious reader, adventurer, arabist, and ruffian, Eaton became
convinced early in his experience with the Barbary powers that force alone would
resolve the issue. “There is but one language which can be held to these people,
and this is terror. [Congress must] send a force into these seas, at least to check
the insolence of these scoundrels and to render themselves respectable.”295

In any case the president’s proclivity for being overly restrictive toward his
squadron commanders was overridden by his Secretary of the Navy. Smith’s
directive to the departing fleet gave the commander wide latitude in choosing
among blockading, hunting corsairs, or convoy escort. Unfortunately, the first
294
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commodore chose to interpret his orders as narrowly as he could, thus
convincing himself that he lacked specific authority to attack Tripoli directly. The
squadron, consisting of the frigates President (44), Philadelphia (36), and Essex
(32), and the schooner Enterprise (12) was commanded by Richard Dale, the
administration’s second choice after the more aggressive Thomas Truxton, who
refused to serve as both squadron commander and captain of the flagship.296
Jefferson elected to delay a formal notification to Congress about the
Mediterranean fleet until it was underway. His communication to them, however,
revealed the initial uncertainty of his Mediterranean policy.
“The real alternative before us is whether to abandon the
Mediterranean or to keep up a cruise in it, perhaps in rotation with
other powers who would join us as soon as there is peace. But this
Congress must decide.”297
The statement showed Jefferson’s enduring devotion to the idea of
international cooperation in the suppression of piracy—an idea he embraced as
both minister to France and Secretary of State. It also showed his instinctive
desire to defer to Congress in the hope, perhaps, that they would assume a
decisive stance toward the Barbary powers. The Congress refused to declare
war, however, and Jefferson, despite his reputation as a “strict constructionist”,
was perfectly willing to fight an undeclared war. Eventually, in February, 1802,
Congress authorized “all necessary force” to protect merchant shipping against
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the Barbary pirates. The president had the requisite authority to commit
Americans to combat, and the war with Tripoli could continue at his discretion.298
Richard Dale, a Revolutionary war hero who had served with distinction
aboard the Bonhomme Richard, was to prove as cautious as a commodore as he
had been reckless as a lieutenant. His cruise began splendidly as the
aggressive Lieutenant Andrew Sterett, in command of the Enterprise, destroyed
the corsair Tripoli. Dale then undertook a blockade of Gibraltar and compelled
the Tripolitan admiral, Murad Reis (actually a Scotsman-turned-Muslim, Peter
Lisle) to abandon his flagship, the Meshuda (the previously captured and
converted Betsey). Despite these tactical successes, in terms of his strategic
objective, Dale accomplished little. He had interpreted his orders from Secretary
Smith as disallowing any direct attack on Tripoli itself, and he later claimed these
instructions hamstrung him. His half-hearted blockade of Tripoli harbor did not
impress or seriously impede Yusuf, and Dale himself soon despaired of the war
effort.299
Jefferson, upon hearing the news of the Enterprise exploit, commented
upon the early phase of the war in his annual message to Congress. Although
his deference to the legislative body was politick, it also revealed a naïve
restraint in the name of constitutionality that served only to weaken and dissipate
America’s initial efforts to fight the war successfully.
“One of the Tripolitan cruisers…engaged the small schooner
Enterprise, commanded by Lieutenant Sterret, …was captured after
a heavy slaughter of her men, without the loss of a single one on
our part…Unauthorized by the Constitution, without the sanction of
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Congress, to go beyond the line of defence, the vessel being
disabled from committing further hostilities, was liberated with its
crew.”300

In the spring of 1802, Jefferson and Smith, having failed a second time to
persuade Truxton to accept the position, assigned Richard Morris as commodore
in charge of the squadron sent to relieve the first one. Morris was the brother of
a Vermont congressman who had facilitated Jefferson’s victory over Burr in the
presidential election, so the appointment was clearly a political one. The new
commodore sailed with his wife and son aboard the flagship, and the attention he
paid to his own comforts far exceeded his zeal in making war. His squadron
consisted of the Constellation (36), Chesapeake (36), Adams (28), and two ships
already in the Mediterranean, the now famous Enterprise (12), and another
frigate, the Boston (28), which had previously joined Dale’s squadron.301
Morris spent an entire year plodding through the western Mediterranean,
visiting one European port after another and did not make it to a Barbary port
until nine months after his arrival at Gibraltar. Under his loose direction a
blockade of sorts was imposed upon Tripoli, but since the squadron lacked a
sufficient amount of shallow-draft vessels to intercept runners hugging the
dangerous waters of the coast, the blockade was wholly ineffective. In fact, it
was worse than ineffective, because it actually emboldened the enemy when he
saw how little capacity America had for war. With William Eaton back in
Washington, filling Jefferson’s ear concerning Morris’ lethargy, the president
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directed that a new squadron with a new commander be assigned. Edward
Preble took charge as the third commodore in the war effort. Morris was recalled
on 16 June, 1803 and subsequently court-martialed and dismissed from the
Navy.302
At the same time that Morris’ unhappy command was coming to an end,
an encounter between Algiers and Great Britain showed the world what might
happen if a Christian power fought back against the Barbary pirates with
resolution. When British warships defended against and sank several Algerian
corsairs, the dey retaliated by imprisoning every British citizen in Algiers. In
response, Lord Horatio Nelson sailed to Algiers with a fleet of seven frigates and
systematically pummeled the city, causing fires and destroying buildings. After
refusing to negotiate, Nelson finally gave his terms: the immediate release of all
British prisoners, a fine, a promise to behave, and compensation to any British
citizens who suffered losses during the escapade. The dey agreed, and the
British departed.303
For his part Jefferson’s strategic views of the war were solidifying. As he
sent Preble to the Mediterranean, he explained his perspective on the problem:
“The war with Tripoli stands on two grounds of fact. 1st. It is made
known to us by our agents with the three other Barbary States, that
they only wait to see the event of this, to shape their conduct
accordingly…2dly. If peace was made, we should still, and shall
ever, be obliged to keep a frigate in the Mediterranean to overawe
rupture, or we must abandon that market. Our intention in sending
Morris with a respectable force, was to try whether peace could be
forced by a coercive enterprise on their town. His inexecution of
orders baffled that effort. Having broke him, we try the same
experiment under a better commander. If, in the course of the
302
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summer, they cannot produce peace, we shall recall our force,
except one frigate and two small vessels, which will keep up a
perpetual blockade. “304

Jefferson’s comments illustrate his understanding of what was truly
America’s first “domino theory” of enemy behavior. But while the theory might
prove dubious when applied to Southeast Asia in the 1960s, it was accurate
along the Barbary coast in the early 19th century. The various governments of
Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli watched very closely what treaty provisions
the Christian powers obtained from each other, and they based their demands for
tribute on what they thought the market would bear.
Preble sailed first to Tangiers and secured peace with the emperor of
Morocco, who had been threatening war with America over the matter of two
ships the Americans had captured. This minor diplomatic victory, however, was
soon overshadowed. The first major event of Preble’s command was a
catastrophe for Americans and the war effort. Captain William Bainbridge, a
well-meaning, courageous and energetic officer who nevertheless suffered a
string of unfortunate events in his career, ran his frigate, the Philadelphia (44)
aground outside of Tripoli harbor, where she was subsequently captured and the
crew enslaved. Bainbridge was not even able to scuttle the ship properly, and
the bashaw found himself in possession of an intact American frigate. But the
disaster led to a daring feat of arms the following February, when Stephen
Decatur, Jr. led a boatful of American commandos into Tripoli’s harbor by night
and burned the frigate beyond repair, escaping without the loss of a single man.
304

Jefferson to Judge Tyler, Monticello, March, 1805, Washington ed. iv, 574.

165

The Philadelphia thus provided the Americans with a universally celebrated
episode of bravery—even attracting the praise of Horatio Nelson—while at the
same time the enslaved crew became a central issue in the war.305
In August, 1804, Edward Preble launched his long planned-for assault on
Tripoli, destroying several ships, capturing several more, and damaging the city
by shelling. In a series of follow-on raids against the city late in the summer,
Preble determined to hammer the bashaw hard enough to conclude a peace
agreement. But while his exploits would earn Preble the gratitude of the nation,
by themselves they served only to harden Yusuf’s resolve. In fact it pointed out
the obvious: with a secure land-base of operation, the Tripolitans could harass
the Americans indefinitely with impunity. Preble, however, was energetic in his
prosecution of the blockade, and, armed with gunboats to supplement his fleet,
he was successful in capturing and interdicting Tripoli’s previously untouched
corsairs and runners. To his chagrin in early fall, he received orders to hand over
command to the war’s fourth commodore, Samuel Barron, who was en route
from America with four more frigates.306
By the time Barron took over what was to be an uninspiring command,
William Eaton’s frustrations had grown to the point that he approached Jefferson
with a proposal to support the bashaw’s older brother, Hamet, whom the
dastardly Yusuf had wrongly deprived of office.307 His ambition was to culminate
in the war’s most unlikely and probably most effective operation: the seizure of
Derna, Tripoli’s second largest city, by a handful of Americans and a ragtag
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coalition of mercenaries and Arab cavalry who, for the right price, had rallied
behind Hamet. The account of Eaton’s expedition in the face of foreign and
domestic intrigue against him, few resources, and an unending series of mutinies
and desertions, is one of the most remarkable in American history. It is almost a
certainty that the over 400 mile march from Alexandria, Egypt to Derna, where
the American-led coalition promptly stormed the city while outnumbered 10-to-1,
would never had come close to success were it not for the singular determination
and skill of Eaton.308
With Eaton maintaining a tenuous hold on Derna in the spring of 1805,
and with Samuel Barron incapacitated by liver disease, the American consul
general, Tobias Lear, took charge of diplomatic efforts aimed at securing peace.
A long-time confidante of the now deceased George Washington, Lear
deprecated any idea of Americans allying with the pretender Hamet, and instead
pressed for a negotiated peace with Yusuf. Lear was instrumental in drying up
support and resources for Eaton’s continued operations, which ultimately aimed
at replacing Yusuf with the more pliable Hamet. Instead, Lear prevailed upon
Barron, and then John Rodgers who took over command from the ailing
commodore, to sail to Tripoli and negotiate. Eaton and many of Jefferson’s
Federalist critics believed that had Rodgers’ squadron conducted a Preble-like
bombardment of Tripoli in conjunction with a renewed land campaign, they could
have compelled Yusuf’s defeat. Instead, the desperate bashaw was allowed to

307

Eaton Papers, Boxes 7-8; Naval Documents, vol. 5, 348-561.
Two good accounts are found in Samuel Edwards, Barbary General: The Life of William H.
Eaton (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968), ; and Joseph Wheelan, Jefferson’s War:
America’s first war on terror, 1801-1805 (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2003), pp. 232-305.

308

167

save face by demanding and receiving $60,000 in ransom for the crew of the
Philadelphia. He signed a peace treaty with America on June 10, 1805, and the
war was over.309 Eaton was ordered to abandon Derna but came home to a
hero’s welcome.310
In the years leading up to the War of 1812, the United States was able to
secure peace with Tunis and maintain relations with Morocco and Algiers. But
when the dey of Algiers launched his corsairs against the Americans again in
1815, the president sent Stephen Decatur, Jr. with a squadron to deal with him.
Decatur managed to capture two Algerian warships, kill the ranking enemy
admiral, and then sailed into the enemy’s harbor with a massive fleet. The dey
capitulated almost immediately, and, in Decatur’s words, the Americans obtained
a treaty “at the mouths of our cannon”.311

The Tripolitan War featured an unremarkable and desultory American
intervention into the waters and politics of North Africa. Under the command of
one mediocre commodore after another, the United States Navy tried without
success to use naval power alone to force the Pasha of Tripoli to terms. Even
the best performer—the aggressive Commodore Edward Preble—failed to make
an impression on the enemy ruler, whose capital appeared impervious to assault
from the sea, and whose navy could routinely infiltrate the American blockade. A
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few tactical successes excited American nationalism and proved the mettle of the
new generation of young officers, but they did not convert into strategic
accomplishment until the intervention of William Eaton. As the theorist
Clausewitz would write later in the century: “Everything in war is very simple, but
the simplest thing is difficult.”312 So it proved for the Americans’ efforts to project
military power against the bashaw of Tripoli. The difficulty of bringing together
resources, aggressive leadership, and clear strategic direction became more
than evident over the four years of war.
The Tripolitan War pointed both to Jefferson’s shortcomings and his
genius as a strategist. The most conspicuous failure early in the war was
Jefferson’s decision to cut the strength of the navy simultaneously with
conducting operations in the Mediterranean. This decision, based on faulty
economics, resulted in few ships and even fewer capable seamen. Still, it was
not the lack of firepower that doomed the Americans’ initial efforts. It was lack of
aggressive leadership and, to a degree, the initial dearth of shallow-draft
gunboats. The inexplicable lethargy of Dale and Morris caused the war to
stagnate. Since Jefferson and Samuel Smith were charged with choosing the
leadership of the squadrons they sent, their initial choices were conspicuous
strategic failures.
In forming a strategy for war, national leaders must play a guessing game
in trying to determine what actions will compel the enemy to agree to their terms.
Underestimating enemy resolve is an oft-repeated mistake in war, and
Jefferson’s administration was guilty of this classic error. The idea that a
312
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desultory blockade and a show of strength would cause the bashaw to abandon
his modus operandi for collection of wealth was short-sighted. It was only when
he was faced with the possibility of regime change or personal destruction that
he relented. Had Jefferson understood this from the start, he may either have
chosen not to go to war, or to have girded for a more aggressive policy from the
start.
The genius of the Tripolitan War strategy is difficult to perceive. There
were some exciting tactical moments: the Enterprise defeating the Tripoli without
losing a man, the various bombardments of enemy ports, the firing of the
Philadelphia, and, of course, Eaton’s exploits of derring-do. But the strategy, at
first glance, seems desultory, lacking energy and direction, and incompetent.
From the perspective of a modern superpower, we expect the president to lay out
a stern and unwavering directive that enumerates conditions for victory and
hands the enemy an ultimatum: surrender or die. But Jefferson’s handling of the
war with Tripoli was much more subtle and ultimately successful, if not
conspicuously brilliant.
The art of strategy is not concerned with splendid tactical events. Rather,
it must be focused on the more crucial, large-scale issues of balancing ends,
ways, and means. When a country’s very existence is threatened, the “ends” of
strategy are extreme—to defeat the enemy and/or compel his surrender. These
extreme ends both demand and enable the use of equally extreme means and
ways. When the majority of citizens in a republic feel the threat of destruction,
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they are willing and able to acquiesce in conscription, high taxes, and staggering
casualties. Large-scale ends are coordinate with large-scale means.313
The converse is also true. When the perceived ends of a given strategy
are small-scale, the means and ways must also be small. During the ethnic
conflict in Kosovo in the 1990s, President Clinton’s decision not to use ground
forces invited much condemnation from pundits. After all, they reasoned, if we
are going to fight a war, we must fight to win. But Clinton and his advisors
understood that the potential end-state in Kosovo would be, at best, the
achievement of a tenuous cease-fire between ethnic factions. There would be no
real gain for America there. Hence, from the American perspective, the ends of
the Kosovo strategy would be small-scale. It would be a capital mistake, then, to
commit great armies, money, and lives for the achievement of so little. The
marginal ends demanded the expenditure of marginal means. The resulting
Kosovo strategy, if it did not please the pundits, was balanced, and that is the
definition of good strategy.
Similarly, the war with Tripoli was not a matter of life or death for most
Americans. We were not going to annex land or defeat an invasion of our
continent. Instead, we were attempting to secure our merchant shipping against
one of several piratical powers. Some regions of the country were vitally and
emotionally connected to this pursuit, while others viewed it as utterly
unimportant. The best we could hope to achieve was a relatively small-scale,
temporary security of our economic interests in the Mediterranean Sea. Hence,
the limited ends of the Tripoli strategy called for the expenditure of limited means.
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In achieving the right balance, Jefferson showed himself to be a good strategist,
while simultaneously exposing himself to criticism of his political opponents.
The Americans’ efforts against Algiers, Tripoli, and the other Barbary
powers produced long-term effects. In fact, with the American example of
defiance, the great powers of Europe began to rankle against the tribute system.
As Jefferson put it:
“There is reason to believe the example we have set, begins
already to work on the dispositions of the powers of Europe to
emancipate themselves from that degrading yoke. Should we
produce such a revolution there, we shall be amply rewarded for all
that we have done.”314
In the course of the mid-1800s the Barbary coast ceased to be a threat to
American and European shipping. What had once been a dreaded source of
irresistible pirates became a handful of third-rate powers ripe for European
colonialism. Meanwhile, following Jefferson’s original penurious naval policy, the
War of 1812 saw the resurgence of American sea power.

Jefferson and the Indians
The historiography of Jefferson’s dealing with the Indians suffers from a
common perspective that views the issue from a moral or ethical perspective.
The titles alone of books on the subject reveal the moral bias of many writers:
American Indian Holocaust and Survival, by Russell Thornton; Jefferson and the
Indians: the Tragic Fate of the First Americans, by Anthony F. C. Wallace; and
the provocative Custer Died for Your Sins: an Indian manifesto, by Vine
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Deloria.315 The fate of the native Americans at the hands of successive
administrations throughout the 19th century has left an indelible sense of guilt on
the nation, and this pervasive remorse colors historians’ perceptions and
interpretations. My goal, conversely, is to lay aside the moral and ethical
implications of Jefferson’s handling of Indian affairs and instead analyze his
actions in terms of the actual national security problems of the day. One can
view a policy through an ethical lens and declare it bad while at the same time
another can look at it from the perspective of national security and proclaim it
good. The issue for this study is a simple one: did Jefferson’s Indian policy
make the nation more or less secure?
In addition to allowing cultural bias into their histories, some critics of
Thomas Jefferson also make the mistake of blaming him for the sins of an entire
nation. Wallace’s critical look at Jefferson, for example, does a splendid job of
detailing the president’s policies but fails to grasp the larger contextual
inevitabilities: that the reach of the federal government vis a vis the Indian
problem was very short. There was little any president or governmental policy
could do, for example, to restrict white encroachment, prevent the sale of liquor
to Indians, or change cultural prejudices. There was, in brief, a measure of
inevitability in the history of the American Indian, and even the most strident
condemnation of white policy fails to derive any reasonable alternatives. Rather
than extracting Jefferson’s actions from the context of the early 19th century, it
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would be more to the point to compare his actions to those of his
contemporaries. In this we would find Jefferson to be far more compassionate
than others both in government and out.
When Jefferson succeeded to the presidency the Indians represented a
potential threat to the national security. This is not to say in any way that white
Americans were not at fault. They, too, had a long history of violence and abuse
toward native Americans. European settlement in America was a threat to the
national security of the Indian nations, too. But from the perspective of the
government of the United States, the American Indians were a danger. Although
they usually practiced limited warfare against European incursions, they had a
history of violence dating back to the first Tidewater Wars of the 17th century
(when sudden attacks almost extinguished the Virginia colonies), and they had
been used as raiders and guerilla fighters by both the French and British in the
past. British influence remained strong among the Indians of the Northwest
Territory (present day Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin). The British had a long
record of arming and supplying the Indians from Canada as the French had done
before them. Prior to the Louisiana Purchase, the French, who had employed
Indians as raiders during the French and Indian War, might be capable of using
them again. And the Spanish, with their territories all along the southern United
States, had ready access to the Indian tribes, including the Seminoles,
Choctaws, and Creeks. European manipulation of the Indian tribes was a
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constant theme of early American history and represented a clear and present
danger in Jefferson’s day.
“On the commencement of the present war, we pressed on them
the observance of peace and neutrality, but the interested and
unprincipled policy of England has defeated all our labors for the
salvation of these unfortunate people. They have seduced the
greater part of the tribes within our neighborhood, to take up the
hatchet against us, and the cruel massacres they have committed
on the women and children of our frontiers taken by surprise will
oblige us now to pursue them to extermination…Their confirmed
brutalization, if not the extermination of this race in our America, is
therefore to form an additional chapter in the English history of the
same colored man in Asia, and of the brethren of their own color in
Ireland and wherever else Anglo-mercantile cupidity can find a twopenny interest in deluging the earth with human blood.”316

During times of war, when Jefferson’s normal discretion was brushed
aside by his impulses toward nationalism, his prejudice and antipathy toward the
Indians that were fighting against his nation emerged.
“I am sorry to hear that the Indians have commenced war, but
greatly pleased you have been so decisive on that head. Nothing
will reduce those wretches so soon as pushing the war into the
heart of their country. But I would not stop there. I would never
cease pursuing them while one of them remained on this side the
Mississippi.”317
“The Indians…will yield, and be thrown further back. They will
relapse into barbarism and misery, lose numbers by war and want,
and we shall be obliged to drive them with the beast of the forest
into the stony mountains.”318
But to characterize these rough words as representative of Jefferson’s true
feelings concerning the Indians would be inaccurate. He was writing on both
occasions during a time of war in the context of Indian aggression. His anger
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stemmed not simply from cultural bias, but also from the certainty that the hated
British were behind the depredations. In truth, taken as a whole, Jefferson’s
writings indicate an altogether different opinion concerning the Indians.
Rather than succumbing completely to the racial prejudice of his day,
Jefferson, as a son of the Enlightenment, believed that despite the technological
disparity between the red man and white, the Indians were fundamentally equal
to those of European descent.
“It is in North America we are to seek their original character. And I
am safe in affirming, that the proofs of genius given by the Inidans
of North America place them on a level with whites in the same
uncultivated state. The North of Europe furnishes subjects enough
for comparison with them, and for a proof of their equality, I have
seen some thousands myself, and conversed much with them, and
have found in them a masculine, sound understanding…I believe
the Indian to be in body and mind equal to the white man.”319

Despite his critics’ antipathy, there can be little doubt that Thomas
Jefferson was genuinely sympathetic to the plight of the American Indians. But
his sympathy was not akin to that of the detached, modern student looking
backward through the lens of a liberal, democratic superpower. Rather, his
views existed within the context of the vast clash of civilizations that he was born
into and that would continue well past his death. In that context it was perfectly
congruent for Jefferson to be simultaneously sympathetic and yet irretrievably
biased against the hunter/gatherer culture of the Indians. He remained
fascinated by Indian history yet assured of its dismal future as well. A collector of
treasured Indian artifacts, he looked forward to the eradication of the culture that
produced them, in favor of the Indians’ assimilation into an agricultural society.
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“The decrease of game rendering their subsistence by hunting
insufficient, we wish to draw them to agriculture, to spinning and
weaving.”320
“I consider the business of hunting as already become insufficient
to furnish clothing and subsistence to the Indians. The promotion
of agriculture, therefore, and household manufacture, are essential
in their preservation, and I am disposed to aid and encourage it
liberally.”321

Rather than condemning the writer of the Declaration of Independence for
his supposed hypocrisy, one can just as easily point to Jefferson’s discretion and
restraint toward the Indians. He fully intended to supervise their continued
removal and assimilation, but he was equally determined to do so in a manner
that would benefit the individuals while destroying their culture. Above all,
Jefferson’s policies, if they lacked strength in enforcement, at least were rich in
practicality. The threat of foreign intrigue was real, as evidenced by the part
Indians played in the War of 1812.322
Jefferson’s Indian policy included the continued, gradual, and peaceful
acquisition of land for white settlement. He made it clear in his communication to
territorial governors and Indian agents that he wanted to maintain peaceful
relations with the various tribes and acquire their land through purchase
agreements. At the same time he intended to extend trade among the Indians
for the dual purpose of providing them the means to convert to agriculture and to
coax them into debt, whereupon they could sell their lands to the federal
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government. The conversion to agriculture would in turn make the Indian tribes
less dependent on vast hunting lands and instead make more productive use of
smaller tracts. The white culture’s bias against using lands for hunting grounds
was pervasive in Jefferson’s day.
“To ratify a heathen nation Who have no better right to this land
than we have ourselves; and they have by estimation nearly
100,000 acres of land to each man of their nation and of no more
use to government or society than to saunter about upon like so
many wolves or bares, whilst they who would be a supporter to
government and improve the country must be forsed even to rent
poor stoney ridges to make a support or rase their families on whilst
there is fine fertile countries lying uncultivated, and we must be
debared even from injoying a small Corner of this land.”323

While this pervasive bias was certain to be destructive of Indian culture,
Jefferson had equally strong impulses toward helping and protecting the Indians.
Unfortunately his initial intentions of limiting the reach of federal government
tended to leave the details of his policies in the hands of local and state/territorial
governments to handle. Since the local officials and militias were solely
composed of the very white settlers who craved Indian lands, the result would be
foreordained.324
Jefferson intended to force the Indian tribes, particularly in the south, into
assimilation by slowly obtaining lands along the Mississippi. This acquisition
would have two purposes—one explicit and the other implicit. The former
purpose was to provide secure communications between American settlement
around Natchez and the territories of Tennessee and Kentucky. The more
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secretive purpose was to encircle the Indian nations as a means to forcing them
to accept an agricultural lifestyle.325
“The ultimate point of rest and happiness for them is to let our
settlements and theirs meet and blend together, to intermix, and
become one people. Incorporating themselves with us as citizens
of the United States, this is what the natural progress of things will
of course bring on, and it will be better to promote than to retard
it.”326
“I shall rejoice to see the day when the red men, our neighbors,
become truly one people with us, enjoying all the rights and
privileges we do, and living in peace and plenty as we do, without
any one to make them afraid, to unjure their persons, or to take
their property without being punished for it according to fixed
laws.”327
“Our settlements will gradually circumscribe and approach the
Indians, and they will in time either incorporate with us as citizens
of the United States, or remove beyond the Mississippi. The former
is certainly the determination of their history most happy for
themselves; but in the whole course of this it is essential to cultivate
their love.”328
At the same time Jefferson’s administration, working through Indian agent
Colonel Benjamin Hawkins and the territorial governments, went about directly
negotiating for the purchase of key tracts of land. Initially this effort resulted in
the acquisition of relatively small tracts in the Mississippi Territory and Georgia,
but after the Louisiana Purchase it included vast regions north of the Ohio River
and west of the Mississippi, as well as critically needed tracts in Tennessee. In
some cases these acquisitions benefited the Indians involved. The cession
negotiated with Jean Baptiste du Coigne, chief of the Kaskaskias, for example,
gave the small tribe their only chance for survival against the depredations of the
325

Wallace, 218-225.
Jefferson to Benjamin Hawkins, 1803, Washington ed. iv, 467.
327
Jefferson to the Cherokee Chiefs, 1808, Washington ed. viii, 214.
326

179

Shawnee and Potawatomis as the United States took on the responsibility of
defending the Kaskaskias.329
In other cases the cessions eventuated in war. When William Henry
Harrison coerced the Delaware along the north bank of the Ohio to cede their
lands, the parent tribes who had allowed the Delaware to settle there protested
that the Indians who had signed the agreement had no legal authority to do so.
A subsequent conference among the offended chiefs and Harrison resulted in a
short-lived but happy concord that years later would give rise to war. The
Indians’ aggravation at having been deprived of lands north of the Ohio River led
to the rise of the Prophet and his brother Tecumseh, who would pull together a
confederation against America in the opening days of the War of 1812.330
Still, Jefferson’s policy goals had been largely met by the middle of his
second term, and the Indian tribes between the Atlantic coast and the Mississippi
were all but surrounded by white settlement. He had also secured lands in
southern Michigan and northern Ohio, which helped to protect Detroit. As
Jefferson foresaw, this encirclement would eventually lead to the eradication of
the Indians’ way of life—preferably peaceably. The moral implications of these
land acquisitions aside, they were crucial to securing the United States against
British aggression from Canada in the War of 1812.331
By the end of his second term in office, Jefferson had presided over the
acquisition of nearly 200,000 square miles of Indian land, all without falling into
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open war with the former owners. As Anthony Wallace sums up the
achievement:
“As he left office, the banks of the Ohio were safe, much but not all
of the Mississippi shoreline was in the government’s hands, and
public roads traversed Indian territory in a number of directions,
connecting American forts, frontier settlements, and centers of
commerce. Jefferson had seen to the national security and the
future expansion of the growing white population into the remaining
Indian territory east of the Mississippi, a task which Andrew
Jackson would nearly complete a few years after Jefferson’s
death.”332

Wallace’s tone, of course, is condemning throughout his book, but his description
points to the fact that Jefferson had achieved greater security for the nation. His
commission as president was foremost to provide for the defense of his nation,
not to satisfy the moral impulses of later generations, and in this even his critics
agree that he was successful. Much of the criticism aimed at Jefferson’s Indian
policy draws strength from what happened years after Jefferson died in 1826.
During the administration of Andrew Jackson, the United States
government was responsible for the forced relocation of the Five Civilized Tribes
to the west of the Mississippi. Thousands of Indians died along the “Trail of
Tears”, an episode that became emblematic of the injustices suffered by the red
man at the hands of the white. Congress’ Removal Act of 1830 was the
legislation that led to the tragedy, but critics of Thomas Jefferson point to him as
the source of the policy that inevitably led to it. Still, Jefferson was not directly
culpable for the human disaster which occurred after his death, and it is unlikely
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that his genuine sentiments toward the Indians would have led him to allow such
an event to occur.
At the root of the problem was that the white settlement of North America
resulted in a clash of civilizations. As time went on the white civilization
continued to strengthen, and the Indian civilization continued to decline. When
civilizations clash, particularly over land rights, the result is inevitable and can
scarcely be restrained or even delayed. Racial bigotry, crime, and war will follow.
From at least the time of the Revolution, and certainly after the Louisiana
Purchase, the eventual white settlement of North America was inevitable, which
is to say, the destruction of Indian civilization was a certainty.
To ponder the moral implications of this basic confrontation is an ongoing,
fascinating, and fruitless occupation. If the student of history begins with
condemnation of Jefferson’s Indian policy, he must find himself ultimately back at
the cradle of civilization condemning the Hittites for raiding against the
Sumerians and Akkadians and pursue his moral crusade through the balance of
human history. Modern, self-sufficient, liberal democracy, pontificating from the
secure lands once bloodily contested by our ancestors can recline in morally
judging the past. But the facts of history remain: civilizations clash, and violence
is the result. Nineteenth century America featured such a contest between two
civilizations, one immeasurably stronger than the other. Jefferson’s warning to
the chiefs in the Detroit area expressed the cold mathematics of this disparity:
“in war they will kill some of us; we shall destroy all of them.” In such a context,
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the explicit or implicit policy making of a single president will make little
difference.

The Strategic Calculation of Thomas Jefferson and the Louisiana Purchase
As Jefferson’s first term of office drew to a close, he achieved a
remarkable coup in foreign affairs: the purchase, for fifteen million dollars, of the
ill-defined Louisiana Territory—an acquisition that more than doubled the size of
the United States. This accretion in the country’s territory was as much the
product of circumstance as it was of Jefferson’s decisions, but it was reflective of
the president’s strategic calculation, which was the foundation of his military
policy.
By December, 1801, Jefferson had learned that Spain and France were
negotiating the retrocession of the Louisiana Territory to France.333 The transfer
of a critical part of the continent from a weakened Spain to powerful France did
not bode well for American foreign policy. Jefferson observed that “There is on
the globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our natural and habitual
enemy…It is New Orleans.”334 Because the Mississippi River was the main
outlet for goods from the Ohio Valley and the entire American West, New
Orleans was the focal point for both trade and conflict with European powers.
Jefferson believed that in the long run, time was on the side of the United States.
The population was growing and expanding westward. Eventually, simply
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mathematics would drive the Europeans out, as long as the government could
avoid losing a war to Britain or France in the mean time.335
The president also perceived accurately the political dynamics of the New
Orleans problem. In 1786 John Jay’s abortive attempt to negotiate a treaty with
Spain that acquiesced in Madrid’s right to close the port had enraged the
American West, and Jefferson had observed the potential for a sectional split.
The westerners simply would not permit the national government to trade away
their right to free navigation through New Orleans. If that right could not be
secured by a government distracted by the needs of the northeast, then they
would likely either seek independence or ally themselves with a European power.
Hence, the Louisiana problem was ultimately about securing the nation from
splitting apart.336
Until the United States was in a position to acquire the city and
surrounding territory, it was to the Americans’ advantage that Spain, among the
various European colonial powers, would retain it. Spain was weak, and
Jefferson believed that he could negotiate with Madrid from a position of
strength, or, if necessary, prosecute a war against Spanish troops with high
hopes of success. He had learned by experience that Spain was malleable
during the crisis of the mid-1780s, when Madrid tried to flex its muscles by
disputing the Americans’ right of navigation through New Orleans. But if France
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were to acquire Louisiana, Napoleon would have his hand on the throat of the
American west, and that was unacceptable.337
Jefferson conveyed his misgivings through Charles Pinckney in Madrid,
Robert Livingston in Paris, and later Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours and his
son Victor, and in response to Federalist war fever, he also prepared his protégé
James Monroe for a special mission to Paris. The president’s strategy was to
avoid war with France if at all possible, because of the danger of losing to
Napoleon’s forces on the one hand, or being forced into a compact with England
on the other. In order to convince Napoleon about the seriousness of the threat
to America should France acquire Louisiana, he pointed out that such an
eventuality would almost certainly push the United States into an alliance with
Great Britain.338
Napoleon had a vision for a French empire in the Americas, but it was a
vision that was destined to die in the first three years of the Jefferson
administration. In addition to Louisiana, French interests included the western
half of the island of Santo Domingo, which had been ceded to France in 1697. In
the turmoil of the French Revolution, slave revolts on the island left French
control weak, and the British seized the opportunity to invade the island in 1793.
Malaria, yellow fever, and continuous slave revolts confounded the British, and
their troubled sojourn there gave rise to an ingenious ex-slave-turned-guerillaleader, Francois Dominique Toussaint. An educated black who had formerly
served with French forces, Toussaint built up a disciplined insurgent army that
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progressively gained control of the island. In 1798 he completed his conquest
and became the master of the devastated island nation. He attempted to put
together an economic order that would strengthen his government and placate
the freedom-loving population at the same time, but with foreign influence
temporarily removed, the former slaves of Toussaint’s army wanted to live as
free men and lost their sense of loyalty to their leader. The stage was set for the
French to return.339
In 1802, Napoleon’s brother-in-law, General Charles Leclerc, landed on
the island and began a rapid conquest of the coastal towns. He then set about
raiding and destroying Toussaint’s guerilla forces until the rebel leader offered his
surrender, which Leclerc accepted. In accordance with Napoleon’s direction to
him, the general then treacherously seized Toussaint and shipped him off to
France, where he died in prison. When Paris signaled that a restoration of
slavery was in the offing, the population again erupted into rebellion. At the
same time, malaria and yellow fever struck the European troops, devastating
regiment after regiment and threatening the French presence on the island.
What could have been a convenient off-shore base for Napoleon’s conquest of
Louisiana thus became a serious obstacle and a logistical nightmare.340
In October, 1802, the situation in Louisiana was exacerbated when the
Spanish intendant, Don Morales, withdrew the Americans’ right of deposit in New
Orleans. This act, in combination with the rumors of the French retrocession,
brought war fever to a new intensity. The Federalists, hoping to recoup some
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political power, postured in favor of immediate seizure of the disputed city.341
Instead, Jefferson stayed the course, appealing to Madrid through his minister
there. The Republican majority in Congress aligned themselves with the
president, and war was avoided for the time being.
As the crisis over Louisiana deepened, Napoleon had a change of heart.
The failed campaigns in Santo Domingo, the prospect of renewed conflict on the
European mainland, and dwindling French coffers had convinced him that
throwing another army into the Americas would be an unfeasible distraction.
Instead, he might use the opportunity of the retrocession and the Americans’
anxieties over New Orleans to bolster his finances. In the spring of 1803, just as
James Monroe was arriving in Paris, Napoleon directed his finance minister to
sell Louisiana to the Americans. The treaty was signed on May 2nd, and news of
the deal reached Washington in July.342
The Louisiana Purchase was the product of extraordinary circumstances
ranging from yellow fever to Spanish provocation to French duplicity. But it also
came about from the strategic calculation of Thomas Jefferson, who read the
situation with remarkable clarity and foresight. Jefferson’s strategic framework
consisted of several principles:343
1. The disposition of western lands in the Americas invited the influence
of and potentially invasion by European powers, chiefly Britain and
France.
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2. Occupation of Louisiana by either of these two powers was
unacceptable and would lead almost inevitably to an American alliance
with the other.
3. Spain, on the other hand, was fundamentally weak, and until the
United States could acquire Louisiana, Spain was the preferred owner.
4. European war, or the threat of it, would distract both Britain and France
from their interests in the Americas.
5. New Orleans and the Louisiana Territory were critical to the success of
the United States. The political party that secured them would win the
loyalty of the west both to the United States and to the party.
6. Time was on the side of the Americans, because population and
economic growth would soon result in overwhelming American
strength along the Mississippi. Hence, the longer war could be
avoided, the stronger the United States’ position would be.

As Jefferson’s first term was coming to a close, his re-election was almost
a foregone conclusion. The acquisition of Louisiana was immensely popular and
a crowning achievement for the administration. Jefferson, the “half-way pacifist”,
had avoided blundering into war and instead used a combination of threats,
patience, and economic suasion to wrest from European control what had
become almost the “western coast” of the United States. With almost no navy
and a tiny army, Jefferson rattled the saber and achieved the conquest of
800,000 square miles.
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Conclusion
By the end of his first term in office, Thomas Jefferson had constructed, if
not an optimal military policy, then at least one that was rational, balanced in
terms of resources and objectives, and cognizant of both internal and external
threats. In line with Jefferson’s anxieties about corruption and anti-Republican
conspiracies, he built a military establishment designed more to answer the
needs of economy and the protection of domestic liberty than to repel a foreign
invasion. Modern interpretations of Jefferson’s policies can be harsh, the more
so when they lack the context of early America’s essential weakness and the
very real threats that were developing within the republic.
Thus, up until 1805, Jefferson’s military policy was reasonably effective
and perhaps a key to the United States’ continued existence through Jefferson’s
administration. But with British provocation growing on the high seas, the chinks
in the armor of the president’s military establishment were about to be revealed.
The closing years of his administration were to show that disarmament not only
forestalled a Federalist coup, but also weakened the president’s hand in
administering his own policies at home and abroad.
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Thomas Jefferson was inaugurated for his second term as president on
March 4, 1805, and he delivered a speech that trumpeted the successes of his
first four years. He declared success in maintaining peaceful relations with
Europe and in eliminating wasteful offices and taxes at home. He also reiterated
his belief that rather than accumulating a huge war chest or fighting future wars
on credit, that each war would be paid for as it was fought through the
instrumentality of taxes as needed. He acknowledged that the purchase of
Louisiana was controversial but reminded his fellow citizens that the larger the
nation, the less likely it would be disrupted by local crises.344
Jefferson reaffirmed his Indian policy: the destruction of their culture is
regrettable but inevitable, and it is therefore incumbent upon the government to
help convert the Indians from a hunting/gathering economy into an agricultural
one. He lamented that fact that certain elements among the Indians desired to
keep things as they had always been. This over-zealous reverence for tradition
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and conservatism was, in Jefferson’s view, as bad for the Indians as it was for
the white man. Progress, not stasis, was the key to success.345
The president then went on to declaim against the anti-Republican press,
but he noted with pride that rather than resorting to repressive measures from the
government, his administration allowed the court of public opinion to pronounce
judgment on the libelous attacks made against him. He viewed his re-election by
an overwhelming majority as proof that a free and open democratic society will
be able to distinguish between truth and falsehood and act accordingly. The
inaugural address ended with a humble appeal for patience and support.346
It was as much a victory speech as a political statement. Jefferson’s
words of March, 1805 gave expression to his sense of how history had proven
him right in his struggle against Federalism. His handling of the army and navy
had been at the center of that conflict, and he was confident that his choices had
been correct. But even as he was speaking, events in Europe were playing out
that would threaten the United States and test the viability of the president’s
military policy.

The Spanish Problem
The government in Madrid was furious about the sale of the Louisiana
Territory to the United States, and Spanish officials were determined to
undermine the transaction by disputing the boundaries. They specifically
disputed the American claim that the eastern boundary of Louisiana was the
Perdido River. In his Fifth Annual Message to Congress in December, 1805,
345
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Jefferson pointed to Spanish incursions throughout the Louisiana Territory.347
The Spanish had also refused to comply with their earlier agreement to
compensate Americans for losses during the War for Independence. The two
sides were disinclined to negotiate in good faith; Jefferson believed the Spanish
to be weak and uncooperative, and he did not shrink from the prospect of a war
with them. He also anticipated that Spain would eventually lose all her
possessions in the Americas.348
Jefferson believed that military success in any war with Spain was a
foregone conclusion and would result in the United States acquiring the Floridas
and the full extent of the Louisiana Territory.
I had rather have war against Spain than not, if we go to war
against England. Our southern defensive force can take the
Floridas, volunteers for a Mexican army will flock to our standard,
and rich pabulum will be offered to our privateers in the plunder of
their commerce and coasts. Probably Cuba would add itself to our
confederation.349

When it became clear to him that Napoleon would not cooperate in
pressuring Spain, Jefferson reasoned that the best policy for the United States
was to seek closer relations with Great Britain. By positioning his country’s
foreign policy as a fulcrum between Paris and London, he could gain leverage
over either when necessary. Still, Jefferson’s basic distrust of English designs on
America prevented a serious effort at repairing relations between the two
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countries. As long as the threat of an English alliance was effective in Paris,
there was no need to go further.350
As 1805 came to a close, Jefferson’s administration was looking to a
combination of money and military suasion as the means of wresting Louisiana
and the Floridas from Spain. Although the nation’s standing army remained
minuscule, Jefferson used the threat of westerners rising up on their own
initiative as the chief instrument to be used against Spain. He suggested through
his ministers in Paris and Madrid that if matters were not settled to their
satisfaction, the white settlers east of the Mississippi would simply march on
Spanish possessions and take them by force. But in his Fifth Annual Message to
Congress in December, 1805, he stated that he had given orders to American
regulars to oppose any further incursions the Spanish might make into the
Louisiana Territory.351
The relationship between the president and Congress concerning foreign
policy during the crisis with Spain is of some note. In line with his beliefs about
the Constitution, Jefferson explicitly deferred to Congress regarding the decision
to go to war or prosecute offensive operations against Spain. But underlying his
political ideas and self-restraint was the more practical matter of means.
Jefferson’s administration had pared the military down to minimal strength, and if
the country were to go to war, Congress would have to appropriate funds for
more troops and ships. He urged the Legislature to reform the states’ militias so
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as to exclude persons over the age of twenty-six and those with families. His
intent was to make the militia more easily mobilized, so that they could respond
rapidly to Spanish incursions and buy time for the deployment of regular troops
as needed.352 Thus, in his strategic calculation, Jefferson viewed the office of
president as having the power to command military forces and even deputize
militias when necessary, but he looked to Congress for the authority and means
to conduct major war.353

Jefferson also communicated to Congress his desire for them to
appropriate money for the construction of gunboats and coastal artillery to defend
the vulnerable seaports and coastal communities. He had not abandoned the
idea of building a regular sea-going navy as well, but he offered two approaches
to naval strategy simultaneously: an unconventional, wholly defensive gunboat
strategy, and a conventional strategy built around frigates and ships-of-the-line.
He even suggested that Congress add to the number of authorizations for
captains and lieutenants. The Republican Congress eventually chose the former
strategy and marginalized the conventional navy, but Jefferson clearly favored a
balanced approach.354
In the end the attempt to solve the disagreements with Spain came to
naught. Even after Jefferson was able to convince Congress to appropriate two
million dollars to buy additional territory in the Floridas, Spain refused to
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negotiate. But by then two momentous military events in Europe had changed
the balance of power there, and Jefferson’s attentions would be distracted by
new threats.355

Crisis with Great Britain
On October 21, 1805 Napoleon’s Combined Fleet under Admiral Pierre
Villeneuve was intercepted by the British Fleet under Admiral Horatio Nelson
near the port of Cadiz. The resulting Battle of Trafalgar was one of the most
decisive naval engagements of all time, and it would have an immediate impact
upon Thomas Jefferson’s foreign policy, military policy, and strategic
calculations. The political and military combinations in Europe that led up to one
of the most decisive naval battles in history were entirely beyond Jefferson’s
influence, but they framed the president’s national security strategy for the
ensuing four years.
During the fourteen month interlude that followed the Peace of Amiens,
Napoleon realized that unless he took decisive action, the Royal Navy would
continue to blockade the European coast and cripple French trade. He decided
to solve the British problem once and for all by invading the home island, and to
that end gathered his armies near the Pas de Calais in the summer of 1805. To
protect the troop barges in their channel crossing, he directed Admiral Villeneuve
to gather the French and Spanish fleets and make initially for the West Indies (to
draw the British fleet there) and then back to the English Channel. The French
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admiral managed to evade the blockading British ships, but throughout the
summer, Nelson was in hot pursuit as Villeneuve made his way across the
Atlantic and back to Cadiz.356
By this time, Napoleon had abandoned his plans to invade England and
instead focused on his upcoming campaign against Austria. He order Villeneuve
to break out of Cadiz with the Combined Fleet and make for the Mediterranean,
there to cooperate against the small British army gathered in Sicily. On 19
October, the French and Spanish ships began to move from Cadiz.357
Nelson, meanwhile, had screened the port with a handful of frigates,
keeping the main fleet some fifty miles offshore in order to lure his adversaries
out to sea. As soon as his frigates reported the enemy ships’ movement, Nelson
ordered his fleet to intercept. Employing his characteristic aggressive style, he
charged into the Combined Fleet in two columns, separating the French van from
the rest of the fleet. In the confused melee that followed, Villeneuve was
captured along with twenty French ships, and about 14,000 seamen from the
Combined Fleet were lost—half of them killed and the other half captured. The
British fleet was battered but did not lose a single ship. Nevertheless, the nation
lost its greatest hero when Nelson himself was mortally wounded and survived
only long enough to learn of the victory.358
The Battle of Trafalgar secured England from invasion and led to British
naval superiority for the next century. Now the undisputed masters of the sea,
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the British were determined to use their advantage to clamp down on French
trade and starve Napoleon into submission. The French responded by changing
their naval strategy from one oriented to main fleet actions—which they clearly
had little hope of winning anymore—into a strategy of commerce raiding, the
guerre de course. Both strategies were inimical to American interests, since the
great prosperity the United States was enjoying rested largely on carrying
overseas trade. Before President Jefferson could even digest the ramifications
of the British triumph, Napoleon scored one of his own, this time on land.359
Having abandoned his plans to invade England, Napoleon ordered his
troops to march toward Austria near the end of summer. Austrian armies had
attacked Bavaria in September, and Napoleon was determined to knock Britain’s
key ally out of the war before the Russian or Prussian army could intervene. In
less than six weeks, the French army reached the Danube and pounced upon
the unfortunate Austrian General Karl von Mack at Ulm. Napoleon crushed the
Austrian army and proceeded to Vienna, which surrendered to him after Emperor
Francis I fled.360
Reveling in his victory, Napoleon was aware that his mastery of Europe
was by no means accomplished yet. Prussia was threatening to join the British
alliance, and Russian armies were en route to Austria to join up with what
remained of the Austrian army. When the two allies united, they counted 90,000
against Napoleon’s 75,000. Napoleon chose to defend near the town of
Austerlitz, which was commanded by the nearby Pratzen Heights. On the eve of
359
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his greatest victory, Napoleon surprised his own generals by abandoning the
decisive high ground and letting the enemy take it.361
Napoleon knew that the young Russian Tsar Alexander I was anxious for
a glorious victory. By giving the Russians control of Pratzen Heights, he was
certain that he could lure them into an attack on his own right flank, which he had
secretly reinforced. Meanwhile, in the early morning fog of December 3, while
the Russians were moving according to Napoleon’s plan, two French divisions
were forming in the fog below the Russian center. Napoleon ordered the attack,
and suddenly the Tsar watched with horror as 17,000 French soldiers emerged
from the mist to crush his position on the Heights. Napoleon then followed up the
victory by attacking the enemy from the rear and routing both of the allied armies.
By the end of the day, nine thousand French soldiers were lost, along with
sixteen thousand Russians and Austrians. The Russian Tsar limped back to his
homeland with his defeated army, and Francis I surrendered to Napoleon. In a
stroke, the upstart Corsican had defeated his principle land-based adversary.362
The following year the French emperor turned against Prussia, who had
dared to oppose him without any continental allies. In October, 1806, Napoleon
won the twin battles of Jena and Auerstadt, crushing the Prussians and leaving
Russia to face the French armies alone.363 Tsar Alexander attacked the French
in Poland, and in two battles—Eylau and Friedland—the rivals bled each other
white but without decision. With both sides desperate for peace, Napoleon and
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Alexander met in the middle of the Niemen River and concluded the Peace of
Tilset. Russia and France would become allies in the struggle against Great
Britain…at least for the time being.364
With England in command of the seas and France the dominant land
power in Europe, the two enemies sought for ways to strangle each other’s trade.
Great Britain had to depend upon the Royal Navy to maintain the blockade on
Europe, but they suffered a continual manning problem. Because life aboard a
navy ship was harsh and the pay low, British sailors frequently deserted to serve
aboard merchant ships, and American merchantmen were the most popular
source of employment. In order to combat the drain on manpower, the Royal
Navy routinely stopped merchant ships of other nations and searched for British
sailors, impressing them back into the Royal Navy if found. From their
perspective, this was a reasonable practice and the only way to handle the
growing number of desertions. But Jefferson and most Americans saw both
impressment and interference with neutral shipping as an affront to their nation’s
sovereignty.365
Jefferson’s administration was also smarting over the Essex decision
rendered by the British High Court of Admiralty in 1804 and confirmed the
following year, in which the British decided to combat the process of American
merchant importing goods and then exporting them from the United States as
neutral cargo.366 As his second term progressed, Jefferson expressed alarm that
the Royal Navy was capturing and impounding more and more American
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merchantmen. American overseas trade was colliding with British military
strategy, and neither side could see a clear solution to the problem. Jefferson
was sure of only one thing: he did not want a war with Great Britain.367
While the president fretted, Congress passed a weak measure aimed at
coercing the British through economic suasion: the non-importation act of March,
1806. The act listed specific goods that would be banned starting in November.
At the same time, Congress pressured Jefferson to send William Pinckney and
James Monroe to London to secure a diplomatic solution to the growing
problems on the high seas. 368
When the results of the two men’s efforts reached Washington the
following year, Jefferson killed the proposed treaty in cabinet without referring it
to the Senate, because it did not deal with the issue of impressments. The
British rightly pointed to the ease with which their sailors could desert, procure
false papers in America, and serve aboard American merchantmen. The
Americans likewise complained (correctly) that the British were recklessly seizing
not only true deserters, but also innocent Americans. Despite London’s
professed commitment to exercise greater caution in the future, Jefferson and
most Americans continued to view impressment as intolerable.369
The conflict came to a head on June 22, 1807. The USS Chesapeake, an
American frigate, set sail from Norfolk en route to the Mediterranean. Captain
James Barron commanded the ship, but as it left port it was ill-prepared for
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action. Unstowed gear lay all over the decks, and the crew was short-handed.
Shortly after it got underway, the HMS Leopard spotted it and sailed parallel to it
for about forty miles out to sea. The Chesapeake, being an armed vessel of the
American Navy, should not have been subject to boarding and search by the
British, but the commander of the Leopard, supposedly under the orders of ViceAdmiral Sir George Berkeley, insisted that the American frigate submit to a
search for British deserters. Captain Barron refused, and the British opened fire,
rapidly disabling the ship, killing three sailors and wounding eighteen. When the
Americans struck their colors, the British then boarded and carried off four
men.370
Americans were outraged. War fever spread quickly, and both Federalists
and Republicans clamored for war. Jefferson’s response—quickly characterized
as pusillanimous by his Federalist foes—was much more circumspect. He saw
no advantage in going to war with England, and he reiterated his belief that the
decision to go to war must rest with Congress. He preferred peaceful measures
to the dangers of war with Britain, and by 1807 he could point to the Louisiana
Purchase as the example of what patience and diplomacy could achieve if given
the chance. Jefferson foresaw the day when the American population would
grow to the point that the country could support a more assertive foreign policy,
but until that time, he wanted to avoid war with the stronger European powers.371
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On 2 July, Jefferson ordered all British vessels out of American ports. He
later explained to Congress that because the Royal Navy was molesting ships
even in American harbors, his administration was left with two possible
responses: maintain a huge military (army and navy) presence in every port, or
simply ban the British completely. The first option was unaffordable.372 At the
same time he dispatched the USS Revenge to London with an envoy to discuss
the situation. Jefferson wanted the British government to disavow the attack on
the Chesapeake and abandon the practice of searching public armed vessels.
Jefferson wanted to extend protection from search to any merchantmen flying the
American flag, too, but that suggestion was unlikely to carry very far in London.
The American envoy was also to demand the restoration of the men taken, and
the recall of Vice-Admiral Berkeley. But underlying the entire diplomatic initiative
was Jefferson’s desire to have the matter of impressment dealt with once and for
all.373
Jefferson refused to recall Congress, partly because he wanted to give the
war fever a chance to calm down. He agreed to call the legislators back early,
however, and he scheduled the opening of the session for late October.
Meanwhile, he alerted the state militias and then settled in to await word from
London. As he contemplated the possibility of war with England, Jefferson saw
that the conflict would at least provide an opportunity to seize the Floridas from
Spain once war broke out.374
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As the weeks crawled by the chances for peaceful resolution diminished.
The four deserters were tried at Halifax, and one of them—Jenkin Ratford—was
hanged. Meanwhile, British Foreign Secretary Canning squashed any hope of
tying the affair to the greater issue of impressment. He argued persistently that
Americans were openly enlisting deserters from the Royal Navy and had closed
their ports to British vessels. (Both allegations were true.) He dispatched a
special envoy, George Rose, to negotiate in Washington.375
The situation worsened in the fall of 1807 when King George III issued a
proclamation requiring all British naval officers to enforce impressment over
neutral merchant vessels. Soon after, British Orders-in-Council prohibited trade
with all continental ports from which the British flag was excluded and declared
all vessels bound for open ports on the Continent must pass through British
ports, pay taxes, and secure clearance before proceeding. This measure,
combined with the effects of Napoleon’s blockade of England in the Berlin
Decree of November, 1806, guaranteed a difficult time for American vessels on
the high seas.
With American merchantmen thus imperiled, the Jefferson administration
took a precautionary step to protect her vessels: an embargo.376 Secretary of
State James Madison was most likely the author of the plan, but Jefferson
himself accepted responsibility for the plan. His government banned all overseas
commerce, so that no American vessels would leave port. It was a weak
response to British provocations, but there was little else to be done. Senator
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Samuel L. Mitchill noted that “in a choice of evils an Embargo was the least.”377
Jefferson also considered increasing the regular army and called on the states to
have their quotas of militia ready for defense as needed.378
Having chosen against war (probably a good decision), Jefferson focused
for the ensuing final year and a half of his administration on enforcing the
embargo (probably a bad decision.) In strategic terms, he became fixated on the
feasibility of the embargo, rather than its suitability. He insisted to Congress that
British depredations on the high seas and their increasingly intrusive policies of
both France and England mandated a continuation of the embargo.379 When
merchant interests in the northeast began to feel the pain of having stocks and
ships rotting in port, they began to rail against the administration’s policy and to
selectively disobey it. Jefferson reacted with distress at the evidence that federal
law was being ignored, and he decided to take increasingly draconian measures
to counteract the lawless trend. In the end, he was obliged to use federal troops
in New England to prevent illegal trade with British Canada—a step he himself
would have deprecated if taken by a Federalist president.380
The historiography of Jefferson’s embargo reveals wide divergence
among historians as to the president’s motivations and thinking. Henry Adams
saw the embargo as an outgrowth of Republican theory, Jefferson’s opportunism,
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and his fear of scuttling the American experiment.381 Louis M. Sears believed
that the embargo was an outgrowth of Jefferson’s fundamental pacifism.382
Bradford Perkins judged the whole affair as a colossal blunder and the product of
Jefferson’s incompetence.383 Leonard Levy was no more complimentary; he saw
Jefferson as a confused tyrant making war on his own people to avoid war
abroad.384 Merrill Peterson saw the embargo as a logical development of
Jeffersonianism and as an effort to prove the virtue of the republic.385
By the time Jefferson left office, he was weary of the whole affair. His
persistence in enforcing the embargo vilified him in the eyes of many, but the
policy itself seemed to have no effect on European decision making. On the
surface, then, the policy of embargo was a failure. But such a simple
characterization is misleading. There were at least two features of the policy that
were positive, as Jefferson himself explained to Congress. First, the embargo
protected American seamen from capture and her ships from seizure.386
Secondly, the ban on British goods and markets served to stimulate the
development of the American economy.387 Still, the tone of Jefferson’s message
to Congress hints of despair, and the points he singles out seem a bit of a
stretch. The real genius of the embargo policy was that it obviated war with
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England—a war that the United States would not win easily. Dumas Malone hits
upon this basic motivation:
“He [Jefferson] undoubtedly believed that war was justifiable and
for a time seems to have regarded it as inevitable. His
unwillingness to recommend it now cannot be properly attributed to
pacifism on his part…The American President was a man of
unusual patience who never doubted that time was on the side of
his young country. The designation of him as a prophet of pacifism
in unwarranted, but he was unquestionably a major prophet of noninvolvement in world affairs.”388
Any military conflict between England and the United States would have
played out with the same operational dynamics seen in the War for
Independence: British dominance of the seas, and American resilience on the
land. But the strategic elements of a war over shipping rights and impressments
would have been very different from those of the American Revolution. In the
former conflict, patience and determination were able to convince the British that
further attrition of their forces would not accomplish their political objectives in
North America. But in the early 19th century, there was little hope that any
American military action or pressure would be able to radically change British
policies on the high seas, especially since those policies were vitally connected
to London’s war against France and, hence, to its very survival. At best, such a
conflict would have been long and indecisive. At worst, it could spark a political
crisis within the United States—perhaps even secession and civil war.
After the Chesapeake affair, war fever demanded action: “This country
has never been in such a state of excitement since the battle of Lexington.”389
No administration could have survived politically if it had done nothing. The true
388
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virtue of the embargo was that it gave the appearance of a decisive strategic
response to British provocation, while at the same time keeping the United States
out of a war it couldn’t win. Viewed from the perspective of a 21st century
American superpower, the embargo seems an effete and wasteful policy. But in
the early 19th century, the United States was weak, and President Jefferson had
to choose from among less-than-optimal policy options. Choosing an embargo
allowed time for war fever to cool, and for Americans to better prepare
themselves for a war against Great Britain. Because of Thomas Jefferson’s
strategic insight, that war would not come until his successor’s administration, by
which time the country was strong enough to survive.

The Hero of Weehawken
If the threat of foreign invasion remained somewhat distant before 1807,
the danger from within was real and immediate. Aaron Burr, Jefferson’s first term
vice president, was implicated in a plot that served to highlight the brittleness and
vulnerability of the early republic. Born in 1756 and educated at Princeton, Burr
served in the Revolutionary War and rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel. After
the war he became a lawyer and a powerful political figure in New York, vying
with Alexander Hamilton. He served as state attorney general and then as US
Senator, and he consolidated his control of New York politics through the
Tammany Society. Able to control the state legislature’s pick of presidential
electors, Burr was powerful enough to secure the Republican nomination for vice
president under Thomas Jefferson in the election of 1800. His narrow loss to
389
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Jefferson in the runoff and the president’s decision to minimize Burr’s role in the
government caused Burr to look to the Federalists for political support. As the
term of his vice presidency was coming to a close, Burr sought the governorship
of New York and ran against the Republican candidate, who was backed by
Alexander Hamilton. (Hamilton feared that Burr, if elected governor, would
encourage New York and New England to secede from the Union. The bitter
exchanges between the two men during the gubernatorial race led to Burr
demanding satisfaction from Hamilton. The two met at Weehawken, New Jersey
on 11 July, 1804, and Burr shot the luckless Hamilton to death.390
Fleeing New York and New Jersey, Burr began to turn his attention and
energies to the American West. Developing numerous contacts throughout the
region, including General James Wilkinson, Burr’s audacious schemes included
at one time or another, a revolution to separate the West from the United States,
an invasion of Spanish Florida, an invasion of Mexico, and perhaps even a coup
against Jefferson’s administration.391 In this effort Burr was able to enlist
Federalist opponents of the Jefferson administration, as well as those who held
dubious land grants in the west. The latter hoped for a separation from the
United States as the means to secure their lands.392
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As discussed above the center of gravity of any plot in the West was New
Orleans. The conspirators rightly concluded that who controlled New Orleans
controlled the mouth of the Mississippi; and who controlled the mouth of the great
river controlled all the waters connected to it. The western states, whose
economies depended upon unrestricted flow of goods down the Mississippi,
would make a deal with whoever controlled New Orleans.393
Burr’s downfall was his connection to the infamous James Wilkinson. At
the last minute, as Burr had begun moving toward New Orleans in the summer of
1806 to execute the plot, Wilkinson decided that he could secure his place in
history as the savior of two countries—the United States and Spain, which two
countries he “loved equally well”.394 At this time, Wilkinson was both
Commanding General of the United States Army and in the pay of the Spanish.
In order to secure both of these happy stations, he turned on Burr. Probably the
chief influence in Wilkinson’s decision was a frank letter from Secretary
Dearborn, warning the general that he had been implicated in the plot.

“There is a strong rumor that you, Burr, etc., are too intimate.
You ought to keep every suspicious person at arms length, and be
as wise as a serpent and as harmless as a dove.”395

Meanwhile, Burr had made his way to Pittsburgh, where he recruited
Federalist sympathizers and collected supplies. He even inquired as to the
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participants of the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 and suggested that if it had been
properly led, it would have succeeded. From there he moved to Blennerhassett
Island on the Ohio River, where he conspired with his friend, Harman
Blennerhassett, and the two of them arranged for further recruiting and collection
of supplies and boats. As Burr continued to Cincinnati, Louisville, and on into
Tennessee, where he met with Andrew Jackson, he duped numerous Army and
militia leaders into thinking that his expedition was authorized by the Jefferson
administration. Indeed, Jackson wrote to Jefferson to assure the president of his
support in the expedition against the Spanish, whereupon Jefferson wrote back
asking what expedition Jackson was talking about. Burr also tried to get William
Henry Harrison to mobilize the militia of the Indiana Territory.396
Burr had been too free in admitting his designs to those he thought were
his confederates. Many of his contacts were not supportive but instead began to
inform the government of his plans. During his stay in Louisville, Burr attracted a
number of key figures to his schemes, and most of his co-conspirators there,
oddly enough, were Republicans. Notable Federalists began to write letters to
Jefferson informing him of Burr’s plots and naming those in collusion with him,
but Jefferson was reluctant to act on the word of Federalists against fellow
Republicans.397
James Wilkinson, having made his decision to betray Burr, concluded that
it was in his best interest to forestall a possible war with Spain over the border
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between Spanish Texas and the Orleans Territory.398 Spain insisted that the
Arroyo Hondo River was the boundary, while the Americans claimed it was the
Sabine River, thus creating a disputed territory between the two rivers.
Throughout 1806 both sides conducted desultory patrols and troop movements
that might have eventuated in war, but Wilkinson decided instead to press for a
negotiated “neutralization” of the disputed land. His efforts were blessed with
success, largely because the Spanish military commander along the Sabine, a
Colonel Simon de Herrera, evacuated the area and crossed to the Spanish side
of the Sabine on his own authority.399 Thus through the efforts of Wilkinson and
Herrera, the peace was maintained, giving the American general the freedom to
move against Burr in New Orleans if necessary. Once he secured the city and
felt reasonably certain that the locals there would not spontaneously rebel, he
began to move against Burr’s agents in the city.400
Jefferson began to receive reports of the Burr conspiracy from December,
1805, but he delayed acting until he could have Burr arrested on a clear violation
of the law. In January the following year, he received solid testimony concerning
the plot from Joseph Daveiss, District Attorney of Kentucky. Unfortunately for
Daveiss, Jefferson was either suspicious or otherwise put off by the revelation
that Burr’s supporters in Kentucky were mainly Republicans, and the president
therefore did not act on the allegations. Later on that summer, Commodore
Thomas Truxton and George Morgan both notified Jefferson of Burr’s plans to
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separate the West from the Union, but it was not until October, 1806 that the
president began to act on the gathering information.401
On 22 October, the Cabinet met and discussed the situation. They
decided to send instructions to the authorities in the western territories to watch
Burr and arrest him if the evidence warranted. Although Wilkinson was
implicated as well, Jefferson delayed any decision concerning his ranking
general. It is instructive, however, to note that whatever his beliefs concerning
Wilkinson’s loyalty, Jefferson had now been confronted with a potential Cromwell
at the head of a United States Army. This scenario was a realization of all the
fears conjured by radical Whig ideology, and it goes a long way toward
explaining—even justifying—Jefferson’s disinclination to build a large military
establishment. Ultimately, Jefferson was compelled to stand behind his
treasonous general, because Wilkinson was to become the star witness for the
prosecution against Burr.402 Earlier attempts by Jefferson and Dearborn to
balance Wilkinson’s power within the army by installing staunch anti-Wilkinson
Republican, Samuel Hammond, as second in command of the 2nd Infantry
Regiment failed.403
When Burr was finally apprehended in the Mississippi Territory in
February, 1807, he desired to face trial in the Territory, rather than being handed
over to Wilkinson’s military jurisdiction or taken to the East. Instead, he was
eventually transported to Richmond, Virginia, where, in the late summer he was
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tried and acquitted. The essence of the case was Chief Justice John Marshall’s
contention that in order to be guilty of treason, one must have assembled an
army whose avowed purpose was to make war against their own countrymen. In
the course of the trial, which focused on events at Blennerhassett Island, the
prosecution could not produce these elements of proof. Jefferson remained
publicly aloof for reasons of propriety, but he agonized over the results of the
affair, and Aaron Burr walked away unpunished but politically ruined.404
The Burr Conspiracy, which wrapped up at about the same time as the
Chesapeake Incident occurred, pointed to the vulnerability of the United States
during the first decades after the Revolution. That Aaron Burr could progress so
far in his designs, enlisting none other than the Commanding General of the
Army, as well as notable politicians, including at least one US Senator,
underscores the dangers faced by Jefferson’s administration. When lifted from
the context of the times, Jefferson’s national security policy—especially his
paring down of the military—might seem foolhardy. But when viewed with a firm
appreciation of the dangers from domestic unrest and conspiracy, Jefferson’s
ideas on the handling of the army and navy seem wise.

Jefferson’s Army
In the wake of the Burr crisis, Jefferson and Dearborn began to worry
about the loyalty of officers in the Pittsburgh area and elsewhere. There was
little to be done, however, because proving disloyalty would be a difficult matter.
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Further, there was still a genuine danger of foreign invasion, and in that event,
the nation would need every serving officer to fight. Instead, Jefferson was able
to use the war fever that followed the Chesapeake incident in 1807 to increase
the size of the army and “dilute” the Federalist influence. Jefferson and Dearborn
sponsored a bill that tripled the size of the army. Officer slots grew from 200 to
500. Five more infantry regiments were authorized, along with more cavalry and
light artillery. A total of 6000 more authorizations brought the army’s end
strength to about 9000.405
By the end of 1807 Jefferson had appointed over 60% of the new officers.
Meanwhile, over the president’s two terms, about 75% of former Federalist
officers left the service through retirement, death, or other reasons. The result
was that after 1808, almost 90% of the officer corps was Republican. Jefferson
came to rely upon this pool of loyal soldiers during the embargo crisis in 1808-09.
In a move that he would have deprecated in earlier years, he ordered the regular
army to replace state militias who were lackadaisically enforcing the embargo in
New York and Vermont. The fears of Republican ideologues came true in the
person of their party leader.406
In late 1808 Jefferson asked Congress for 50,000 volunteers and the
authority to use them as worries about war with England again loomed. As the
military establishment grew, the process of Republicanization continued. Cadet
authorizations grew from 42 to 200, giving Jefferson more opportunities for
patronage and further dilution of Federalist influence. Still, prior to 1812, about
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73% of West Point cadets were from the northeast, while the rest of the army
reflected a better balance of representation. William Skelton suggests that this
imbalance in West Point may have been due to the obscurity of the school in its
early years.407
After Jefferson left office, his successor, James Madison showed much
less interest in the military. Both Madison and his Secretary of War William
Eustis let both the army and West Point languish, which went a long way to the
army’s poor performance in 1812. Eustis disbanded the light artillery battery, and
doctrinal innovations likewise came to a halt before the war.408
The War of 1812, however, ensured the continued survival and influence
of Republican officers in the army. Following the war, Republicans in general
became more Hamiltonian in their economic policies, but other aspects of
Jeffersonian ideology persisted. Although Jefferson’s military legacy left much to
be desired, he was able to steer the army away from the danger of disloyalty,
mutiny, or threat of a coup. Despite his ideological aversion to a large military
establishment, Jefferson’s administration presided over a huge increase in the
size of the army by the end of his second term.409

Conclusion
Thomas Jefferson’s second term was a disappointment to him and to his
allies. But his handling of the dual dangers of the Burr conspiracy and the crisis
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with Great Britain point to his superior strategic understanding. In a time when
an unscrupulous man could concoct and put into motion an unlawful enterprise of
the magnitude envisioned by Aaron Burr, Jefferson’s wisdom in limiting the size
of the army and restructuring the officer corps to eliminate pockets of disloyalty
was crucial to the nation’s security. With the army’s senior officer, James
Wilkinson, in Spanish pay, a large, disloyal officer corps might well have
accomplished what George Washington forestalled during the Newburgh
Conspiracy: a coup against the government of the United States. Jefferson’s
even-handed but determined management of the military establishment
contributed to the defeat of such adventures.
It would be an easy matter to criticize Jefferson’s lack of preparedness to
deal with the international implications of the Napoleonic wars. He led or
acquiesced in Congress’ neglect of the navy in favor of building ineffectual
gunboats. Thus when the crisis with England deepened over the Royal Navy’s
impressments and interference with trade, the country had no means with which
to respond. Jefferson had, in effect, disarmed the nation in the face of
international aggression.
But the reality of the situation in Jefferson’s second term belies a simple
evaluation. The combined navies of France and Spain could not stand up to the
Royal Navy at Trafalgar, and it is absurd to imagine that the United States could
build, sustain, and man a navy large enough to make a difference. Federalist
pundits knew this and suggested that a small navy might at least act as a
deterrent to London’s predatory policies, but again this is unlikely. England’s
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survival depended upon a blockade of Europe and the uninterrupted manning of
the Royal Navy. America’s juvenile insistence on unrestricted free trade and
freedom from search, seizure, and impressment was simply not realistic. The
balance of power in Europe resulted in one block ruling the land and the other
the sea. Just as ancient Athens built her foreign policy around the need to
sustain naval superiority, so also Great Britain’s security depended upon policies
that did not accommodate America’s self-absorbed interpretation of sovereignty.
Conflict, then, was inevitable. Given the population, infrastructure, political
organization, and economic structure of the embryonic republic of the United
States, any American administration would have to deal with Great Britain from a
position of weakness. The war fever that erupted after the Chesapeake affair
could not substitute for a well-considered policy. Jefferson’s administration could
have ridden the tide of public opinion into a war that it could not win, but the
president judged that peaceful measures were more appropriate and safe. The
resulting embargo, for all its shortfalls and lack of decisive outcomes, prevented
disaster and distracted the people long enough for the immediate crisis to pass.
If the results damaged Jefferson’s reputation, they secured the country from the
devastation that might have ensued if war had broken out.
There was an apparent irrationality in Jefferson’s military policy, and it
worsened through the course of his second term of office. The president who
employed the United States Navy against the Barbary pirates more decisively
than either of his predecessors simultaneously oversaw the reduction and
marginalization of that same navy. The man who declared a large army a threat
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to liberty and unaffordable presided over the growth of that army and its use to
enforce civil law. The incoherence of Jefferson’s military policy stemmed from
his admittedly erroneous understanding of modern economics and an
exaggerated fear of Federalist ambitions. But his military misjudgments were
tolerable and most likely saved the nation from both domestic and foreign
disasters. In the end, Jefferson demonstrated a masterful management of
scarcity, weakness, and risk.
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EPILOGUE
Thomas Jefferson and History’s Might-Have-Beens

Once a year at Christmas, I watch Jimmy Stewart bumble his way through
It’s a Wonderful Life—a story about a man who learns what history would have
been like had he never been born. By the end of the movie, George Bailey
(Stewart) is transformed, and he sees his life and his decisions in a whole new
light.
I have it on good authority that historians should avoid discussions about
things that never happened. Speculation about possible permutations of
history—the fascinating “what-if’s” that amateurs and novelists sometimes delight
in—are anathema to the profession of history. Yet I can see no other way to
properly evaluate Thomas Jefferson, for he lived and governed at a true crossroad of American history. One does not have to be blessed with a gift of
prognostication to grasp the fact that without Jefferson’s leadership and ideas on
governance, the history of the United States would have been dramatically
different from what actually happened.
The election of 1800 had a direct and profound impact on the national
security policy of the United States. Twelve years of Federalist rule had resulted
in growing public debt, an unaffordable military establishment, and encroachment
on civil liberties through the Sedition Act. From his office as inspector general of
the army, Alexander Hamilton had been considering leading an army into Virginia
to resolve his political differences with Republicans there. To decide the
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electoral tie between Jefferson and Aaron Burr in 1800, hotheads from both
political parties contemplated the use of force. The country was inching closer to
insurrection and civil war.
Early 19th century America was populated with a generation of men who
had self-actualized in revolution. They had taken the greatest gamble of their
lives in plunging into a war for independence from Great Britain. But with the war
and their independence newly won, they now had the much more complex task
of deciding what new political form should emerge from the cessation of violence.
For two administrations, the Federalists had been in the driver’s seat. During
George Washington’s tenure, the reputation of the man himself kept at bay the
violence of the political conflicts that were brewing. But with Washington in
retirement, John Adams found himself beset by an active and hostile Republican
press, while his own vice president—Thomas Jefferson—pulled the strings.
Accusations, suspicions, and paranoia grew with each passing year until the
Quasi-War with France nearly tore the country apart.
When Thomas Jefferson became the nation’s third president in 1801, the
United States were anything but united. There were three distinct sections of the
country: the north, the south, and the west, and they each had conflicting needs
and priorities. There were two political parties—the Federalists and the
Democratic Republicans—but neither considered themselves a party, neither
thought of the other as legitimate, and neither could envision a future in which
party politics would become an accepted norm. Instead, the growing divergence
of government philosophies gave rise to mutual recrimination and accusations of
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treason. Within that context, influential men were easily seduced by
opportunities for power grabs.
It is a matter of record that Aaron Burr, James Wilkinson, William Blount,
and even Alexander Hamilton (to name a few) were engaged in unauthorized
dealings with foreign powers. The early 19th century was a time in which
honorable gentlemen would nevertheless plot against their own governments—
sometimes for money, sometimes for the sake of conviction. If such men had a
large army at their disposal, it is almost a certainty that their political
dissatisfaction would have transformed into military action inimical to the
Constitution they were all pledged to protect. The genius of Thomas Jefferson’s
national security policy was that no such attempted coup occurred. By managing
a balanced reduction of the army and navy and then later growing both
institutions when the need arose and their political loyalties were more sure,
Jefferson may have forestalled a violent shift in the course of American
democracy.
Recently I read a newspaper article in which modern scholars listed the
top ten worst decisions by American presidents. Jefferson’s embargo of 1807
made the list. Conforming to the traditional interpretation of the embargo, these
scholars deprecated the ineffective attempt at economic coercion against Great
Britain and pointed to Jefferson’s own frustrated attempts to enforce the embargo
against a growing popular insurgency against it.
But the odd thing about the scholars’ list is that they also criticize James
Madison for leading the nation into the War of 1812…and yet fail to perceive the
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inconsistency. Jefferson’s embargo was the instrument by which he avoided an
unwise war with Great Britain. In his own words, his options were “Embargo,
War, or Nothing” in response to the Royal Navy’s attack upon the USS
Chesapeake in 1806. This simple statement was fairly accurate. Jefferson and
the Republicans could have done nothing to protest England’s act of war…and
thereby suffered political shipwreck in the wake of the war fever that gripped the
nation. Alternately, they could have easily led the nation into war. But as
Jefferson perceived, it would have been a war they could not possibly have won.
By default, then, Jefferson chose embargo. Indeed, it was more a matter of not
choosing war.
Thomas Jefferson’s America was a weak nation whose ambitions far
exceeded its means. The threats against the survival of the United States were
many and serious, but Jefferson correctly saw that given time, the country would
prosper and strengthen. To purchase the time required, his administration would
have to accept less than optimal choices in foreign affairs. It would have been an
easy matter to let the depredations of the British, French, and Spanish lead to
war. But to gain anything from the blood spilt, the treasure spent, and the
political will lost in such efforts would have been next to impossible. The United
States lacked the means to project military power that could threaten London,
Paris, or Madrid, so American strategy would have remained essentially
defensive and indecisive. At worst, America could have been invaded or even
succumbed to internal dissension.
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Instead, Thomas Jefferson led the nation down a path of mediocrity. His
actions were indecisive, ineffective, frustrating, and uninspired. But America
survived and prospered, just as he had foreseen. There were no invasions, no
coups, no civil wars during his term of office. Later historians like Alfred Thayer
Mahan and Forrest McDonald, could bluster about the need for naval strength or
deprecate Jefferson’s marginalization of the military establishment, but they were
viewing the problem from the context of America’s later strength. Jefferson was
playing with a losing hand, and his best option was to minimize his losses so that
his country could survive.
From the trauma of two world wars and the subsequent Cold War,
Americans came to think of national security as synonymous with military
preparedness. By the turn of the twentieth century, the country was no longer in
danger of domestic insurrection or upheaval. All of the nation’s serious threats
lurked outside her borders. Hence, national security became an easily
comprehensible exercise in mobilizing and deploying the requisite military
strength to keep the enemy at bay. But in 1801, such was not the case.
Domestic threats to the Constitution loomed large, and in that context, Jefferson
was wise enough to perceive that military preparedness was at best a subset of
national security…and could even be inimical to it.
Jefferson was a man who favored balance over strength, endurance over
activity, and patience over passion. His handling of the war with Tripoli revealed
his impulses toward nationalism and justice on the one hand, but also his
restraint and appreciation for the need to balance ends and means on the other.

223

The old proverb counsels “nothing ventured, nothing gained”, but similar logic
dictates that if only little is to be gained, then only little should be spent. Since
the best that could be hoped for in a war with Barbary pirates was a temporary
peace and continued commerce on the Mediterranean, Jefferson rightly
concluded that a full-scale mobilization of a navy, let alone an invasion force,
would have been ill-advised. In the end, he led the nation to a victory within
acceptable limits in terms of blood and treasure.
In his dealings with Indians, foreign challenges, and domestic threats,
Thomas Jefferson pursued a wise, balanced course. If he fell short of aweinspiring victories, it was more because of the nation’s weakness than any policy
defects. If he failed to bring Britain or France to terms, he at least avoided defeat
at their hands. If he left the nation’s defenses in a state of incapacity, as many
historians have claimed, then he can also be credited with disarming any
potential Cromwells or Caesars. In the end, one of Thomas Jefferson’s greatest
accomplishments was what didn’t happen: the trauma of civil war did not strike
the United States until 1861. Had the passions that burned in 1800 have boiled
over into secession and war, there would have been no industrial north to
eventually succeed. Instead, when Thomas Jefferson left office, he handed over
to James Madison’s care a nation that was a bit more integrated politically and a
little more used to the idea of party politics. The issues that might have torn the
nation apart had been successfully deferred, and the threats from within and
without had been lessened if not defeated.

224

Bibliography

Primary Sources

American State Papers, Naval Affairs, I.
Annals of the Third Congress. Washington, 1794.
Cooke, Jacob E., ed., The Federalist, Numbers 4 (Jay), 5 (Jay), 8 (Hamilton), 13
(Hamilton), 14 (Madison), 16 (Hamilton), 22 (Hamilton), 23 (Hamilton), 24
(Hamilton), 25 (Hamilton), 26 (Hamilton), 28 (Hamilton), 29 (Hamilton), 30
(Hamilton), 41 (Madison), 45 (Madison), 69 (Hamilton), 72 (Hamilton), and
74 (Hamilton). Middletown, CN: Wesleyan University Press, 1961.
Fitzpatrick, John C., ed. The Writings of George Washington, 39 vols.
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931-44.
Ford, Paul L., ed., The Works of Thomas Jefferson in Twelve Volumes. New
York and London: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1904-1905.
Jefferson, Thomas, “Summary View on the Rights of British America”, 1774. The
Papers of Thomas Jefferson. Edited by Julian P. Boyd et al. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1950--.
Jefferson, Thomas, “A Declaration on Taking Up Arms” (2nd draft)
Lipscomb, Andrew A. and Albert E. Bergh, eds., The Writings of Thomas
Jefferson. Washington, D.C.: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association,
1904.
Lodge, Henry Cabot, ed., Works of Alexander Hamilton. New York: Federal
Edition, 1904.
Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers:
naval operations including diplomatic background from 1785 through 1801.
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1939.
Scott, Lieutenant General Winfield. Memoirs of Lieut-General Scott, LL.D. New
York: Sheldon & Company, Publishers, 1864.
Treaty Between the United States of America and the French Republic, Paris,
May 2 1803, Feb 15 2006,
http://earlyamerica.com/earlyamerica/milestones/louisiana/text.html.

225

Treaty of Peace and Amity, Tripoli, June 4 1805, Feb 15 2006,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/barbary/bar1805t.htm.
United States Military Philosophy Society. Minutes of meeting, 30 Jan 1808.
Washington, H. A., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson. Washington DC: Library
of Congress, 1854.

Secondary Sources
Abernethy, Thomas Perkins, The Burr Conspiracy. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter
Smith, 1968.
Adams, Henry, Albert Gallatin. New York: Chelsea House, 1983.
---

History of the United States During the Administration of Thomas Jefferson.
New York: Albert & Charles Boni, 1930.

---., The Formative Years: a history of the United States during the
administrations of Jefferson and Madison. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1947.
Addington, Larry H. The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century.
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984.
Allen, Gardner W., Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs. Hamden, CT: Archon
Books, 1965.
Ambrose, Stephen, Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West Point. Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966.
Anderson, Fred, Crucible of War: The French and Indian War and the Fate of
Empire in British North America. New York: Vintage Books, 2001.
Andreski, Stanislav. Military Organization and Society, 2d ed. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1968.
Appleby, Joyce, Thomas Jefferson. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2003.
Bailyn, Bernard, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. Cambridge:
The Belknap Press, 1967.
Banning, Lance, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978.

226

Boot, Max, The Savage Wars of Peace: small wars and the rise of American
power. New York: Basic Books, 2002.
Burnett, Edmund C., The Continental Congress. New York: The Macmillan Co.,
1941.
Brannan, John, ed., Official Letters of the Military and Naval Officers of the
United States. Washington: Way and Gideon, 1823.
Cerami, Charles A., Jefferson’s Great Gamble: The Remarkable Story of
Jefferson, Napoleon, and the Men Behind the Louisiana Purchase.
Naperville, IL: Sourcebooks, Inc., 2003.
Chandler, David, The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York: Scribner, 1966.
Clark, G. N. War and Society in the Seventeenth Century. Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press, 1958.
Von Clausewitz, Carl, On War. London: Penguin Books, 1984.
Corbett, Julian, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. New York: Longmans,
Green and Co., 1911.
Crackel, Theodore J., Mr. Jefferson’s Army: political and social reform of the
military establishment, 1801-1809. New York: New York University Press,
1987.
---

West Point: A Bicentennial History. Lawrence, KS: Kansas University
Press, 2002.

Creveld, Martin van, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present. New
York: Free Press, 1989.
Cunningham, Noble E. Jr., In Pursuit of Reason: The Life of Thomas Jefferson.
New York: Ballantine Books, 1987.
Dauer, Manning J., The Adams Federalists. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Press, 1953.
Deloria, Vine, Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto. New York:
Maximilian, 1969.
Doughty, Robert A., et al. Warfare in the Western World. Lexington, MS: D.C.
Heath and Company, 1996.

227

Dunn, Susan, Jefferson’s Second Revolution: The Election Crisis of 1800 and
the Triumph of Republicanism. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2004.
Earle, Edward Mead, Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought From
Machiavelli to Hitler. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943.
Edwards, Samuel, Barbary General: The Life of William H. Eaton. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968.
Ellis, Joseph J., American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jefferson. New
York: Vintage Books, 1998.
---

Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation. New York: Vintage
Books, 2002.

Fiske, John, The Critical Period of American History: 1783-1789. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1916.
Flexner, James T., George Washington in the American Revolution. Boston:
Little, Brown, & Co., 1968.
Fowler, William M., Jack Tars and Commodores: The American Navy, 17831815. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984.
Freeman, Douglas S., Washington. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1968.
Fuller, J. F. C., Armament and History: A Study of the Influence of Armament on
History from the Dawn of Classical Warfare to the Second World War.
London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1946.
---. The Conduct of War 1789-1961. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,
1961.
Grant, John, et al., West Point: The First 200 Years. Guilford, CN: The Globe
Pequot Press, 2002.
Gray, Colin S., The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies
in War. New York: The Free Press, 1992.
---

War, Peace, and Victory. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990.

Guerlac, Henry. “Vauban: The Impact of Science on War,” in Edward M. Earle,
ed., Making of Modern Strategy: military thought from Machiavelli to Hitler.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943.

228

Headrick, Daniel R. The Tools of Empire: Technology and European
Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century. New York: Oxford University Press,
1981.
Hickey, Donald R., The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict. Chicago: University
of Illinois Press, 1989.
Hirst, Francis W., Life and Letters of Thomas Jefferson. New York: The
MacMillan Co., 1926.
Harrison, Lowell H., Kentucky’s Road to Statehood. Lexington, KY: The
University Press of Kentucky, 1992.
Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State: the theory and politics of civilmilitary relations. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1957.
Jacobs, James R., The Beginning of the US Army, 1783-1812. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1947.
Johnstone, Robert Mr. Jr., Jefferson and the Presidency: Leadership in the
Young Republic. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978.
Kennedy, Roger G., Burr, Hamilton, and Jefferson: A Study in Character. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Klemm, Frederick. A History of Western Technology. New York: Scribner,
1959.
Kline, Mary-Jo, Political Correspondence and Public Papers of Aaron Burr.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.
Leach, Douglas E., Roots of Conflict: British Armed Forces and Colonial
Americans, 1677-1763. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1986.
Levy, Leonard W., The Causes of the War of 1812: National Honor or National
Interest? Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing Co., 1976.
Mahan, Alfred Thayer, Sea Power and its Relations to the War of 1812. New
York: Reprint Services Corp., 1905.
---

War of 1812. New York: Reprint Services Corp., 1905.

Mahon, John K., The War of 1812. New York: De Capo Press, 1972.

229

Malone, Dumas, Jefferson and His Time. Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1974.
Mayer, David N., The Constitutional Thought of Thomas Jefferson.
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994.
McCullough, John Adams. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001.
McDonald, Forrest, Alexander Hamilton: A Biography. New York: WW Norton &
Co., 1979.
---

The Presidency of Thomas Jefferson. Kansas City: University of Kansas
Press, 1976.

Melton, Buckner F., Aaron Burr: Conspiracy to Treason. New York: John Wiley
& Sons, Inc. 2002.
Millet, Allan R., and Peter Maslowski. For the Common Defense: a military
history of the United States of America. New York: The Free Press, 1984.
Montross, Lynn. War Through the Ages. New York: Harper, 1960.
Mumford, Lewis. Technics and Civilization. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1934.
Nock, Albert J., Jefferson. New York: Brace & Co., 1926.
Perkins, Bradford, Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805-1812.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963.
Peterson, Merrill, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1970.
Pope, Dudley, Decision at Trafalgar: The Story of the Greatest British Naval
Battle of the Age of Nelson. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1999.
Prucha, Francis P., American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Indian
Trade and Intercourse Acts, 1790-1834. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1970.
Remick, Norman T., West Point: character, leadership, education. Warren
Grove, NJ: RPR, 2002.
Roberts, Michael. “The Military Revolution, 1560-1660” in David B. Ralston, ed.,
Soldiers and States, Civil-Military Relations in Modern Europe. Boston:
Heath, 1966.

230

Ropp, Theodore. War in the Modern World. New York: Collier Books, 1962.
---. “Armed Forces and Society: Some Hypotheses” in David B. Ralston, ed.,
Soldiers and States, Civil-Military Relations in Modern Europe. Boston:
Heath, 1966.
Sears, Louis M., Jefferson and the Embargo. New York: Octagon Books, 1967.
Skelton, William B., An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps,
1784-1861. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992.
Slaughter, Thomas B., The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the
American Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Smith, Gene A., For Purposes of Defense: The Politics of the Jeffersonian
Gunboat Program. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1995.
Stuart, Reginald C., The Half-way Pacifist: Thomas Jefferson’s view of war.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978.
Thornton, Russell, American Indian Holocaust and Survival: A Population
History Since 1492. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987.
Tucker, Glenn, Dawn Like Thunder: The Barbary Wars and the Birth of the US
Navy. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1963.
Wallace, Anthony F. C., Jefferson and the Indians: The Tragic Fate of the First
Americans. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1999.
Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War: a history of United States
Military Strategy and Policy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973.
Wheelan, Joseph, Jefferson’s War: America’s First War on Terror, 1801-1805.
New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003.
Whipple, A. B., To the Shores of Tripoli: The Birth of the US Navy and Marines.
New York: William Morrow and Co., 1991.

Articles
Bauer, K. Jack, “Naval Shipbuilding Programs, 1794-1860”. Military Affairs, Vol.
29, Issue 1, Spring, 1965.

231

Ewing, C. M., “The Whiskey Tax and John Neville” (1930). June 15 2005,
http://www.whiskeyrebellion.org/legislat.html.
“History of the Russian Navy—The Black Sea Fleet”, July 23 2005,
http://www.navy.ru/history/.
Jackson, Donald, “Jefferson, Meriwether Lewis, and the Reduction of the United
States Army”. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 124,
No. 2, April 1980.
Leiner, Frederick C., “The Whimsical, Phylosophic President and His Gunboats”,
The American Neptune, Vol. 43, 1983.
Savage, James E., “Spaniards, Scoundrels, and Statesmen: General James
Wilkinson and the Spanish Conspiracy, 1787-1790”, Hanover History
Review [online journal], vol. 6, Spring, 1998, July 13 2005,
http://history.hanover.edu/hhr/98/hhr98_1.html.
Smith, Gene A. “A Perfect State of Preservation: Jefferson’s Dry Dock
Proposal”, Virginia Cavalcade, Vol. 39, Num. 1, Summer, 1989.
---

“Floating a Republican Idea: Jefferson’s Gunboats at New Orleans”, Military
History of the West, Vol. 24, No. 2, Fall, 1994.

---

“US Navy Gunboats and the Slave Trade in Louisiana Waters, 1808-1811”,
Military History of the West, Vol. 23, No. 2.

232

